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Abstract 
The last outbreak for Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in the United States (U.S.) was in 
1929.  Since that time the U.S. has not had any exposure to the disease or vaccination, creating a 
very susceptible livestock population.  The central U.S. has a large susceptible livestock 
population including cattle, swine, sheep, and goats.  The impact of FMD in the U.S. would be 
devastating.  Simulation modeling is the only avenue available to study the potential impacts of 
an introduction in the U.S.    
Simulation models are dependent on accurate estimates of the frequency and distance 
distribution of contacts between livestock operations to provide valid model results for planning 
and decision making including the relative importance of different control strategies.  Due to 
limited data on livestock movement rates and distance distribution for contacts a survey was 
conducted of livestock producers in Colorado and Kansas.  These data fill a need for region 
specific contact rates to provide parameters for modeling a foreign animal disease. 
FMD outbreaks often require quarantine, depopulation and disposal of whole herds in 
order to prevent the continued spread of the disease.  Experts were included in a Delphi survey 
and round table discussion to critically evaluate the feasibility of depopulating a large feedlot.  
No clearly acceptable method of rapidly depopulating a large feedlot was identified.  Participants 
agreed that regardless of the method used for depopulation of cattle in a large feedlot, it would be 
very difficult to complete the task quickly, humanely, and be able to dispose of the carcasses in a 
timely fashion.   
Simulation models were developed to assess the impact of livestock herd types and 
vaccination on FMD outbreaks in the central U.S. using the North American Animal Disease 
Spread Model (NAADSM), a spatially explicit, stochastic state-transition simulation model.  
  
Simulation scenarios with large vaccination zones had decreased outbreak length and number of 
herds destroyed.  Vaccination did not provide additional benefit to control compared to 
depopulation alone when biosecurity and movement controls were high, however the ability to 
achieve high levels of biosecurity and movement control may be limited by labor and animal 
welfare concerns. 
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Chapter 1 - Literature Review – Epidemiology, control methods, 
and predictive modeling of Foot and Mouth Disease  
 Introduction 
The Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) virus is a highly contagious RNA virus that has 
seven serotypes and over 60 subtypes.  It primarily affects cloven-hoofed animals, such as cattle, 
pigs, sheep, and goats.  Despite the low mortality, the economic impact of the disease is severe 
due to the decrease in production and more importantly the loss of international trade.  FMD is 
among the most significant diseases and can damage not only a national economy but also has 
significant global implications (Forman et al., 2009; Knight-Jones and Rushton, 2013).  It is 
endemic in much of Africa and Asia, and sporadic in South America. Countries currently free of 
FMD, like the United States (U.S.), take every precaution to prevent entry of the disease so it is a 
major constraint to international trade.  The U.S. has a livestock population that is naïve to FMD 
with the last outbreak occurring in 1929 (Graves, 1979).  In the U.S. the concern of FMD virus 
re-introduction and the potential economic impacts have risen with the increase of international 
travel of individuals, and trade of animals and animal products and the emergence of domestic 
and international terrorists groups that may desire to harm U.S. agriculture (Neher, 1999; 
Knowles, 2011; Yeh et al., 2013).  Additional concern with FMD is that the virus can spread 
rapidly through susceptible livestock populations prior to the appearance of clinical signs 
(Burrows, 1968b; Burrows et al., 1981) causing early detection prior to the spread of the disease 
difficult.   
A secure food supply is vital to the economy with U.S. farms selling $297 billion in 
agriculture products through market outlets in 2007 (USDA-NASS, 2007b).  Since FMD is a 
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foreign animal disease in North America, simulation modeling is the only avenue available to 
study the potential impacts of an introduction and is an essential tool to evaluate control methods 
(Bates et al., 2001; 2003b; c; Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003; Harvey et al., 2007).  Many disease 
modeling programs have been developed to simulate the spread of disease in populations.  
Epidemiological disease models are dependent on accurate estimates of the frequency and 
distance distribution of contacts between livestock operations to estimate disease spread and 
impact, and to guide control measures (Gibbens et al., 2001; Dickey et al., 2008; Premashthira et 
al., 2011).   
Control measures, such as, movement restrictions, increased biosecurity, depopulation, 
pre-emptive culling, and vaccination have been implemented to decrease the spread of the 
outbreak in various combinations (Ferguson et al., 2001a; Gibbens et al., 2001; Bouma et al., 
2003; Sutmoller et al., 2003; Perez et al., 2004; Pluimers, 2004; Yoon et al., 2006; Volkova et 
al., 2011).  Depending on the size of the outbreak, timeliness of the implementation, the 
workforce capacity, and the available resources, the control strategies will vary.  In the face of a 
FMD outbreak, well- informed decisions on the best control strategy will need to be made.  
 Foot and Mouth Disease 
 Etiology 
FMD virus is a member of the genus Aphthovirus in the Picornaviridae family.  There are 
seven immunologically distinct serotypes of FMD virus: O, A, C, South African Territories 
(SAT) 1, 2, 3, and Asia 1, and over 60 strains.  The serotypes are not cross-protective so the 
location of each is important however new strains occasionally develop spontaneously.  
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Additionally cross-protection between strains varies by antigenic similarity.  FMD virus 
serotypes and strains vary within each geographic region. 
 Distribution 
Type O, A, and Asia 1 are common throughout Asia and O, A, C have been found in 
Europe and South America.  SAT strains 1, 2, and 3 have been identified in Africa and the 
Middle East has had A, O, Asia 1, and SAT 1.  South America is a meat exporting continent that 
has worked hard to eliminate the disease but it is still found sporadically throughout the 
continent.  FMD is endemic in much of Africa and Asia.  Australia, North America, and Europe 
have been free for a number of years and New Zealand has never had FMD.   
 Pathogenesis 
All cloven-hoofed animals are susceptible to FMD virus.  The virus gains entrance 
though the respiratory tract or through abrasions in epithelium of, for example, the oral cavity, 
feet or teats (Sutmoller et al., 1968; Sellers and Parker, 1969; McVicar and Sutmoller, 1976).  
The clinical signs of the disease are vesicular lesions around the coronary band of the foot, 
mucosa of the mouth, and on the teats and udder.  Occasionally, the vesicles may occur on the 
vulva, prepuce, or pressure points on the legs.  Other clinical signs include salivation, lameness, 
fever, lethargy, weight loss, and anorexia.  The clinical signs can vary in severity based on 
species and strain of FMD.  Sheep do not develop as severe of clinical signs and often the 
disease can be misdiagnosed, for example, as ulcerations on gums due to grazing, orf, facial 
eczema, trauma, or foot rot (Ayers et al., 2001; Black et al., 2004).  Pigs typically have the most 
severe lesions on their feet with the first symptom being lameness progressing to ataxia and the 
shedding of claws (Yoon et al., 2012).  Cattle usually become febrile and develop lesions in the 
oral cavity and muzzle.  Frequent clinical signs in cattle are excessive salivation, nasal discharge, 
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mastitis and loss of milk production subsequent to teat lesions.  There are also reported 
differences in the strains.  For example in the 1997 Taiwan outbreak serotype O caused severe 
lesions in pigs but no clinical signs were seen in small ruminants or cattle (Dunn and Donaldson, 
1997; Yang et al., 1999) while in the U.K. 2001 outbreak serotype O caused clinical signs in 
ruminants (Sutmoller et al., 2003).   
FMD has high morbidity and low mortality in adults but in young animals a high 
mortality can be seen due to multifocal necrosis of the myocardium (Alexandersen et al., 2003).  
In countries with a naïve livestock population the virus can spread rapidly and be associated with 
high morbidity rates.  The incubation period of FMD is 2-14 days but is dependent on the strain 
of the virus, virus dose, route of transmission, animal species, and environmental conditions 
(Garland and Donaldson, 1990; Alexandersen et al., 2003).  The virus initially infects and grows 
in the pharyngeal area (McVicar and Sutmoller, 1976; Burrows et al., 1981) and has been 
isolated from secretions and excretions for 1-5 days prior to clinical signs and after the 
appearance of clinical signs (Burrows, 1968a; Sellers and Parker, 1969; Burrows et al., 1981; 
Donaldson, 1997).  In a more recent study, Charleston et al. (2011) found that cattle infected 
with FMD virus are substantially less likely to be infectious before showing clinical signs than 
previous studies had found, thus the likelihood of transmission may be dramatically decreased if 
control can be implemented just 24 hours earlier.  This would greatly increase the effectiveness 
of early response to control an outbreak; however, the estimates are contrary to previous research 
and should be cautiously applied.  Charleston et al. (2011) included only 8 pairs of cows to 
measure the transmission of a single strain of FMD virus so their limited observations need 
additional confirmation and may be consistent with the previous estimates.  Additionally the 
results of transmission of one strain of FMD virus cannot be inferred to all strains of the virus 
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(Kitching, 2005).  Inappropriate application of the results from this study in modeling may 
substantially underestimate the transmission of FMD and subsequently outbreak size and 
resource needs if they are not representative. 
 Epidemiology 
 Transmission 
The virus is spread commonly to susceptible animals by the movement of infected 
animals.  The susceptible animals are infected via inhalation of infectious droplets coming from 
the breath of infected animals (Sellers, 1971; Sellers et al., 1971b).  The FMD virus can also be 
transmitted through abrasions in the skin or mucosa.  Cattle and pigs may become infected with 
as little as 1 International Unit of the virus by injection (Burrows, 1966; Sellers, 1971).  The 
virus can be shed by nasal discharge, exhaled air, saliva, lesion tissue, urine, feces, semen, and 
milk and tends to drop quickly by day 5-7 after the development of clinical signs.  This coincides 
with the drop in virus titers and the first development of antibodies (Graves et al., 1971).  Cattle 
excrete the virus in milk for several days before the clinical signs of the disease become apparent 
but with the proper control methods such as pasteurization the spread of FMD in the milk can be 
prevented (Donaldson, 1997).   
Airborne transmission between farms without the movement of animals is not as common 
but can occur under certain climatic conditions.  Favorable conditions for airborne spread are a 
relative humidity of at least 55% and minimal mixing of the air by turbulence and convection 
(Alexandersen et al., 2003).  It is believed that large amounts of excreted infectious particles 
behave like a fine dust that spreads over premises and stick to fomites (Sutmoller et al., 2003).  
Plumes of the virus have been determined to disperse by wind over long distances (up to 60 km 
over land and 250 km over water) (Hugh-Jones and Wright, 1970; Donaldson et al., 1982; 
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Gloster et al., 2011).  Airborne spread between farms is not as common as direct contact or 
feeding of contaminated products but in ideal environmental conditions it is uncontrollable 
(Donaldson et al., 1982).  The airborne spread of the virus can vary due to susceptibility of 
animals, level of virus excreted by infected animals, and species (Sutmoller et al., 2003). 
FMD virus does differ significantly in transmission between infected animals due to 
difference in shedding of virus among species, serotype/strain virulence, and the timing of 
appearance of clinical signs (Kitching, 2005; Honhold et al., 2011).  Pigs exhale the largest 
amount of virus and are especially a concern for airborne transmission of the virus (Sellers and 
Parker, 1969; Sellers et al., 1971b; Alexandersen et al., 2003).  However, pigs require as much as 
6,000 Tissue Culture Infective Doses 50 (TCID50) for aerosolized infection (Alexandersen et al., 
2002a; Kitching et al., 2005).  Cattle as well as sheep are highly susceptible to infection by the 
aerosol route requiring only 10 TCID50 (McVicar and Sutmoller, 1968; Kitching, 2005).  Cattle 
on the other hand are the most likely species to become infected with the virus and are generally 
the first species to show clinical signs in an outbreak.  Cattle appear to be at a higher risk of 
infection because they have a higher respiratory volume than sheep (Kitching et al., 2005).  In 
comparison to swine, ruminants produce at least 3,000 times less aerosolized virus a day during 
the early clinical phase of the virus (Kitching et al., 2005).  The threat of aerosol transmission 
was demonstrated in 1981 when aerosol virus spread from infected pigs in France, across the 
Island of Jersey where cattle were infected, and then to an island off the coast of England 
(Donaldson et al., 1982).   
FMD virus also differs in transmission between strains (Kitching, 2005).  A study 
comparing three strains of FMDV in pigs, using controlled direct contact found that transmission 
took 14 hours longer for serotypes Asia 1 and O compared to A.  Additionally with Asia 1 
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serotype not all the contact pigs were infected after an 18 hour direct contact, exposure between 
infected pigs and naïve pigs (Pacheco et al., 2012).  In the field, a serotype O strain isolated from 
Kinmen Island in the Republic of China did not cause disease in cattle, a species that usually is 
very susceptible (Knowles et al., 2001a).  The difference among serotypes could have 
implications for control methods, vaccine testing, and disease modeling.  
 Dissemination 
The FMD virus can be spread between herds directly by movement of infected livestock, 
and through indirect contacts through people, or contaminated material such as equipment, 
vehicles, or clothing and by animal products (milk, meat, semen) (Cottral, 1969; Sellers, 1971; 
Gibbens et al., 2001; Fevre et al., 2006; Ellis-Iversen et al., 2011).  The movement of livestock 
has long been recognized as an important route of the spread of disease (Woolhouse et al., 2001; 
Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006; Velthuis and Mourits, 2007; Dube et al., 2009).  In 2001 a shipment of 
calves from Ireland led to a FMD outbreak in the West of France and the Netherlands (Sutmoller 
et al., 2003) and the 2001 U.K. outbreak spread throughout the country through the long-distance 
movement of infected sheep (Gibbens et al., 2001).  Indirect contacts have played a role in 
outbreaks as well, during the U.K. 1967-1968 outbreak, the movement of milk was found to be a 
major hazard in the spread of the disease (Dawson, 1970; Hedger and Dawson, 1970).  The 
movement of milk could cause further spread either through feeding infected milk to animals on 
another farm or through indirect contact of the milk tanker during connection to the bulk tank, 
dip stick measurement, displacement of air during tank filling, or vacuum-operated bulk tanker 
discharge systems (Dawson, 1970).  FMD has also been spread by the ingestion of contaminated 
fodder (Kitching et al., 2005), unheated waste food (Knowles et al., 2001b), and imported straw 
was implicated as the source of the 2000 outbreak in Korea (Sugiura et al., 2001).   
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The dissemination of FMD can vary by region or country due to differences in agriculture 
production systems.  Within the U.S. there are regional differences in production types, 
management systems, operation size distributions, distance distributions that make comparison 
between regions difficult.  Unfortunately due to the variation in both the number and frequency 
the contacts of similar farms, it is difficult to capture the livestock contact.  Some farms are 
highly connected with frequent direct and indirect contacts while others have very few contacts 
(Brennan et al., 2008).  In order to understand the possible spread of a highly infectious disease 
such as FMD, understanding the contact structure among animals and/or farms in a population is 
important including regional differences.  Often there is little knowledge of what contacts (direct 
and indirect) exist between farms.   
Some research has been done to better understand the contacts between farms but as 
expected results vary by region and by production type (Dickey et al., 2008; Ribbens et al., 2009; 
Tildesley et al., 2011).  The livestock industry is heterogeneous requiring livestock movement to 
be studied at the country or regional level.  Several countries such as the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Japan, Australia, and Brazil have implemented an electronic identification system to 
track the movement of livestock in order to have traceability within the food system.  These 
databases also enable researchers to study animal movements.  Other countries that do not have 
access to such a database must rely on questionnaires and surveys to livestock owners in order to 
understand the movements that occur in the industry.   
Countries with electronic livestock movement databases have data to develop networks 
of livestock movements and the connections between premises.  In the contact networks the unit 
of interest is the holding premises, and the relationship is the movement which produces paths on 
which infectious diseases can spread (Dubé et al., 2011a).  By determining the network structure 
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of a population you can determine a number of individual measures that may correlate with the 
risk of infection which is valuable in disease surveillance and control methods (Christley et al., 
2005).  This is important because a contact network with a short average path length will exhibit 
fast disease spread (Shirley and Rushton, 2005).  In a contact network a path length is the 
minimal number of steps that are needed to connect two farms.  The shorter the path length 
between two farms, the more likely one farm will become infected, should the other one already 
be infected (Kiss et al., 2006).  Additionally, the more movements between farms, the more 
opportunities there are to transmit disease.  Contact network analysis can be a useful tool for 
epidemiologists to gain a better understanding of livestock movements and the information also 
can be used to help parameterize disease spread models to produce more valid results.  
Countries that do not have access to livestock movement databases must rely on periodic 
survey information obtained from producers on the frequency of movements on and off farms to 
gain an understanding of the possible spread of FMD.  Studies conducted in New Zealand, the 
Netherlands, California, and Texas have identified and quantified these contacts with surveys.  
Due to the diversity of in the agriculture systems there are differences among the study regions.  
A study in the Netherlands found that on average 91 direct and indirect contacts occurred per 
farm for all types during a 2 week period with large numbers of individual pigs being moved 
(Nielen et al., 1996) compared to New Zealand where 50 contacts of people, animals, and 
materials were reported during a 2 week period (Sanson et al., 1993).  In two U.S. surveys the 
contacts were broken down by herd type to capture the variation in production systems in the 
regions.  In the Panhandle of Texas the average number of direct contacts was less than 2 direct 
contacts in a 2 week period for large cow/calf operations and large dairies.  The operation with 
the highest number of direct contacts was small feedlots (<1,000 head) with 14 direct contacts in 
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2 weeks (Ward et al., 2009; Hagerman et al., 2013).  A survey of producers in 3 counties in 
central California reported large dairies averaged approximately 9 direct contacts in a 2 week 
period.  Large swine operations in the same 3 counties in California had 9 direct contacts in a 2 
week period (Bates et al., 2001).  The indirect contacts also varied by production type and region 
in the U.S.  In the Texas Panhandle large feedlots with ≥50,000 head had the highest number at 
630 indirect contacts in 2 weeks (Ward et al., 2009; Hagerman et al., 2013).  In California, Bates 
et al. (2001) found that dairy calf and heifer ranches with ≥250 calves had the greatest number of 
indirect contacts at 284 in 2 weeks.  Dairy calf ranches in the Texas Panhandle study reported 70 
indirect contacts in a 2 week period.  Other differences in the indirect contacts by region existed 
among cow/calf, small ruminant, and backyard herds with the operations in the Texas Panhandle 
having a higher number of indirect contacts compared to the herds in the California survey.  The 
variability illustrates the complexity of understanding the possible spread of a FMD outbreak but 
also stresses the need for further region specific data collection.  Due to the regional differences 
among livestock operations and management practices in the U.S. predicting disease 
dissemination will require ongoing local data collection of contact relationships and premises 
type (Dickey et al., 2008). 
There can be seasonality in livestock movement patterns as well.  In Great Britain, 
September and August are intense trading months and if an epidemic would begin during this 
time it has the potential to be widespread and reach many different parts of the livestock network 
(Kiss et al., 2006).  In Scotland, spread of an infectious disease through livestock movements is 
low, but distinct cyclical patterns are present with peaks in May and August (Tildesley et al., 
2011).  With the seasonality of livestock movements there is also seasonality of indirect contacts.  
Survey results of California beef producers found a pattern of cattle movements from primary 
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premises to other locations at the time of cattle going to pastures for grazing.  This movement of 
cattle coincided with an increase in numbers of seasonal employees reported by some 
respondents.  An increase in movement of animals as well as an increase in indirect contacts 
could lead to an increased disease risk (Marshall et al., 2009).   
Furthermore, hubs, such as auction markets, within a network can play a key role in 
maintaining the connectivity of farms (Shirley and Rushton, 2005) and result in wide spread 
dissemination of infectious agents (Fevre et al., 2006).  McLaws and Ribble (2007) identified 
movements through auction markets as the most critical factor that contributed to the unusual 
magnitude of very large epidemics when studying 24 epidemics, between 1992 and 2003, in 
countries that had previously been free of FMD.  These results agree with a simulation study 
which demonstrated that only small outbreaks are possible in Great Britain without the 
amplification of an auction market (Green et al., 2006).   
In a survey of California beef producers, more than 40% of livestock movements were to 
an auction market (Marshall et al., 2009) and another study in 3 counties of California found that 
32% of the livestock sold at the auction markets were destined for a location ≥ 60 km away 
(Bates et al., 2001).  In the U.K., farms are also highly interconnected with very active auction 
markets that have large numbers of animals passing through (Kao et al., 2006; Volkova et al., 
2011).  In a contact network analysis of cattle movements in Great Britain from January 2002 
and December 31, 2004, Robinson and Christley (2007) found that 41% of cattle movements 
from single operation through an auction market were dispersed to between 2 and 4 different 
livestock operations.  Additionally it was found that cattle moved from a single operation as a 
group could be dispersed to up to 62 holdings on a single day.  The same study reported that 
movements through markets covered longer distances than movements that were farm-to-farm.  
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This would allow wide distribution of highly contagious disease such as FMD.  Auction markets 
are not the only hubs that can be within a contact network though.  Individual farms with 
frequent movements can also play a key role in the dissemination of an infection in livestock 
populations (Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006).   
The distance of movements also varies by region which can likewise lead to wider 
dissemination of a disease outbreak.  Surveys in both the Netherlands and New Zealand reported 
>50% of direct contacts were within 10 km (Sanson et al., 1993; Nielen et al., 1996).  The 
distance of movements though is more of concern in North America.  In Ontario, Canada dairy 
movements covered a maximum distance of 1417 km (Dube et al., 2008).  In a region of 
California it was found that dairies, dairy calf and heifer ranches, and large swine producers had 
frequent indirect contact with animals on other livestock facilities located at a distance of up to 
105 km (Bates et al., 2001).  A third of respondents to a beef producer survey in California 
reported that cattle were shipped to or received from other states, and a median value of these 
interstate movements was twice per year (Marshall et al., 2009).  Lastly in the U.S. it was found 
that cattle tend to be moved towards the center of the country (Forde et al., 1998) demonstrating 
the movement of cattle to the Midwestern states with a high density of feedlots.  With more than 
50% of the total U.S. sales of cattle and calves coming from Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and 
Colorado (USDA-NASS, 2007a), an introduction of a disease to this region would be devastating 
to producers as well as the local, state, and national economy. 
Finally, indirect contact spread may also occur through people.  Sellers et al. (Sellers et 
al., 1971a) found that after inhalation of virus-rich aerosols, FMD virus can survive in the human 
respiratory tract and be transmitted.  Later studies contradicted those results and found the 
transmission can be prevented if farm workers or investigators change into clean outerwear and 
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wash their hands, and no virus was found in the human respiratory tract (Amass et al., 2003; 
Amass et al., 2004).  Good biosecurity of workers and other people handling the livestock is 
extremely important in the prevention of the spread of FMD. 
 Persistence of FMD 
A further concern of FMD is the persistence of the virus.  The FMD virus can survive in 
milk and milk products, meat, frozen bone marrow or lymph nodes, and it can remain active in 
rich organic materials under moist cool temperatures.  However no outbreak has been attributed 
to heat treated milk products (De Leeuw et al., 1978).  Relative humidity levels of about 55%, 
cool temperatures, and pH range of 7.0 - 8.5 support prolonged survival in infected aerosols and 
on fomites (Sellers et al., 1971b; Donaldson, 1986).  The virus has been found to survive in straw 
up to 15 weeks (Cottral et al., 1960).   
Persistent or carrier cases of FMD have been observed where the virus was isolated from 
the pharynx at least 28 days after being infected (Alexandersen et al., 2002b).  Experimentally 
ruminants have been found to be carriers (Gaggero and Sutmoller, 1965; Burrows, 1966; 1968b; 
Sutmoller et al., 1968) with the African buffalo found to be a carrier of FMD for at least 5 years 
(Hedger, 1972; Condy et al., 1985; Hedger and Condy, 1985).  The only reports of transmission 
from carrier animals were to cattle in Zimbabwe (Thomson et al., 1984; Hedger and Condy, 
1985).  The reasons for lack of transmission are uncertain (Thomson, 1996).  The carrier period 
varies in length by species; cattle may be carriers for up to 12 months, and sheep and goats up to 
9 months (Condy et al., 1985).  Lastly the concern of spread due to a carrier animal has 
decreased after experimental data demonstrated that transmission occurs from carrier animals to 
susceptible animals at very low frequencies and currently in unidentified circumstances (Davies, 
2002). 
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 Outbreaks 
Outbreaks of FMD have occurred in every region of the world containing livestock with 
the exception of New Zealand (Grubman and Baxt, 2004).  In endemic countries, the disease has 
a low mortality rate but the frequency of outbreaks and the large numbers of livestock affected 
results in an ongoing high economic impact (Knight-Jones and Rushton, 2013).  In free countries 
the impact of a FMD outbreak would be devastating as well and is a constant threat.  Taiwan, 
after being free of the disease for over 68 years, had a FMD outbreak in 1997 that was estimated 
to cost $378.6 million (Yang et al., 1999).  In 2001 the U.K. had an outbreak after being free for 
34 years and the estimated number of productive animal lives lost was 8 million due to the 
number of pregnant animals that were culled (Sutmoller et al., 2003).  The total estimated cost of 
the 2001 U.K. outbreak was $6 to $10 billion (Anderson, 2002).  Shortly after the outbreak 
started in the U.K. it spread through the shipment of animals to the Netherlands.  The outbreak 
was much smaller compared to the U.K. outbreak but it caused infection in 26 herds and resulted 
in the depopulation and disposal of 267,992 animals on 2,763 farms (Bouma et al., 2003).  South 
American countries have had a continuous battle with FMD, and in 2000, Brazil had an outbreak 
resulting in approximately 11,000 head of livestock being depopulated followed by an outbreak 
in Uruguay in 2001 that cost $13.6 million to eradicate (Sutmoller et al., 2003).  Despite 
measures and controls in place many countries have been devastated by FMD leading to much 
research on control and eradication of the disease. 
 Control and eradication methods 
 Surveillance and Detection 
Surveillance programs are essential in early detection of a FMD outbreak.  The large 
magnitude of the 2001 U.K. outbreak has been attributed to having an estimated 57 herds 
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infected prior to the first case being reported (Ferguson et al., 2001b; Gibbens and Wilesmith, 
2002; Thompson et al., 2002; Haydon et al., 2003).  A similar delay in detection was seen in the 
large 1997 outbreak in Taiwan (Carpenter et al., 2011) and the 1951-1952 outbreak in Canada 
(Sellers and Daggupaty, 1990).   
In simulation models of FMD outbreaks in the U.S., surveillance leading to early 
detection has been found to be important to reducing the impact of an outbreak (Bates et al., 
2003c; Ward et al., 2009) and risk-based surveillance systems offers a more efficient approach to 
early disease detection and management of outbreaks (Kao et al., 2006; Stark et al., 2006).  The 
current program in the U.S. relies on recognition and reporting of clinical signs by producers, 
caretakers, meat inspectors, or veterinarians (Bates et al., 2003d) which is a passive surveillance 
program.  Countries with recent outbreaks such as the U.K., Taiwan, and Argentina at the time 
relied on the same method of surveillance (Bates et al., 2003d).  The concern with this method of 
surveillance is that the first observers of the animals must be able to recognize the clinical signs 
and the importance of reporting the disease.  This concern was demonstrated in a study of a 
possible FMD introduction at a state fair in California that found the disease would likely go 
undetected until after the animals had left the fair allowing for possible wide dissemination of the 
virus (Carpenter et al., 2007).  An alternative to the passive surveillance method would be to 
include testing for FMD in current active surveillance systems that collect and screen samples for 
various other diseases that affect livestock such as brucellosis and pseudorabies (Bates et al., 
2003d).  Due to the cost of an active surveillance program an approach is needed to determine 
disease priorities for surveillance based on risk.   
Tracing also plays a critical role in controlling an outbreak.  After an outbreak has been 
detected, tracing of all animals in contact with the infected herd is needed to prevent further 
16 
 
dissemination.  In a simulation model of an outbreak in the Texas High Plains, rapid and 
effective tracing accomplished in 2 days led to a reduction in the number of animals depopulated, 
animals under movement restrictions, and government control cost compared to scenarios with 
tracing accomplished in 10 days (Hagerman et al., 2013).  The relative benefit of a livestock 
movement tracing system was dependent on herd type in model results based on California.  
There was little benefit in early tracing from beef premises and swine premises, but substantial 
benefits with calf and heifer raising, goat, and sheep herds if the movements in the previous 10 
days could be identified in a single day of tracing (Mardones et al., 2012).  The same study found 
that electronic records were more effective for tracing than paper-based records.  A concern is 
that without an electronic animal identification system in place, accomplishing rapid tracing 
during an outbreak may be difficult in less than 10 days.  Furthermore in a California model a 
coordinated electronic national animal identification system program and a 48-hour traceability 
of all herds infected through animal shipments decreased the severity of a FMD outbreak 
(Mardones et al., 2012).  In addition to the constraints of not having electronic records, 
manpower constraints are a concern in the ability to have an effective and efficient tracing and 
surveillance program and delays could lead to increased infections (Mardones et al., 2012).   
Manpower constraints will increase if paper records are used to trace animal movements 
compared to electronic records due to the need for more people and additional time to 
accomplish the physical task.  In the U.K. 2001 outbreak, the lack of accurate movement data 
was one of the main obstacles to disease control in the initial stages (Gibbens et al., 2001).  This 
led to the establishment of an animal movement licensing system to record livestock movements 
for the movements of sheep, pig, and goats in addition to the existing cattle tracing system 
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(Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006).  Tracing is a possible critical area of control but in order to effectively 
utilize it organized and clear records will be needed. 
 Control methods 
Successful disease control requires good disease surveillance, rapid diagnosis, and quick 
intervention (Keeling et al., 2001).  Quick intervention with control methods, such as, movement 
restrictions, increased biosecurity, depopulation, pre-emptive culling, and vaccination have been 
implemented in various combinations to decrease the spread of the outbreak (Ferguson et al., 
2001a; Gibbens et al., 2001; Bouma et al., 2003; Sutmoller et al., 2003; Perez et al., 2004; 
Pluimers, 2004; Yoon et al., 2006; Volkova et al., 2011).   
Identified risk factors of an introduction of infectious diseases to farms by direct contact 
with livestock, include the contact with stray, purchased or brought-in-animals, and boarding or 
co-mingling with other herds (Sanderson et al., 2000; Van Schaik et al., 2002; Bates et al., 
2003b).  Consequently working to control the spread of infectious diseases with animal 
movement restrictions and strict biosecurity has been critical.  Studies have found that farmers 
will apply biosecurity measures if they consider them important/useful for their farms (Casal et 
al., 2007; Toma et al., 2013).  After the 2000 FMD outbreak in Korea, farmers were educated on 
the importance of good biosecurity in the hope of preventing further outbreaks (Wee et al., 2004) 
and despite an outbreak in 2002 improvements were evident.  Education is also needed in the 
U.S.  Despite high direct and indirect contacts feedlots have been found to have poor 
implementation of biosecurity and bio-containment (Brandt et al., 2008).  The effectiveness of 
biosecurity practiced on livestock facilities contribute to the size of a FMD epidemic both for 
livestock new to the herd prior to an outbreak being detected and after an outbreak to prevent 
further spread. 
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Movement restriction is also a critical control method in a FMD outbreak.  During an 
infectious disease outbreak like FMD the first goal would be to stop the movement of livestock 
in order to prevent widespread dissemination of the virus (Giles, 2001).  A simulation study of 
movement restrictions as a control method in outbreaks in the Netherlands found that the 
prevention of infectious contacts to other livestock areas by the implementation of movement 
restrictions resulted in a concentration of the epidemics in a particular area and in a reduction of 
the size of the epidemics (Velthuis and Mourits, 2007).  With movement restrictions however 
animal welfare has to be considered (Laurence, 2002).  During the 2001 FMD outbreak in the 
U.K. more than 6 million animals were culled for disease control or welfare problems resulting 
from animal movement restrictions (National Audit Office, 2005).  All herds under a movement 
restriction are potentially at risk for welfare concerns due to stopping direct and indirect 
movements.  Direct movement controls would certainly be a concern for swine operations that 
frequently are moving animals out of a barn to make room for the next group on a strict time 
schedule.  Indirect contact movement controls would also be a concern for swine operations as 
well as dairy and feedlots that frequently have feed delivered.  Due to the impact of movement 
restrictions on the agriculture industry, control methods must include multiple strategies and 
cannot rely on a complete stop of direct and indirect movements.   
In areas with high density of cattle and pigs farms, the disease might spread regardless of 
movement restrictions through the virus being aerosolized, so control measures against sources 
of infection, such as immediate depopulation of infected farms are also essential (Howard and 
Donnelly, 2000; Muroga et al., 2013).  Depopulation of herds reduces transmission by removing 
diagnosed and undiagnosed but infected animals while reducing the susceptible population 
(Ferguson et al., 2001a).  Additionally, pre-emptive culling of herds that have had direct contact 
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with a positive herd is generally considered a beneficial control method in the face of a FMD 
outbreak (Howard and Donnelly, 2000; Ferguson et al., 2001a; Morris et al., 2001).  The 
depopulation of infected herds and pre-emptive culling of all herds that had direct contact with 
the infected herds or ‘stamping out’ was the first FMD control program which was established in 
1892 in Britain (Sutmoller et al., 2003).  In addition to its successful implementation in Europe it 
was also used in 1929 in the U.S. and in 1951-1952 outbreak in Canada (Sutmoller et al., 2003).  
The strategy of ‘stamping-out’ was not successful however in controlling the 1946 outbreak in 
Mexico.  Despite assistance from the U.S., after 500,000 cattle and 380,000 sheep, goats, and 
pigs were depopulated there was out-cry from farmers (Machado Jr, 1969) halting the 
depopulation program.  Vaccination was initiated to control the outbreak and the last animal was 
vaccinated in 1950.    
 Control of a FMD outbreak in a country that has been free of the disease is initially 
implemented by depopulation of infected herds and all in-contact animals, movement 
restrictions, disinfection of infected premises, and intense surveillance (Kitching et al., 2005).  
However as was necessary in the 1946 outbreak in Mexico, vaccination is another control 
method.  During the 2001 Netherlands outbreak vaccination was also implemented to suppress 
the spread by vaccinating in-contact herds to gain time for pre-emptive culling (Velthuis and 
Mourits, 2007).  Vaccination can be used in an emergency and also prophylactically to protect a 
population against a future outbreak.  Vaccination without depopulation has been successfully 
used to eliminate an outbreak as was the case in the 2001 Uruguay outbreak (Sutmoller et al., 
2003), but it is more widely used in conjunction with depopulation of infected and in-contact 
herds (Davies, 2002).  The disadvantage of vaccination is the delay before protection of almost a 
week (Salt et al., 1998) and the potential increased length on time to return to free of FMD 
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international trade status due to the difficulty of distinguishing vaccinated animals from natural 
infected animals.  Due to international trade regulations countries that have World Health 
Organization (OIE) free of FMD status consider eradication methods such as depopulation only 
prior to initiating vaccination in the face of an outbreak.  To recover FMD free status after an 
outbreak has occurred one of the following waiting periods is required to regain the status or 
where vaccination is not practiced: 
1) Three months after the last case where a stamping-out policy and serological 
surveillance are applied 
2) Three months after depopulation of all vaccinated animals where a stamping-out 
policy, emergency vaccination and serological surveillance are applied 
Or, 
3) Six months after the last case or last vaccination, where a stamping-out policy, 
emergency vaccination not followed by the depopulation of all vaccinated animals, 
and serological surveillance are applied, provided that surveillance survey based on 
detection of antibodies to nonstructural proteins of FMD virus demonstrates the 
absence of infection in the remaining vaccinated population (Office International des 
Epizooties/World Organization for Animal Health, 2012).  
Despite some previous research finding vaccination protocols in the control of a FMD 
outbreak were not economically beneficial (Garner and Lack, 1995; Schoenbaum and Disney, 
2003; Elbakidze et al., 2009) it has been used to control outbreaks.  The 2010 outbreak in Japan 
resulted in 293 infected farms and nearly 300,000 infected animals, including vaccinated 
animals, being depopulated.  To control further spread, emergency vaccination was done in a 10 
km zone around infected cattle and pigs farms.  After vaccination had begun, the number of 
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detected herds detected per day decreased (Hayama et al., 2012).  In the 2002 outbreak, Korea 
also quickly implemented vaccination as one of the control methods and contained the outbreak 
in 30 days (Wee et al., 2004).  The Netherlands vaccinated animals in the face of the 2001 
outbreak also to slow the spread of the disease and followed with depopulation of all vaccinated 
animals to regain FMD free trade status (Pluimers et al., 2002).  In the U.S. the goal of the 
outbreak response will be to regain the FMD-free status but vaccination is included in guidelines 
to a FMD outbreak response for extensive outbreak.  The highest priority will be ensuring a safe 
food supply and business continuity for livestock producers (USDA-APHIS, 2012). 
Workforce capacity can limit the method and scale of disease control strategies (Morris et 
al., 2002).  Vaccination requires less time and labor than are needed for depopulation and 
disposal of the carcasses.  In the 2001 outbreak in the Netherlands the available workforce was 
not sufficient to provide adequate depopulation capacity (Bouma et al., 2003).  In the 1997 
Taiwan outbreak four major factors were reported as responsible for the rapid spread of FMD: 
inability to shut down livestock auction markets; long delays in depopulating the livestock on 
infected farms; high density of pig farms; and inadequate vaccine supply (Yang et al., 1999).  
The workforce needed for depopulation in a high density region such as the central U.S. is 
especially a concern. In a Texas Panhandle FMD exercise it was found that completing 
depopulation and disposal on premises within 72 hours and 96 hours, respectively, was not 
feasible due to the high livestock density (Texas Animal Health Commission, 2007).  The 
number of individuals available during an outbreak and the type of herds infected may play a 
role in determining the appropriate control methods implemented. 
Targeting high risk farms in control strategies could be beneficial in controlling the 
dissemination of FMD.  The heterogeneities in the contact patterns on farms and their effect on 
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the magnitude of Ro, imply that targeting interventions at farms contributing the most to Ro could 
be efficient (Volkova et al., 2010).  Mass vaccination targeting high risk herds or herds with a 
higher number of direct and indirect contacts could greatly reduce the potential for a large 
epidemic (Keeling et al., 2003).  Previous studies have found that large farms tend to have an 
increased risk of infection in the early stages of the epidemic.  In the later stages of the epidemic 
the number of large susceptible farms decreases faster than the number of small susceptible 
farms.  The large farms usually are located in areas with greater contacts and road density 
increasing their risk of infection as was seen in the 2001 UK outbreak (Ferguson et al., 2001b; 
Keeling et al., 2001).  Similar results were found in the 2000 Japanese FMD outbreak where 
medium and larger cattle farms were found to have a greater risk of infection by local spread 
than did small cattle farms (Hayama et al., 2012).  The proximity to infected herds also put farms 
at increased risk.  In a New Zealand simulation model of a FMD outbreak the probability of 
farms within 10 km of an infected premise becoming infected was higher than those outside 10 
km, suggesting increased monitoring for that distance would be beneficial in the face of an 
outbreak (Sanson et al., 1993).  In the same study, in order to stop 95% of the direct movements 
a movement control radius of 100 km would be needed around the infected premise (Sanson et 
al., 1993).  Control methods that target the high risk neighbors of an infected herd are critical 
despite variability among similar production systems (Keeling et al., 2001).   
In the U.S. there is a need for clarification of the role of vaccination during a possible 
FMD outbreak.  In a survey of experienced likely decision-makers in the event of an U.S. 
outbreak there was a lack of clarity regarding factors to consider before implementing a FMD 
vaccination campaign (Parent et al., 2011).  Some respondents in the study favored initiating 
vaccination early in the outbreak, others late in the outbreak, and one did not want vaccination 
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used as a control method.  This lack of consensus on the situations where vaccine would be 
considered useful and the criteria for a decision to implement it is concerning.  The criteria for a 
decision to implement vaccination is necessary in order to have a decision made in a timely 
manner, not delayed because of indecision or disagreement that could have been avoided.  A 
study modeling the impact of FMD vaccination as a control method in a region of California 
found that vaccination must be implemented quickly in order to have maximum effectiveness 
(Bates et al., 2003c).   
In the past the trade restrictions were in place due to the difficulty of distinguishing 
vaccinates and natural infected animals, and the concern of carrier animals.  This made re-
establishing freedom from FMD difficult.  Recently, the U.S has developed a vaccine that 
enables vaccinated cattle to be distinguished from those that were naturally infected with the 
disease (Anonymous, October, 2012).  Though not currently the case, such a vaccine could in the 
future make the depopulation of vaccinated animals unnecessary to regain trade status.  Recent 
research and outbreak experience highlight the need for re-evaluation of the pre-planning 
strategies for a FMD outbreak in order to optimize the response.   
 Disease simulation modeling 
 Simulation models 
Simulation models are valuable tools for evaluating potential disease spread, and the 
impact of control and eradication strategies (Garner and Hamilton, 2011; Mardones et al., 2012).  
Simple simulation models are easy to understand but are misleading if they do not appropriately 
represent the system.  For this reason, complex models have been produced to try and better 
represent the spread of infectious diseases.  Complex models also can be misleading though if 
they do not appropriately represent the system.  Deterministic models are used where input 
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parameters are specified by a single, fixed value.  For example, deterministic models may be 
useful for finding equilibrium points and predicted outcomes.  Stochastic models were later 
developed which led to a more accurate approximation of the epidemic wave (Bartlett, 1953; 
Bartlett, 1956).  Stochastic models allow for variation by using a distribution for the input 
parameter instead of a single value in the deterministic models.  Stochastic models may be used 
when parameter inputs are uncertain or variable so a range of possible values are included in the 
model as a probability distribution.  The probability distributions allow for a more realistic way 
of describing variability and uncertainty in variables.  Therefore, stochastic models generate a 
range of possible outcomes.  Due to this, the stochastic models also allow estimation of the 
distribution of the total epidemic size and duration, and provide the best guidance for decision 
making (Carpenter, 2011; Miller and Parent, 2012).   
Additionally, a simple model is non-spatial which assumes a random or homogenous 
contact relationship of individuals or herds without specifying any spatial location or relationship 
thus all units in the population are equally likely to interact.  For relationships that are 
geographically non-random or heterogeneous a spatial model is necessary to simulate more 
accurate results.  Modeling the spread of disease among herds located at fixed premises is an 
example of the need for increased spatial complexity to provide more realistic results because the 
probability of contact is related to the distance between farms (Carpenter, 2011).  Models that 
presume homogeneity among livestock contacts may underrepresent actual movement patterns 
(Bigras-Poulin et al., 2006) and underestimate the initial rate of transmission (Christley et al., 
2005).  Even small levels of spatial heterogeneity can have large effects on epidemic behavior of 
diseases (Andersson, 1997).  Spatial models reflect local spread of the epidemic better than non-
spatial ones, even early in the epidemic, most likely due to contact probability related to inter-
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farm distance and control methods coverage such as vaccination (Chowell et al., 2006).  For 
spatial models to produce the most accurate results, spatial locations must be known or 
accurately estimated in aggregate for use in the model (Tildesley et al., 2010).  For highly 
infectious diseases like FMD, transmission often occurs over relatively short distances so spatial 
structure of farm locations can play three roles: susceptible farms that are far from infected 
animals are at very little risk, local transmission and depletion of susceptible hosts can 
dramatically reduce the speed of the epidemic, and local control methods can be applied using 
proximity to infected animals (Tildesley et al., 2010).  
During the 2001 U.K. FMD outbreak three main disease spread models were used to 
support the response efforts (Ferguson et al., 2001b; Kao, 2001; Keeling et al., 2001; Morris et 
al., 2001; Kao, 2002).  Ferguson et al. (2001b) used an ordinary differential equation model that 
considers the number of farms in each disease state and the number of locally connected farms.  
The model assumes that all farms can weakly transmit the disease at random over long distances 
(Keeling, 2005).  Both Keeling et al. (2001) and Morris et al. (2001) models are stochastic and 
all farms were uniquely identified.  The Keeling model is simpler than the Morris model, using 
an approach that is relatively robust and facilitates better communication and understanding of 
transmission principles (Kao, 2002).  The Morris model which is the base of the InterSpreadPlus 
model (Stevenson et al., 2013) is a large, complex and flexible model that is capable of 
estimating the influence of many factors on spread of infection influenced by many factors 
(Keeling, 2005). The Keeling model, which is based on transmission kernels, was modified to 
support modeling and planning for future outbreaks.  The model concentrates on the spatial 
structure of the population considering farm size and livestock species as parameters affecting 
farm to farm susceptibility and transmission. The transmission kernel accounts for all 
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transmission mechanisms simultaneously and provides a function of risk of transmission versus 
distance to an infected farm. The transmission kernel is determined empirically by epidemic data 
(Kao, 2002; Haydon et al., 2003; Rorres et al., 2010).  It has been argued that once movement 
restrictions are in place the ‘proximity to the disease is the greatest risk factor for its secondary 
spread’ (Gibbens and Wilesmith, 2002; Bessell et al., 2008; Tildesley et al., 2012).  Additionally 
it has been shown that when local spread predominates, the qualitative ranking of the control 
methods is not sensitive to the quantitative details of transmission (Keeling et al., 2001). The 
model can be used to rapidly evaluate control methods when contact rates among livestock 
premises are not known.   
Additional disease spread models have been developed, Bates et al. (2003b; Carpenter et 
al., 2004) constructed a simulation model to predict the spread and control methods using spatio-
temoporal simulations involving the random sampling of each probability distribution within the 
model.  The results are output distributions from which statistics such as minimums, medians, 
and maximums can be obtained.  For each time step in the simulation, the model calculates the 
risk of exposure for susceptible herds and the number of contacts originating from infected herds 
by considering the location, size, and species of each herd (Bates et al., 2003b).  The North 
American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM) (Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003; Harvey 
et al., 2007), AusSpread (Garner and Beckett, 2005), and the previously mentioned 
InterSpreadPlus (Stevenson et al., 2013) are stochastic, state-transition simulation models also 
developed to study the spread of highly contagious diseases such as FMD.  The models require 
fixed locations, and contact rates, and contact distance distributions for herds that are dependent 
on the defined production type.  The model user establishes the parameters for transition between 
disease states (e.g. susceptible, latent, subclinical, clinical immune), direct contacts, indirect 
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contact, and airborne spread.  The control methods are user defined as well and can include 
quarantine, movement restriction, depopulation, forward tracing, backward tracing, pre-emptive 
culling, vaccination, and surveillance.  This requires substantial data to parameterize the model 
but allows for heterogeneous contact rates between herds and the results of the model can also be 
used to evaluate potential control strategies (Premashthira et al., 2011).  In comparison to models 
that use a transmission kernel the parameter set is more extensive but easier to understand, while 
the transmission kernel is less intuitively understandable. 
All models must be verified to ensure that the description of how a disease is spread in 
the study population has been translated correctly in the computer code (Reeves et al., 2011).  
Models that are used for decision making or scientific research should be expected to meet a high 
standard.  Once a model is verified, validation is necessary to determine if the model portrays the 
process that it has been designed to represent.  A model can be validated internally by making 
sure the outputs for the study population make epidemiological sense based on the parameters of 
the simulation.  External validity however requires real world epidemic data to determine that the 
model results are comparable to the outcome.  When epidemic data is not available for a country, 
it is necessary to determine how representative the simulation outputs are (Kelton and Law, 
2000; Dube et al., 2007).   
In order to validate and increase user-confidence in NAADSM, AusSpread, and 
InterSpreadPlus, relative validation exercises were done to compare the results and differences 
among the models (Dube et al., 2007; Sanson et al., 2011).  For example, the AusSpread and 
InterSpreadPlus models allow for active and passive disease surveillance where the NAADSM 
model does not allow for active disease detection, only passive surveillance.  Additionally 
NAADSM has no explicit way of including auction markets in the population however 
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InterSpreadPlus and AusSpread include the possibility of disease spread through the movement 
of animals through an auction for the purposes of non-slaughter sale.      
The first ‘relative’ validation exercise was to compare the outputs of the models produced 
by simulation of a series of relatively simple scenarios within a hypothetical study population. 
The models were found to have agreement in terms of the number of premises predicted to 
become infected, the temporal onset of the infection, and the spatial distribution of infected 
premises despite there being statistical differences among model outputs (Dube et al., 2007).  
The second ‘relative’ validation exercise was to compare the models using more complex 
scenarios based on real farm data and actual livestock movement data (Sanson et al., 2011).  
There was consistency in the models’ outputs in the between scenario comparisons.  In all the 
models the early use of ring vaccination resulted in the largest drop in number of infected 
premises compared to depopulation only scenarios.  There were differences though in size of the 
outbreaks.  The NAADSM model tended to have the larger outbreaks.  One possible reason for 
this is in the AusSpread and the InterSpreadPlus models, infected but not yet detected herds 
could still send animals to detected premises, although they had no effect on the recipient herd’s 
status.  In contrast, the NAADSM model always selects non-detected herds to receive 
movements, this could lead to an increase in disease transmission which produces larger 
outbreaks (Sanson et al., 2011).  The exercises did demonstrated consistency among the models 
which increases user-confidence in them.     
Models have been used to predict the spread and control of disease as well as aid decision 
makers in evaluating control strategies of a FMD outbreak if it were introduced to a naïve 
population (Howard and Donnelly, 2000; Ferguson et al., 2001a; Gibbens et al., 2001; Keeling et 
al., 2001; Bates et al., 2003c; Garner and Beckett, 2005; Ward et al., 2009; Tildesley et al., 
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2012).  However the first use of models to make farm-by-farm real time decisions during an 
outbreak was in the 2001 U.K. FMD epidemic and the use of models has been criticized due to 
out-of-date parameters, poor quality data, and poor epidemic knowledge (Eddy, 2001; Green and 
Medley, 2002; Taylor et al., 2004; Kitching et al., 2006; Mansley et al., 2011).  Despite the 
concerns of the use of disease spread simulation models and the recognized deficiencies of them 
there is value in studying the results in order to gain a perspective on disease control and 
prevention options but not for tactical decision making (Keeling, 2005; Miller and Parent, 2012).   
A hindrance in modeling is the lack of parameters for the model including good 
demographic data, patterns and rates of animal, vehicle, and personnel movement (Woolhouse 
and Donaldson, 2001; Taylor, 2003; Miller and Parent, 2012).  Despite the increased user-
confidence in the models in order to have output that will be realistic for a region, reliable input 
parameters that are representative for the study population are necessary (Dubé et al., 2011b).  
Precise farm locations are not available in the U.S. but aggregate farm statistics are and models 
with aggregated data can play a role in informing policy decisions (Tildesley et al., 2010). 
Quantitative simulation models are also dependent on accurate estimates of the frequency and 
distance distribution of contacts between livestock operations to estimate disease spread and 
impact and to guide intervention plans (Spedding, 1988; Gibbens et al., 2001; Taylor, 2003; 
Harvey et al., 2007).  Models based on expert opinion have inherent limitations (Ward et al., 
2009) and responses from experts are highly variable leading to wide and flat probability 
distributions (Bates et al., 2003b).  Modeling contacts between premises for the different regions 
will require ongoing local data collection of contact relationships and the type of premise 
(Dickey et al., 2008). A lack of data on the contact network when modeling an infectious disease 
like FMD leads to simplification of local and long-distance spread (Gerbier et al., 2002).  
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Epidemiological models can also be parameterized with historical data or data from past 
outbreaks to be used as a tutoring tool and for solving problems (Kitching et al., 2005).  Again a 
model’s results will depend largely on the parameters within it.   
Models are important for policy decisions prior to an epidemic (Keeling, 2005).  After the 
development of a model, validation is necessary to ensure that the model provides an adequate 
illustration of the process it is designed to represent by making biological sense, mimicking real 
life, not being overly sensitive to the influence of uncertain parameters as well as fitting the use 
for which it was designed (Taylor, 2003).  A validated model can play an important role in 
defining policy in disease control strategies but collaboration with veterinarians, disease 
modelers, and epidemiologists is necessary to continue to the improve the models’ accuracy.   
 Foot and Mouth Disease predictive modeling 
Several models have been used to evaluate the spread of FMD (Keeling et al., 2001; 
Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003; Garner and Beckett, 2005; Beckett and Garner, 2007; Harvey et 
al., 2007; Kobayashi et al., 2007; Sanson et al., 2011; Stevenson et al., 2013).  The aim of 
modeling FMD is to gain a better understanding of the behavior of an epidemic and to evaluate 
the effectiveness of control methods (Gerbier et al., 2002; Bates et al., 2003c; Carpenter, 2011).     
In order to improve the contact parameters for epidemiological models of FMD, which 
frequently has been based on expert opinions and questionnaires (Schoenbaum and Disney, 
2003; Dickey et al., 2008; Ribbens et al., 2009; Ward et al., 2009), The Bates et al. (2001) 
contact rates where used in later studies modeling the spread of FMD and impact of control 
methods (Bates et al., 2003b; c).  In the 3 county region of California, results demonstrated that 
pre-emptive culling of herds with highest risk for exposure and vaccination of all animals in a 
specified radius from an infected herd decreased the size and duration of the outbreak compared 
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with a no vaccination strategy (Bates et al., 2003c).  An economic analysis of the same region 
found that the cost of a FMD epidemic could range from $4.3 million to $3.5 billion (Bates et al., 
2003a) highlighting the need for further research on surveillance and control methods.  
Following the 2001 FMD outbreak in the U.K., a model was developed to predict the 
impact of an outbreak in France (Le Menach et al., 2005).  The model indicated a FMD epidemic 
in France may be largely dependent on the location, size, and species type of the initially infected 
farms (Le Menach et al., 2005).  When there were high density cattle or sheep farms, the disease 
was transmitted quickly which highlighted the need for accurate farm location data.  The study 
also found that pre-emptive culling and ring vaccination had the greatest impact on the reducing 
the disease duration (Le Menach et al., 2005). 
When modeling alternative control methods in three regions in the U.S. in the face of a 
FMD outbreak, Schoenbaum and Disney (2003) compared the epidemiological and economic 
impact of 72 different scenarios.  The three regions in the study population were a county in 
south-central U.S., a county in north-central U.S., and a county in the western U.S.  The three 
counties were chosen due to the demographic diversity of the U.S. in hopes of representing the 
U.S. agriculture systems.  They found that the appropriate control strategy depended on the 
county due to herd demographics and the contact rate between herds.  Pre-emptive culling and 
ring vaccination decreased the duration of the outbreak, consistent with other research (Bates et 
al., 2003c; Le Menach et al., 2005).  Schoenbaum and Disney (2003) also found that even with 
the increased expense of higher capacity vaccination and depopulation the decrease in the 
duration of the outbreak decreased the overall cost of the outbreak.  Similar results from a model 
based on an intensive livestock region of Australia found that when FMD spreads rapidly 
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vaccination may be cost effective due to the available resources being insufficient for 
depopulation alone (Abdalla et al., 2005).   
Epidemiological modeling has also been used to assess legislative decisions on FMD 
control methods in Spain.  A simulation model of the spread of an FMD epidemic in the Castile 
and Leon region of Spain found depopulation in conjunction with vaccination to be beneficial 
but in smaller zones than those legislated.  Depopulation and vaccination of premises within a 
radius of < 1 km and <3 km, respectively, around infected herds significantly decreased the 
number of infected herds compared to the legislated radius of <3 km and <5 km (Martínez López 
et al., 2010).  Vaccination was further studied in Europe by Backer et al. (2012) and the model 
suggested that vaccination may effectively control an epidemic as quickly as pre-emptive ring 
culling in a densely populated livestock area in the Netherlands.  
Differences in model output are expected due to the regional differences in the 
agricultural industry and the associated differences in contact parameters, limited geographic 
model regions/populations and the subsequent limited opportunity for spread in models.  A study 
of the spread of FMD in the livestock dense region on the Texas Panhandle did not find 
vaccination advantageous in controlling the outbreak (Ward et al., 2009).  The study control 
strategies included an emergency 5 km ring vaccination and a targeted vaccination of high risk 
herds.  The results of the model indicated that even with adequate vaccine supply, it did not offer 
any advantage as a control method.  Ward et al. (2009) also found that the number of herds 
depopulated was associated with the production type of the initially infected herd.  More herds 
were depopulated when the initial herd infected was a large feedlot compared to the initial herd 
being a herd with ≥100 adult beef cows.  In another study in California looking at the impact of 
the initially infected herd the mean duration of outbreaks beginning in dairy herds was 
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significantly longer than for outbreaks beginning in beef herds (Pineda-Krch et al., 2010).  This 
indicates that initial herd could have great impact on the outbreak size but it would vary by 
regional agricultural systems.  Regional differences do occur in the results but limited geographic 
model populations are important to consider.  Both Ward et al., (2009) and Pineda-Krch et al., 
(2010) assume that all movements would be contained to the study region during an outbreak.  In 
reality direct and indirect contact movements outside the study region could lead to additional 
outbreaks outside the model population leading to an extended outbreak and potentially different 
outcomes.   
Due to the limited number of validated simulation models, the ability to use them in 
countries they were not developed for is advantageous; however country specific data is needed 
to appropriately parameterize the models.  Tildesley and Keeling (2008) evaluated the use of the 
kernel transmission model in Denmark and found that the transmission kernel used in the U.K. 
was not applicable to Denmark.  The difference in types and density of livestock was found to 
greatly influence the control methods recommended by the model.  The model was also used to 
evaluate control methods in Pennsylvania (Tildesley et al., 2012).  The study was conducted to 
determine if the kernel transmission model could be useful in the U.S. where there is a lack of 
direct and indirect contact data available.  The transmission kernel used in the study was derived 
from a U.K. FMD outbreak where the farm density was high so it was necessary to apply it to a 
region of the U.S. that had a similar farm density.  In addition to having a similar density of 
farms, Pennsylvania also had similar farm sizes to the U.K.  The model demonstrated that the 
transmission kernel that was sufficient to cause an extensive outbreak in the U.K. was not 
sufficient in Pennsylvania.  A possible reason for this is that the density of the farming areas 
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between the two regions is similar however there are more farms in the U.K. and approximately 
twice the land area.  
Due to the structural complexity and heterogeneity of contacts, models that include 
regional contact rates may be more effectively adapted.  Both NAADSM (U.S.) and 
InterSpreadPlus (New Zealand) have been successfully modified to regions other than the ones 
for which they were developed.  InterSpreadPlus was used to re-create the 2002 FMD epidemic 
in Korea and the model demonstrated its ability to represent a real epidemic (Yoon et al., 2006).  
NAADSM has been used in South America to evaluate outbreaks and improve the model (Rivera 
et al., 2009) but further validation is needed.   
Predictive epidemiological disease models have been used to estimate the potential 
economic impacts of an outbreak as well.  Pendell et al. (2007) estimated economic losses of an 
outbreak confined to Kansas ranged from $43 to $706 million depending on the type of livestock 
herd that was initially infected.  In an economic model of the impact to the entire U.S., Paarlberg 
et al.(2002) estimated that a FMD outbreak could decrease U.S. farm income by approximately 
$14 billion and in 2012 it was estimated that an outbreak originating from the proposed National 
Bio- and Agri-Defense Facility in Kansas could exceed $100 billion in costs (NBAF, 2012).  In 
all scenarios an outbreak of FMD would have a drastic effect on the agriculture industry and the 
U.S. economy. 
 Conclusion 
FMD is an infectious disease found in cloven-hooved animals in many parts of the world.  
The disease is highly contagious and can spread through the movement of animals, equipment, 
people, waste, and through the air in certain conditions.  The ability of FMD to spread prior to 
clinical signs makes rapid intervention critical but difficult.   
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With the devastating economic impact of FMD, control and eradication are important 
aspects and need to remain a focus of research.  Even with many outbreaks every year 
throughout the world, published research on the outbreaks and the control methods that were 
used is limited.  Additionally with the advances in the development of a FMD vaccine which 
allows for differentiation of vaccinated animals from infected animals highlights the need for re-
evaluation of OIE trade regulations.  Currently the data is lacking on the impact of vaccination as 
a control strategy in all regions of the U.S.  Further the workforce and vaccine dose requirements 
necessary to carry out vaccination as a control method are uncertain.   
Epidemiological simulation modeling has been used to assess control methods in 
countries that are currently free of the disease.  As with all models there are limitations to the 
results based on the quality of the data that is used to parameterize them.  The regional 
differences in livestock contact and the movement through auction markets require continued 
research to generate region and production type specific rates.  Currently there is a gap in 
livestock contact data for the U.S. with the exception of limited data available for California and 
the Panhandle region of Texas.  Any model will depend for its legitimacy on the accuracy on the 
data supporting it.  The limited livestock contact data leads to uncertainty in outcomes and 
identification of control policies in the U.S. as well as the inability to assess resource needs of 
possible control strategies in the face of an FMD outbreak.  Additionally, in order to increase the 
user-confidence of the results of the model, further research is needed on model validation.  
Validation exercises comparing the NAADSM, InterSpreadPlus, and AusSpread have 
demonstrated the value of the models and have been beneficial in validating the models however 
further validation using outbreak data is needed.  Every opportunity should be taken to 
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parameterize these models for countries that have suffered recent outbreaks and compare the 
model output to the actual outbreak.    
In the U.S., models have been used to predict the impact of a FMD outbreak and guide 
control plans.  The models are regional due to the differences in livestock production throughout 
the country.  Further research and model development is needed to expand simulation model 
results to the entire U.S. while allowing for the regional differences of animal movements.  The 
economic impact of FMD is too great to not continue to improve simulation models and the data 
used to parameterize them.
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 Abstract 
Objective — To characterize direct and indirect contacts among livestock operations in 
Colorado and Kansas. 
Design — Quarterly questionnaire. 
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Sample Population — 532 livestock producers in Colorado and Kansas. 
Procedures — A quarterly questionnaire distributed to livestock producers in Colorado and 
Kansas from January 2011 through December 2011.  Data from completed questionnaires were 
entered manually into an electronic format and statistically summarized  
Results — Direct outgoing contacts were highest among large swine operations for all quarters.  
Dairy operations moving cattle to auction and other dairy operations had the next highest number 
of direct outgoing contacts.  Mean daily incoming direct contact rates were highest for large 
feedlots and dairies.  The yearly indirect contact for large feedlots exceeded 750 per year each 
from feed trucks, livestock haulers, and manure haulers.  Dairy operations averaged over 400 
indirect contacts per year primarily from milk trucks, 283 from manure haulers, and 150 from 
feed trucks. 
Conclusions and Clinical Relevance — High rates of direct contact among large swine 
operations may represent risk for direct transmission of disease predominantly within the 
integrated swine system.  The high number of indirect contacts in a year as well as high rate of 
incoming direct contacts from auctions and small feedlots put large feedlots at substantial risk for 
introduction of disease.   
These direct and indirect contact rates of producers in Colorado and Kansas will be useful 
for establishing and evaluating policy and biosecurity guidelines for producers and for sources of 
indirect contact among livestock producers.  They also can be used to inform efforts to model 
transmission and control of infectious diseases such as Foot and Mouth Disease. 
60 
 
 Introduction 
 The central United States (U.S.) has a relatively high concentration and a diverse range of 
livestock operations.  These herds are susceptible to a broad range of diseases transmitted by 
both direct and indirect contact between herds.  Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is a highly 
contagious infectious disease that affects cloven-hoofed animals and is endemic in parts of Asia, 
Africa, and South America.  The FMD virus can spread rapidly through susceptible livestock 
populations prior to the appearance of clinical signs1-2 causing early detection, prior to the spread 
of the disease, to be difficult.  FMD has not occurred in the U.S. since 1929 and no vaccination 
has been practiced, resulting in a fully susceptible livestock population.  Due to the 
susceptibility, diversity and the large scale operations in this region an introduction of FMD 
would be economically devastating.  Recent estimates place the cost of an FMD introduction into 
the United States at $14 billion, causing a 9.5% decrease in farm income3.  An epidemiological 
disease spread model to determine the economic impact of FMD in southwest Kansas found that 
the economic loss on the local economy would be about $35 million4.  With more than 50% of 
total U.S. sales of cattle and calves coming from five states in the central US,5 the introduction of 
a highly infectious disease, like FMD, would be damaging to the entire region. 
 The FMD virus can be spread between herds by movement of infected animals (direct 
contact), and through indirect contacts such as vehicles, people, or contaminated material6-7.  In 
outbreaks of FMD in the United Kingdom in 2001 and 2007, transmission was attributed to both 
direct and indirect contacts8-9. 
 Since FMD is a foreign animal disease in North America, simulation modeling is the only 
avenue available to study the potential impacts of a potential introduction in the U.S.10-14.  
Quantitative simulation models like these are dependent on accurate estimates of the frequency 
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and distance distribution of contacts between livestock operations to estimate disease spread and 
impact and to guide intervention plans15-16,8,14.  Limited data exist in the U.S. regarding livestock 
movement rates and distance distributions for both direct and indirect contacts.  Bates et al.10 
reported contact rates among livestock operations within a three-county region of California and 
Marshall et al.17 reported contact rates among beef producers in California, however no data 
exists for livestock in the central U.S.   
The direct contacts of livestock operations are important in predicting the spread of FMD 
because the virus can be transmitted prior to the development of clinical signs1-2.  The direct 
contacts between farms were the major route of the initial spread of the FMD outbreak in the 
U.K. in 2001.  After livestock movement restrictions around infected premises and closure of 
markets were in place the virus was spread mainly through the indirect contacts8 indicating that 
livestock movement controls were not sufficient to control disease spread. 
With the increased concern of foreign animal disease introduction as well as the changing 
dynamics of the livestock industry further research is needed to estimate the contact rates18,19 and 
possible spread of diseases among livestock operations.  The objective of this paper is to report 
the findings from a study conducted to estimate contact rates and contact distance distributions in 
the central U.S. and to improve the accuracy of contact parameters used in disease spread 
modeling using a survey among livestock operations.  
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 Materials and Methods 
 Study region 
 Colorado and Kansas were selected as the region to collect survey data.  These states 
were selected because they represent livestock operations and management in the central region 
of the U.S.      
 Sampling frame and selection of participants 
 To develop the livestock contact survey mailing list, producer lists were generated for 
beef cattle, dairy cattle, swine, and small ruminant through communication with livestock 
producer groups in Colorado and Kansas.  Groups included the Kansas Livestock Association 
(KLA), Colorado Livestock Association (CLA), Colorado Cattlemen’s Association (CCA), 
Kansas Pork Association (KPA), Kansas Sheep Association (KSA), Colorado Wool Growers 
Association (CWGA), Kansas Meat Goat Association (KMGA), and Kansas Farm Bureau 
(KFB).  All members of the KLA, CCA, KPA, KSA, CWGA and the KMGA were sent letters of 
invitation to participate in the survey on their respective association letterhead except for KPA 
and CLA which elected to use Kansas State University and Colorado State University letterhead 
respectively.  The KFB included a column about the survey in their electronic newsletter and 
provided information on their website. Additionally an article was published in the Western 
Dairy Newsletter20, focusing on FMD and introducing the study.  Further publicity was 
generated through web site announcements, and extension e-mails.  A Livestock Contact Survey 
website was developed and publicized providing more information for producers about the 
survey as well as an electronic sign-up form.  In order to reach as many producers as possible, in 
Colorado, flyers were distributed at two large auction markets, the National Western Stock 
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Show, Dairy Day, and through 4-H extension agents throughout the state; personal visits to 
sheep, goat, and cattle producers in Northern Colorado were made accompanied by a private 
veterinarian.  In Kansas, invitation letters to participate in the survey were mailed to operations 
in Kansas with a Confined Animal Feeding Permit, operations that received a commodity milk 
payment, and members of the Local Harvest organization, an organization of farmers selling 
their products directly to the public.  The KLA sent out 3,650 letters, the KPA 460, the CCA and 
CWGA 1,615, and an additional 2,000 were sent out from the remaining lists.  Duplication of 
invitation letters was highly likely due to sending out through multiple organizations and 
mailings.  Producers were asked to volunteer to participate in the survey by returning a postcard 
with their name and preferred communication information.  To ensure that information collected 
during the study remained anonymous, communication information and survey responses were 
kept separate throughout the study.   
 Survey questionnaire  
A six page questionnairea was developed to collect contact data from producers.  The 
questionnaire was mailed to six producers in Colorado and Kansas to pre-test it for clarity.  After 
the suggested revisions were made, the questionnaire was sent electronically or by surface mail, 
based on cooperator preference, to all enrolled participants.  The mailings included a cover letter, 
the 6-page questionnaire, and a postage paid return envelope.  For the participants that requested 
to receive the questionnaire via email a cover letter was attached to the email along with the 
questionnaire.  Four quarterly surveys were sent to all participants in March, June, September 
and December to capture variation in movement throughout the year.  A reminder email or 
postcard was sent to non-responders approximately four weeks after the survey was sent.  
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Approval for this survey was obtained from the Kansas State and Colorado State University 
Review Boards for Research Involving Human Subjects.  
 Classification of type of operation 
 Participants in the survey were asked the current number and type of livestock at the 
operation as well as the primary type of operation.  Participants who returned a survey but did 
not own any cattle, pigs, or small ruminants were not used in the survey analysis.  Some 
participants selected more than one type of operation, so a classification system was used to 
assign a production type to all participants. Survey participants were placed into 9 operation 
types based on the description of operation chosen on the survey and type and number of 
livestock in the operation.  Operation types were classified based on types of contacts with in the 
livestock production system. So for example large and small feedlots were separated to represent 
backgrounders and finish feedlots which fit into a different place in the production chain so types 
of contacts may be different; large swine are likely part of an integrated swine business so 
behavior is different than small swine operations.  Cow/Calf operations included all operations 
that described their operation as commercial cow-calf or beef seed stock.  Small cow/calf 
operations had <100 head and large cow/calf operations had >100 head.  Small feedlot included 
all operations that selected stocker grazer, beef backgrounder, and/or cattle finish feedlot that had 
<3,000 head.  Large feedlot included all cattle finish feeders that had >3,000 head.  If a 
participant selected more than one type of operation, the type with the greater number of 
livestock was selected as the assigned operation type.  Operations with a majority of beef cattle 
that selected commercial cow-calf operation along with another type were placed in a cow-calf 
operation type. Dairy operations included seed stock producers, commercial dairy operations, 
and calf raisers.  Sheep, dairy goat and meat goat operations were combined into a small 
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ruminant operation type.  Swine operations with <1000 head were assigned as small swine herds 
and those with > 1000 were assigned as large swine herds  Because seven percent of participants 
reported having swine and beef cattle we added a mixed beef and swine operation type in our 
analysis.  Operations reporting both beef and swine with >40% of either beef or swine and at 
least 11% of the other type were classified as mixed beef-swine.    
 Estimation of direct contact rates and distance of contacts 
 Participants were asked to record all shipments of livestock, both incoming and outgoing, 
for seven days.  The survey included two pages for recording direct contacts including date of 
movement, species moved, number of animals, source of livestock, destination of livestock and 
the distance traveled.  For the source and destination a brief description of the type of location 
was requested, for example auction or feedlot.  An additional page was provided for cow-calf 
and sheep producers to record movements for the previous three months, to more accurately 
portray the movements in those operations since these producers have fewer movements in 
general.  The record included month of movement, species of livestock, number of shipments, 
the approximate distance the livestock were moved, and  the destination or source.  For all 
operation types, movements to pasture, pen, grazing, headquarters, stock fields, crop fields, and 
calving pen that were <11 km were classified as movement within the operation.  Those that 
were > 11 km were included in contact movements due to the distance traveled and the increased 
concerns of contact with other livestock.  Other reported movements could not be clearly 
classified for contact with a particular operation type.  These reported movements of livestock to 
a veterinary clinic, for semen testing, or for embryo transfer were classified as veterinary visits 
and movement to rodeos, petting zoos, fairs, and shows were classified as show.  All contacts 
were dropped if the destination or source listed only a city or state because the type of contact 
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was unknown.  The contact rate was calculated by producing a count of contacts of each 
participant for each destination-source combination.  The total number of the contacts was 
divided by the duration of the time frame from the survey to get daily rate.  The daily rate for 
seven day movements and three month movements were combined to generate a mean quarterly 
number of contacts for each livestock type combination.   
Estimation of indirect contact and distance of contacts  
 Indirect contacts were defined as contact between livestock indirectly through an 
intermediary such as a person, vehicle, or feed.  Survey participants were asked to record the 
frequency of visits by potential indirect contacts to their operation and the approximate distance 
that was traveled by the indirect contact to reach the operation.  As with the direct contacts, all 
participants were asked to complete a record for the seven days after survey arrival, and cow-calf 
and sheep producers were also asked to record the number of visitors and approximate distances 
for the previous 3-months.  The survey listed 28 categories of visitors (Table 7).  A free form 
entry of other visitors that were not included in the list was also provided.  The indirect contract 
rate was calculated by converting the seven day and three month records into daily rates and 
combining the rates to produce the number of quarterly mean indirect contacts for each contact-
livestock type combination.   
Statistical Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics were calculated for survey response and percentiles were calculated 
for contact rates utilizing commercially available statistical software.b  
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 Results   
 Response to survey 
 A total of 1136 surveys were returned from a total of 532 unique participating operations.  
A total of 182 equine movements were reported with 88% of them from cow/calf operations and 
remaining 12% were from small feedlot and mixed beef and swine operations.  Six returned 
surveys were dropped from analysis because no livestock were on the premise.  In addition, 38 
outgoing movements and 483 incoming movements were dropped from the data that was 
analyzed due to type of contact being left blank or not recording a specific operation type for 
source or destination. These movements accounted for 6.5% of the total direct movements 
reported.  Of the movements that were dropped due to unknown type of contact, 320 came from 
the small swine production type due to no response given for source for incoming livestock and 
103 were due to a small ruminant producer bringing livestock in from “out of state”.  These 
reported contacts could not be categorized as to source and so could not be accurately included in 
contact calculations.  Of the returned surveys 66% were from Kansas.  In Colorado, 791 surveys 
were sent out and 388 responses were received from 141 unique participants.  In Kansas, 1609 
surveys were sent out and 742 responses were received from 391 unique participants.  The first 
quarterly survey (Dec-Feb) had the highest response rate with 354 (56.4%) surveys returned of 
the 628 sent out.  Kansas had surveys returned from 93 of the 105 counties in the state and 
Colorado had 42 out of the 64 counties represented.  The overall response rate of the survey was 
47.3% of all surveys returned from participants and the first quarter of the survey was the highest 
response rate for both Colorado and Kansas (Table 1). Cow/calf producers made up 60.5% of the 
operations that participated in the survey (Table 2).  Number of unique participants for each 
operation type for Colorado and Kansas are reported in Table 2.  The survey was completed by 
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the owner of the operation 89% percent of the time, 7% of the time by the manager, 3.5% 
selected other as role in operation, and the remaining 0.5% did not give a response.  Herd size 
distribution of livestock types is reported in Table 3.   
 Direct animal contact 
 The average number of outgoing contacts during each quarter varied for each operation 
type (Table 4). Large swine to other large swine operations had the highest number of outgoing 
direct contacts for all quarters (median 5.9-24.53).  Dairy operations moving cattle to auction and 
other dairy operations had the next highest number of contacts in a quarter (median 2.6-10.34).  
The mean number of contacts for large cow/calf operations were highest to auctions (median 
1.28-2.88-2.55).  Mixed beef-swine, small swine and small ruminant operations reported similar 
contact rates and were higher than small cow/calf movements. 
 For some reported outgoing movements (e.g. those to a veterinarian, a show, or to 
another site within an operation), the type(s) of operations (if any) in contact with the shipped 
animals was not clear (Table 5).  Large cow/calf, small cow/calf, beef/swine, and small feedlot 
operations were the only operations to report movements of < 11 km to home grazing.  No 
operation type reported more than two visits to a show in a quarter (Table 5). 
The incoming number of contacts also fluctuated by quarter. Incoming contacts from 
auctions to dairies were only reported during June through August (Table 6).  Large feedlots 
reported the highest number of incoming direct contacts from auctions, peaking in the March to 
May quarter, with a mean of almost 12 contacts for the quarter.   
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 Indirect animal contact  
 The indirect contacts included in the analysis are reported in Table 7. The yearly number 
of indirect contacts varied substantially by operation type and visitor type.  The highest reported 
estimated mean daily incoming contact rates were for large feedlots and dairies.  The yearly 
contact for large feedlots exceeded 725 contacts per year (181 contacts per quarter) each from 
feed trucks, livestock haulers, and manure haulers.  Dairy operations averaged over 400 contacts 
per year (100 contacts per quarter) from milk trucks, 282 contacts (70 contacts per quarter) from 
manure haulers, and 146 contacts (36 contacts per quarter) from feed trucks (Table 7).     
 Distance traveled by indirect contacts to each operation type was similar across the 
quarters of the year for reported indirect contacts except for livestock haulers.  Livestock haulers 
traveled a median of 113 km for each contact in the months of September to November 
compared to approximately 64 km for the rest of the year (data not shown).  Distances traveled 
by all indirect contacts to each production type are reported in Table 8.  The longest median 
distance traveled by indirect contacts was to large feedlot operations (Table 8).  
 Discussion 
The purpose of this survey was to characterize the movements of livestock and the types 
of contacts that occur among livestock operations in Colorado and Kansas.  The region for this 
study represented the west central region of the U.S. with a wide variety of livestock operations 
types.  Previous studies have been conducted to evaluate the contact rates in the state of 
California10,17, the Netherlands21, and New Zealand22 but due to the difference in operation types, 
sizes and regionally specific management practices this study provides a more specific 
description of contacts in the west central U.S. Due to the practical limitations of enrollment of 
participants in this study, true random sampling of livestock operations was not possible.  
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Participation in the survey was by self-selected volunteers.  As such our survey is subject to 
volunteer bias in the response.  Reasons for declining to participate may have included perceived 
time requirement, concerns with privacy issues and confidentiality of information.  Previous 
studies of livestock operation contact rates10, 21,22 faced similar limitations, but concluded that 
results were still broadly representative of their respective surveyed populations. 
In order to reach as many producers as possible invitation letters and flyers were 
distributed through a wide variety of organizations and methods.  Our intention was to invite as 
broad a range of participants as possible.  One result of this was a high probability of duplicate 
invitations and an inability to enumerate the number of unique invitations made or calculate the 
initial survey invitation response rate.  During the survey the response rate of the self-selected 
volunteers decreased from 56% for the first survey of the year to 41% for the fourth and final 
survey.  The decrease in the response rate throughout the survey may have been due to 
participants becoming uninterested or perceiving little direct benefit from taking the time to 
complete the survey.  Kansas had a greater number of participants, which was expected due to 
the larger number of livestock operations compared to Colorado.  The responses to the survey 
did include all livestock production types and a range of herd sizes within each type.  The 
numbers of participants for the dairy and large feedlot operation types were lowest. Since 
approximately seven percent of participants reported owning both swine and beef cattle, we 
considered this a potentially important conduit for spread of disease from a swine operation to a 
beef cattle operation and a mixed beef and swine production type was included.  The inclusion of 
mixed livestock production systems could increase contact rates between species leading to 
larger outbreaks of infectious diseases that infect both species such as FMD. An additional 
consideration is the removal of all movements with undetermined source or destination. The 
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majority of movements removed were incoming contacts for small swine and small ruminant 
operations so their contacts may be underestimated.  The equine movements were not included in 
the analysis because the survey did not ask for equine movements so the reported numbers are 
likely not reliable estimates of overall equine movement. 
The average cattle on feed per feedlot in Colorado is 1,665 head and in Kansas it is 
2,02223 which does represent the relatively large number of small feedlots compared to large 
feedlots as was also reflected in the survey response.  Both large and small feedlots in this survey 
had substantial numbers of direct and indirect contacts.  Previously reported data from California 
included only a few small feedlots 10,17.   
The average beef cow herd in Colorado and Kansas is approximately 60 head23 and the 
average beef cow herd size was 369 in this survey.  Our average herd size will be somewhat 
inflated as the participants in our quarterly survey were asked to record the current number of 
livestock including calves and bulls, while the 2007 USDA: NASS census results include only 
the number of cows in the herd.  Due to the reporting of total number of livestock we did have a 
decrease in the number of cattle reported in later quarters of the year as calves were mostly likely 
weaned and removed from the operation.  Still this survey population appears to represent larger 
cow-calf herds within Colorado and Kansas.   
In previously reported data from California, approximately 30% of beef cattle herds were 
kept at multiple locations17.  The number of movements recorded in this survey to other locations 
that were part of the same operation suggests that Kansas and Colorado beef herds are similarly 
managed on multiple sites.  Multiple locations that were part of the same operation could be 
located some distance apart from one another.  For purposes of this report, we included direct 
contacts between two locations that were part of the same operation when these locations were 
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more than 11 km apart.  Due to the likelihood of fence line contact with other operations; 
transmission to other locations is still a concern even for movement within an operation.  This 
may over-represent contact rates if those are quarterly herd movements and the herd remains 
isolated with no contact with other livestock.  The movements of < 11 km were included in the 
outgoing contact rate within an operation.  Eleven kilometers was chosen due to a natural break 
in the data from the survey (data not shown). 
The average herd size of dairy herds is 283 cows in Colorado and 150 cows in Kansas23.  
The median herd size in this survey for dairy operations was 138 head for the 33 dairy herds who 
participated in the survey.  Dairy operations in this survey had over 3 indirect contacts a day or 
280 contacts a quarter, a much lower indirect contact rate than found in small dairies (< 1,000 
cattle) in California10.  The lower indirect rate among dairies in this study is most likely due to 
the smaller size of herds in Colorado and Kansas relative to those in California.  The number of 
dairies responding to the survey was low however and caution should be exercised in over 
interpreting the reported contact rates.    
The average herd size of swine in Colorado is approximately 750 and in Kansas it is 
1,300 head23. The large swine production type had a high number of contacts which included any 
movements reported to another location even if part of the same operation.  Most large swine 
production is part of an integrated industry with livestock shipped within operations and then 
directly to slaughter, making it unique compared to the other operations in our study 
population24.  The high number of direct contacts for large swine facility to large swine facility 
most likely represents this vertical integration in the swine industry, and may represent risk for 
direct transmission of disease predominantly within the integrated system and not to other types 
of livestock operations.   
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Multiple production types reported high outgoing and incoming contact with auction 
markets, suggesting markets are an important potential distribution and surveillance point for 
infectious disease spread.  Bates et al.10 also found that large numbers of livestock were 
purchased from livestock auctions in herds in a three county region in California.  The results of 
our study also demonstrate all cattle operations reporting livestock incoming from auctions.  
Multiple herds and livestock types mix at auction markets before dispersal to individual herds 
providing substantial opportunity for disease transmission and dispersal.  Continued education to 
producers on the risks of bringing outside livestock onto the premise and the importance of 
quarantine, and open vs. closed herds to prevent the possible spread of diseases such as 
infectious bovine rhinotracheitis virus, bovine viral diarrhea virus, Tritririchomonas foetus, 
porcine epidemic diarrhea virus, and porcine reproductive and respiratory virus  remains 
important.  Separation of sick animals from healthy animals to prevent direct exposure is the 
basis for control of spread of endemic pathogens25,26.  Additionally biosecurity of cleaning and 
disinfecting livestock trailers may also help control disease spread.  This survey provides data to 
quantitate the magnitude of the risk from contact between herds through auction markets.   
Indirect contacts are a potential risk for disease spread particularly for a highly 
contagious disease such as FMD27, 9.  Indirect contact could allow disease spread after livestock 
movement controls have been in place, resulting in a longer outbreak8.  Some indirect contacts 
must be maintained for animal welfare reasons and for continuity of business and long term 
survival of livestock production even in the face of an outbreak.  Delivery of feed, supplies, and 
labor will be necessary and will require increased efforts in biosecurity and disinfection to 
control risk.  Large feedlots had the highest number of indirect contacts in a year as well as high 
incoming direct contacts from auctions and small feedlots putting them at substantial risk for 
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introduction and spread of disease.  These contacts occur over a potentially long distance as well, 
increasing the risk of relatively long distance transmission of disease in an outbreak.  This data 
provides an estimate of the number of contacts for planning the resources that will be required to 
institute biosecurity and disinfection procedures to control indirect transmission risk in the face 
of an FMD outbreak in the central U.S.  
These direct and indirect contact rates of producers in Colorado and Kansas will be useful 
for establishing and evaluating policy and biosecurity guidelines for producers and for sources of 
indirect contact among livestock producers.  With the high indirect contact rates found in this 
study, cleaning and disinfection is imperative to prevent the transmission and persistence of 
diseases such as porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRSV), Salmonella spp, 
bovine viral diarrhea virus, and Escherichia coli O157.  Both Salmonella dublin and Escherichia 
coli O157 have been shown to persist in cattle manure28,29 and indirect transmission of bovine 
viral diarrhea virus and porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome has been reported30,31,32.  
Furthermore the contact rates will be useful to planners to estimate the number of contacts and 
identify the resource requirements to control them in the face of a disease outbreak.  For example 
the large number of feed truck visits and need to deliver feed daily has huge welfare impact and 
magnifies the need for accurate estimates of contacts and well planned biosecurity and 
disinfection while still allowing contact consistent with good animal welfare. 
The direct and indirect contact rates also can be used to inform efforts to model 
transmission and control of infectious diseases such as FMD which infects multiple species.  The 
results can lead to biosecurity improvements for emergency planning during an infectious 
disease outbreak among livestock as well as provide data to parameterize simulation models to 
evaluate control methods during a possible outbreak.  Contacts from this study are specific to the 
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central US, allowing modeling with region specific parameters for increasing validity of 
results19.   Prior to this data no direct and indirect contact rates were available for the central U.S. 
and simulation models of livestock disease outbreaks lacked an essential element to provide 
valid model results and evaluate alternate control methods in this important agriculture region. 
This data fills a need for region specific contact rates to provide parameters for modeling a 
foreign animal disease and producing valid results helpful for planning and decision making 
including the relative importance of different control strategies such as biosecurity and 
movement control. 
aThe questionnaire is available from the senior author upon request. 
bStataCorp. 2011. Stata: Release 12. Statistical Software. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP. 
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Table 2.1 - Distribution of 2,400 livestock operation contact surveys sent by method and 
total returned by state and quarter.  Percent responded is unique responses for each 
quarter and total responses for each state and overall. 
State Quarter 
Surface 
Mail 
E-
Mail 
Total 
Sent 
Total 
Responses 
Percentage 
Responded 
CO Dec-Feb 126 75 201 115 57.2% 
CO Mar-May 118 75 193 98 50.8% 
CO June-Aug 124 75 199 90 45.2% 
CO Sept-Nov 123 75 198 89 44.9% 
Total CO 
 
491 300 791 392 49.6% 
KS Dec-Feb 245 182 427 239 56.0% 
KS Mar-May 244 152 396 195 49.2% 
KS June-Aug 242 151 393 155 39.4% 
KS Sept-Nov 242 151 393 155 39.4% 
Total KS 
 
973 636 1609 744 46.2% 
Overall Total  1464 936 2400 1136 47.3% 
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Table 2.2. - Distribution of 1130 livestock operation contact surveys returned by 532 
unique participants by operation type. 
 Surveys Returned Unique Participants 
Assigned Operation Type Colorado Kansas Colorado Kansas 
Large Cow/Calf 150 275 51 143 
Small Cow/Calf 103 147 39 72 
Dairy 13 21 6 13 
Large Feedlot 6 23 2 11 
Small Feedlot 41 104 14 65 
Large Swine 0 53 0 25 
Small Swine 2 33 1 16 
Beef and Swine 10 55 5 29 
Small Ruminant 63 31 23 17 
Total 388 742 141 391 
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Table 2.3 - Distribution of 1130 livestock operation contact surveys returned by 532 unique 
participants by operation type. 
Operation 
Type Mean 
10th 
Percentile Median 
90th 
Percentile 
Type of 
Livestock 
Counted 
Large Cow/Calf 499 120 318 926 Beef Cattle 
Small Cow/Calf 47 10 50 80 Beef Cattle 
Dairy 1,274 40 138 4,000 Dairy Cattle 
Large Feedlot 17,615 3,326 10,974 50,000 Beef Cattle 
Small Feedlot 615 125 500 1,208 Beef Cattle 
Large Swine 5,280 1,326 2,675 12,000 Swine 
Small Swine 271 36 250 670 Swine 
Beef/Swine 178 8 70 650 Beef Cattle* 
Beef/Swine 353 4 125 756 Swine* 
Small Ruminant 258 15 65 215 Sheep and Goats 
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Table 2.4 - Mean (10th percentile, 90th percentile) total number of outgoing direct contacts 
by quarter reported by 1130 quarterly surveys from 532 livestock operations in Colorado 
and Kansas. 
Source - 
Operation 
Type 
Destination- 
Operation 
Type 
Dec-Feb 
contacts 
Mar-May 
contacts 
June-Aug 
contacts 
Sep-Nov 
contacts 
Large 
Cow/Calf 
Auction 2.88 (1.0,5.0) 1.42 (0,4.0) 1.35 (0,5.0) 1.28 (0,4.0) 
Large 
Cow/Calf 
Large 
Cow/Calf 
1.43 (0,1.98) 2.0 (0,8.0) 1.35 (0,4.0) 0.92 (0,3.0) 
Large 
Cow/Calf 
Feedlot 2.87 (1.0,5.1) 0.17 (0,0) 0.13 (0,0) 0.09 (0,0) 
Small 
Cow/Calf 
Auction 0.74 (0,2.0) 0.81 (0,3.0) 0.36 (0,2.0) 0.86 (0,2.0) 
Small 
Cow/Calf 
Small 
Cow/Calf 
0.49 (0,1.0) 1.51 (0,5.0) 0.70 (0,3.0) 0.52 (0,2.0) 
Small 
Cow/Calf 
Feedlot 0.05 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
Dairy Auction 4.37 (0,13.0) 5.19 (0,13.0) 
10.34 
(0,26.0) 
5.2 (0,13.0) 
Dairy Dairy 5.80 (0,19.5) 3.90 (0,13.0) 7.28 (0,26.9) 2.6 (0,13.0) 
Small 
Feedlot 
Auction 0.65 (0,1.0) 0.34 (0,0) 0.69 (0,0) 4.34 (0,13.0) 
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Small 
Feedlot 
Large 
Feedlot 
0.88 (0,1.0) 3.08 (0,13.0) 1.07 (0,3.0) 1.58 (0,2.8) 
Small 
Feedlot 
Small 
Feedlot 
2.92 (0,13.0) 0.56 (0,1.9) 0 (0,0) 1.00 (0,0) 
Large Swine Large Swine 24.53 (0,78.0) 
15.56 
(0,65.0) 
16.81 
(0,65.0) 
5.9 (0, 13.0) 
Small Swine Auction 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 3.33 (0,13.0) 1.85 (0, 13.0) 
Small Swine Small Swine 1.27 (0,1.0) 1.86 (0,13.0) 0 (0,0) 1.63 (0,13.0) 
Beef/Swine Auction 1.63 (0,3.0) 1.29 (0,2.0) 1.15 (0,1.0) 2.13 (0, 13.0) 
Beef/Swine Beef/Swine 1.06 (4.0) 4.73 (0,7.4) 0.69 (0,3.0) 1.05 (0,3.7) 
Small 
Ruminant 
Auction 1.06 (0,3.0) 2.29 (0,4.0) 2.24 (0, 10.0) 1.69 (0,7.0) 
Small 
Ruminant 
Small 
Ruminant 
1.68 (0,3.0) 1.84 (0,6.0) 1.43 (0,5.0) 2.44 (0,13.0) 
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Table 2.5 - Mean (10th percentile, 90th percentile) total number of outgoing direct contacts 
by quarter for producers with likely livestock contact but where the specific operation 
type(s) contacted is not clear, reported by 1130 quarterly surveys from 532 livestock 
operations in Colorado and Kansas. 
Source - 
Operation 
Type 
Destination- 
Operation 
Type 
Dec-Feb 
contacts 
Mar-May 
contacts 
June-Aug 
contacts 
Sep-Nov 
contacts 
Large 
Cow/Calf 
Within 
Operation 
 <11 km 
0.52 (0,1.0) 0.56 (0,2.0) 0.07 (0,0) 0.34 (0,1.0) 
Large 
Cow/Calf 
Show 0.04 (0,0) 0.02 (0,0) 0.11 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
Large 
Cow/Calf 
Veterinarian 0.07 (0,0) 0.10 (0,0) 0.07 (0,0) 0.08 (0,0) 
Small 
Cow/Calf 
Within 
Operation 
 <11 km 
0.11 (0,0) 1.07 (0,2.0) 0.31 (0,0) 0.69 (0,0) 
Small 
Cow/Calf 
Show 0.02 (0,0) 0.04 (0,0) 0.22 (0,0) 0.05 (0,0) 
Small 
Cow/Calf 
Veterinarian 0.12 (0,1.0) 0.15 (0,1.0) 0.14 (0,0) 0.13 (0,1.0) 
Dairy 
Within 
Operation 
0 (0,0) 1.30 (0, 6.5) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
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 <11 km 
Dairy Veterinarian 1.30 (0,6.5) 1.30 (0, 6.5) 
1.45 
(0,13.0) 
0 (0,0) 
Small Feedlot 
Within 
Operation 
 <11 km 
1.66 (0,0) 3.13 (0,13.0) 0.42 (0,0) 0.82  (0,0) 
Small Feedlot Show 1.33 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
Small Feedlot Veterinarian 0.26 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
Small Swine Show 1.18 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
Beef/Swine 
Within 
Operation 
 <11 km 
4.1 (0,13.0) 0.94 (0, 3.0) 1.31 (0,3.0) 0.13 (0,0) 
Beef/Swine Show 0.68 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0.85 (0,4.0) 0 (0,0) 
Beef/Swine Veterinarian 
1.37 
(0,13.0) 
0.88 (0, 1.0) 0 (0,0) 0.18 (0,1.0) 
Small 
Ruminant 
Within 
Operation 
 <11 km 
0.10 (0,0) 8.68 (0,5.0) 0.04 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
Small 
Ruminant 
Show 0.48 (0,0) 1.20 (0,2.8) 1.0 (0,3.0) 0.73 (0,0) 
Small 
Ruminant 
Veterinarian 0 (0,0) 1.64 (0,0) 0.13 (0,0) 0.11 (0,0) 
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Table 2.6 - Mean (10th percentile, 90th percentile) total number of incoming direct contacts 
by quarter and by each reported source and destination combination reported by 1130 
quarterly surveys from 532 livestock operations in Colorado and Kansas.  
Source - 
Operation 
Type 
Destination- 
Operation 
Type 
Dec-Feb 
contacts 
Mar-May 
contacts 
June-Aug 
contacts 
Sep-Nov 
contacts 
Auction 
Large 
Cow/Calf 
0.88 (0,2.0) 0.54 (0,1.0) 0.08 (0,0) 0.47 (0,1.0) 
Auction 
Small 
Cow/Calf 
0.03 (0,0) 0.41 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0.04 (0,0) 
Auction Dairy 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
1.45 
(0,13.0) 
0 (0,0) 
Auction Large Feedlot 
7.55 
(0,26.0) 
11.56 
(0,65.0) 
0 (0,0) 
6.50 
(0,39.0) 
Auction Small Feedlot 
2.82 
(0,13.0) 
0.34 (0,0) 2.10 (0,0) 
3.85 
(0,13.0) 
Auction Small Swine 1.18 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
Auction Beef/Swine 
1.37 
(0,13.0) 
0.06 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0.06 (0,0) 
Auction 
Small 
Ruminant 
0.04 (0,0) 0.08 (0,0) 0.55 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
Large 
Cow/Calf 
Large 
Cow/Calf 
1.09 (0,3.0) 1.40 (0,3.0) 1.43 (0,3.0) 
3.06 
(0,10.0) 
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Large 
Cow/Calf 
Feedlot 0.3 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0.06 (0, 0) 
Small 
Cow/Calf 
Small 
Cow/Calf 
0.69 (0,2.0) 0.93 (0,2.0) 0.59 (0,3.0) 0.66 (0,3.0) 
Small 
Cow/Calf 
Feedlot 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0.07 (0,0) 
Dairy Dairy 
3.9 
(0,19.47) 
3.90 (0,19.5) 
5.78 
(0,26.0) 
4.27 
(0,13.0) 
Large Swine Large Swine 
3.19 
(0,13.0) 
2.64 (0,13.0) 1.50 (0,7.5) 1.64 (0,5.0) 
Small Feedlot Large Feedlot 
8.65 
(0,13.0) 
7.19 (0,65.0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
Small Feedlot Small Feedlot 0.64 (0,1.0) 1.46 (0,1.0) 1.32 (0,0) 0.88 (0,3.0) 
Small Swine Small Swine 1.18 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 0 (0,0) 
1.63 
(0,13.0) 
Beef/Swine Beef/Swine 
2.00 
(0,13.0) 
0.59 (0,2.0) 1.37 (0,3.0) 1.58 (0,6.5) 
Small 
Ruminant 
Small 
Ruminant 
0.55 (0,1.0) 1.16 (0,5.0) 0.42 (0,1.0) 0.22 (0,1.0) 
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Table 2.7 - Mean (10th percentile, 90th percentile) total number of indirect contacts per year 
by operation type and by indirect contact source reported by 1130 quarterly surveys from 
532 livestock operations in Colorado and Kansas. 
Indirect 
Contact 
Large
Cow-
Calf 
Small 
Cow-
Calf 
Small 
Feedlot 
Large 
Feedlot Dairy 
Small 
Swine 
Large 
Swine 
Small 
Rumina
nt 
Beef/ 
Swine 
AI 
technician  
0.21 
(0,0) 
0.08 
(0,0) 
0.00 0.00 16.90 
(0,52.2) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ag-tours  0.05 
(0,0) 
0.05 
(0,0) 
10.15 
(0,0) 
1.94   
(0,0) 
0.00 3.26 
(0,0) 
0.88 
(0,0) 
59.13 
(0,4.0) 
0.21 
(0,0) 
Colostrum 
delivery 
0.00 0.00 0.78   
(0,0) 
0.00 4.59 
(0,0) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 
Extension 
agent  
0.4 
(0,0) 
0.01 
(0,0) 
0.50 
(0,0) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55     
(0,0) 
0.91 
(0,0) 
Feed truck  1.84 
(0,5.0) 
0.27 
(0,1.0) 
19.11 
(0,52.2) 
899.65 
(0,4,22
3) 
146.65 
(0,208.1
) 
23.40 
(0,52.2
) 
232.17 
(0,312.
8) 
16.86 
(0,11.0) 
7.67 
(0,24.1
) 
Hoof 
trimmer 
0.20 
(0,1.0) 
0.27 
(0,0.1) 
2.74   
(0,0) 
7.72 
(0,52.2) 
27.72 
(0,52.2) 
0.00 0.00 0.55     
(0,0) 
0.00 
Livestock 
hauler  
1.74 
(0,4.0) 
0.78 
(0,1.0) 
38.22 
(0,104.3
) 
725.99 
(0,1,82
5) 
19.93 
(0,52.2) 
0.00 52.41 
(0,156.
4) 
13.3 
(0,12.0) 
3.65 
(0,24.1
) 
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Manure 
hauler  
0.11 
(0,0) 
0.03 
(0,0) 
10.18 
(0,0) 
822.10 
(0,2,08
5) 
282.25 
(0,52.2) 
0.00 0.88 
(0,0) 
2.77     
(0,0) 
0.00 
Milk truck  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 434.25 
(0,1,303
) 
0.00 0.00 2.77     
(0,0) 
0.00 
Neighbor  6.99 
(0,17) 
5.13 
(0,13.5) 
48.18 
(0,149.0
) 
60.46 
(0,156.
4) 
33.22 
(0,104.4
) 
34.24 
(0,104.
3) 
1.67 
(0,0) 
50.00 
(0,156.4) 
14.60 
(0,56.1
) 
Nutritionist  0.02 
(0,0) 
0.02 
(0,0) 
4.38  
(0,0) 
23.18 
(0,52.1) 
24.46 
(0,52.2) 
1.63 
(0,0) 
2.56 
(0,0) 
1.66     
(0,0) 
(0,0) 
Processing 
crew  
0.70 
(0,2.0) 
0.44 
(0,0) 
0.54    
(0,0) 
1.94    
(0,0) 
0.00 0.00 1.20 
(0,0) 
2.22     
(0,0) 
1.03 
(0,0) 
Renderer 0.03 
(0,0) 
0.02 
(0,0) 
8.63    
(0,0) 
143.36 
(0,312.
8) 
30.66 
(0,156.2
) 
0.00 26.61 
(0,52.2) 
0.00 0.00 
Sales rep 0.57 
(0,2.0) 
0.17 
(0,0) 
8.50 
(0,52.2) 
69.67 
(0,260.
7) 
30.67 
(0.52.2) 
0.00 9.70 
(0,26.1) 
4.53     
(0,0) 
1.24 
(0,0) 
Semen 
delivery  
0.15 
(0,0) 
 0.10 
(0,0) 
0.00 0.00 28.37 
(0,52.2) 
0.00 35.76 
(0,104.
3) 
0.80     
(0,0) 
0.55 
(0,0) 
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Shearer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.70   
(0,4.0) 
0.00 
Veterinarian 1.18(0,
3.0) 
1.08 
(0,2.5) 
5.99 
(0,18.6) 
29.41 
(0,104.
3) 
44.17 
(0,104.3
) 
0.00 20.81 
(0,52.2) 
7.77 
(0,33.5) 
1.21 
(0,8.0) 
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Table 2.8 - Distance traveled in kilometers by all indirect contacts (10th, 50th and 90th 
percentiles) to each operation type reported by 1130 quarterly surveys from 532 livestock 
operations in Colorado and Kansas. 
Operation Type Mean 10th percentile Median 90th percentile 
 
 
   Large Cow/Calf 66 3 16 145 
Small Cow/Calf 37 2 16 90 
Dairy 101 5 16 145 
Large Feedlot 221 8 109 322 
Small Feedlot 108 8 52 217 
Large Swine 84 8 40 306 
Small Swine 39 3 20 97 
Beef and Swine 52 3 24 97 
Small Ruminant 101 8 32 161 
 
 
   Total 81 3 24 161 
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 Abstract 
Objective - To examine the ability to depopulate a large feedlot during a possible Foot and 
Mouth disease outbreak in the Central United States. 
Design – Delphi survey followed by face-to-face facilitated discussion. 
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Sample – Experts in the related fields which included academic toxicologists, pharmacologists 
and animal behaviorists as well as feedlot managers and consulting veterinarians. 
Procedures – A total of 4 large animal veterinary pharmacologists, 5 veterinary toxicologists, 4 
animal welfare experts, 26 veterinary consultants, and 8 feedlot managers were invited to 
participate. 
Results – 27 of the 47 invited experts participated in the survey.  The consensus of the survey 
was that several toxicological agents were deemed highly effective; however, all of these agents 
also had high animal welfare concerns.  The only pharmacologic agent that was considered 
highly effective for euthanasia was pentobarbital sodium IV and the only agent highly effective 
for sedation was xylazine.  All the clinical signs of toxic agents were deemed high or moderate 
welfare concerns; yet there were minimal concerns with penetrating captive bolt and intravenous 
injection.  However, both veterinarians and managers identified penetrating captive bolt as a 
minimally effective method of mass euthanasia.  Veterinarians had high concerns for public 
perception, human safety during euthanasia, and completing the mass euthanasia in a timely 
manner. 
Conclusions and Clinical Relevance - Regardless of the method used for depopulation of cattle 
in a large feedlot, it would be very difficult to complete the task humanely, and in a timely 
fashion. 
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 Introduction 
 During the Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak in the United Kingdom (UK), more 
than 6 million animals were culled for disease control or welfare problems resulting from animal 
movement restrictions1.  The United States (US) has a large, highly productive and efficient 
agriculture industry that is increasingly concentrated compared to the agriculture production in 
the UK.  With the last FMD outbreak in the US occurring in 1929, the increased movement of 
livestock and agriculture products, and the lack of any vaccination program, the US cloven-
hoofed domestic and wild animals are fully susceptible to FMD.   
 The central US has a large number of large feedlot operations and an economy that is 
largely linked to the agriculture industry.  A published model of an FMD outbreak beginning in a 
south-west Kansas large feedlot (> 40,000 head) predicted that over 1.2 million of 2 million 
animals in the study population would be destroyed2.  Another study limited to eight counties in 
the Panhandle region of Texas, a high-density livestock area with an estimated 1.8 million cattle 
on feed, found that outbreaks initiated in >50,000 head feedlots required that as many as 230 of 
these feedlots be depopulated3.  The United States Department of Agriculture National 
Agricultural Statistics Service reported 330 operations with cattle on feed in the US that had > 
8,000 head of cattle4.  The introduction of FMD in the US would be devastating to producers as 
well as the local, state and national economy. 
Highly infectious diseases such as FMD, often require quarantine, depopulation and 
disposal of whole herds in order to prevent the continued spread of the disease.  Depopulation 
refers to the killing of animals efficiently and quickly under extenuating circumstances, such as 
animals with a zoonotic disease, during rapidly spreading outbreaks, or when animals are 
isolated by natural disaster5.  The immediate depopulation of animals on farms where FMD 
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clinical cases have occurred has been considered a mainstay of foreign animal disease 
eradication6.  An emergency response to a FMD outbreak would require an extensive 
understanding of the scientific, technical, and social aspects to depopulation to effectively 
control spread of disease and minimize economic impact, while considering human and animal 
health and welfare concerns.  Early in the 2001 UK outbreak it became clear that the logistics of 
killing large numbers of animals had received little consideration7.  Numerous public complaints 
were reported to the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals8.   
Substances used for euthanasia should minimize environmental contamination or 
exposure of other animals or humans to agents or toxins.  The Texas Panhandle region Palo Duro 
Exercise in 2007 determined the goals of depopulation and disposal of the carcasses was not 
feasible in a timely manner9.  It is critical to determine if it is possible to humanely depopulate 
the animals in a large feedlot.  The effect of culling on veterinarians and the farming community 
during an outbreak can be traumatic10.  The lesson to be learned from the 2001 UK FMD 
outbreak is that ‘a balance must be struck between disease control and welfare, but welfare must 
not be set aside, even in an emergency’11.  The AVMA guidelines for humane euthanasia states 
that under unusual situations such as disease eradication, euthanasia options may be limited so 
the most appropriate technique that minimizes human and animal health concerns must be 
used12.  Depopulation is defined as the killing of animals in large numbers in response to an 
animal health emergency where all due consideration is given to the terminal experience of the 
animal, but the circumstances surrounding the event are understood to be exigent and 
extenuating13.  The objective of this study was to research possible methods to depopulate a large 
feedlot in a timely and efficient manner that minimizes the human and animal health concerns. 
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 Methods 
 An online Delphi survey was conducted utilizing experts within the cattle feedlot industry 
to explore potential methods of euthanasia in a large commercial feedlot.  Experts in food animal 
pharmacology, food animal toxicology, food animal welfare, as well as feedlot veterinary 
consultants and feedlot managers were asked questions to identify possible methods and time 
requirements for depopulation of large cattle feedlots.  Experts identified the parameters for the 
discussion in an exploratory phase followed by an online iterative Delphi approach to generate 
expert consensus in each area of expertise.  The Delphi method involved repeated polling of the 
experts using anonymous questionnaires to structure group communication14.  It is based on the 
assumption that group judgments are more valid than individual judgments, while avoiding the 
potential bias of face to face discussion.  The responses of each round are used in the subsequent 
round as controlled feedback, and the final round, where the response of the participants did not 
change from one iteration to another, was used to produce a group judgment.  Briefly, 
participants in each group answer the same survey questions in each iteration of the survey. 
Following the first iteration question-specific median responses from all participants from the 
previous round are provided for participant consideration during the next round of the survey.  
This allows participants to reconsider their responses in light of their peers’ responses to the 
same questions from the previous round.  Following the online Delphi survey, a facilitated round 
table discussion was held with an expert from each area to allow group learning of the technical 
and practical aspects of the problem15.  Approval for this survey was obtained from the Kansas 
State University Institutional Review Board committee for Research Involving Human Subjects. 
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 Study participants 
 Large animal veterinary pharmacologists, veterinary toxicologists, animal welfare 
experts, veterinary consultants, and feedlot managers were invited to participate.  Pharmacology, 
toxicology and welfare experts were invited to participate based on literature review for authors 
of publications and on expert opinion.  Veterinary consultants were recruited from the 
membership of the Academy of Veterinary Consultants.  The feedlot managers were 
recommended for the survey by the participating veterinary consultants based on experience and 
knowledge of the industry.  
 Survey Design 
 The initial exploratory round of the survey was designed to allow each group of experts 
to identify the important issues and methods related to depopulation of a large number of cattle 
in a feedlot.  Veterinary toxicologists and pharmacologists were asked to identify potential 
agents and methods for use in timely mass cattle euthanasia.  Timely mass cattle euthanasia was 
defined as large numbers of cattle in a short period of time.  Pharmacologists were also asked to 
list agents that could be used for mass sedation.  Both toxicologists and pharmacologists were 
also asked to list animal welfare considerations and human safety concerns and environmental 
disposal considerations for each of the agents they listed.  In the initial exploratory round, 
consulting veterinarians and feedlot managers were asked to list possible methods to kill a large 
number of cattle in a short period of time in large feedlots and list possible concerns relative to 
mass euthanasia.   
 The following rounds used the depopulation methods and issues generated in the first 
round in a Delphi survey with the responses from the exploratory phase being listed as potential 
methods and agents.  For the iterative phase of the Delphi survey effective depopulation was 
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defined as the ability to quickly and efficiently depopulate the cattle in the feedlot.  
Pharmacology and toxicology experts were asked to rate effectiveness of the agents identified in 
the exploratory phase.  The consulting veterinarians and feedlot managers were asked to rate the 
effectiveness and their concerns with methods identified by all experts in the exploratory Delphi 
phase.  Participants were asked to rate their level of concern or rate the effectiveness of the agent 
for depopulation on a Likert scale of 1-5 (1 = “highly effective” or “high concerns”, 2 = 
“moderately effective” or “moderate concerns, 3 = “minimally effective” or minimal concerns”, 
4 = “not effective” or “no concerns” and 5=”do not know”).  An effective agent was defined as 
an agent that would successfully and reliably depopulate a large number of confined cattle in a 
short period of time.   
 From the euthanasia and depopulation methods identified by the exploratory round of the 
survey, and using toxicology textbooks for reference16-19, a list of likely clinical signs was 
developed for presentation to animal welfare experts.  Welfare experts were asked to rate the 
likely clinical signs for animal welfare concerns and for public perception concerns.  The Delphi 
survey portion for each group varied in the number of rounds, based on how quickly consensus 
was reached.  The median result for each questions was monitored and the survey was stopped 
when there was no or minimal change in the median value of the responses from one iteration to 
the next.  Animal welfare experts received two rounds, pharmacologists and veterinary 
consultants received three rounds and toxicologists received four rounds of the Delphi survey.   
 Round Table 
 After the completion of the Delphi survey one pharmacologist, toxicologist, animal 
welfare expert, and two veterinary consultants and feedlot managers were invited to a face to 
face round-table discussion on the methods of depopulation as well as the time and labor 
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requirements.  Prior to the face to face discussion each participant was emailed an outline of the 
facilitated discussion itinerary and the results from the Delphi survey.  The discussion began 
with a brief overview of the results of the Delphi survey and statement of the goal of the 
discussion to reach consensus regarding optimal methods and time requirements for mass cattle 
euthanasia in large feedlots.  The discussion was structured to sequentially address the survey 
categories of methods including pharmacologic, toxicologic, and physical methods of euthanasia.  
In each category the Delphi results were summarized and the floor was opened for discussion to 
identify and clarify key points, and identify potentially acceptable methods, limitations and 
unacceptable methods.  A final summary discussion was used to compare potentially acceptable 
methods and assess time and labor requirements.  The discussion was completed in 
approximately 2 hours.  It was taped and a transcript was produced to aid in summarizing the 
comments.  Comments were assessed to identify consensus opinion of the group as well as areas 
of disagreement. 
 Results 
 Delphi survey 
 A total of 47 experts were asked to participate in the online Delphi survey.  Four 
pharmacologists were invited, three pharmacologists completed the survey and one selected to 
drop out after the initial round.  Three out of the four food animal welfare experts invited agreed 
to participate in the survey.  All five veterinary toxicologists who were invited agreed to 
participate.  Twenty-six feedlot veterinary consultants were invited via email to participate and 
12 agreed.  The feedlot managers were recommended for the survey by the participating 
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veterinary consultants; eight invitations based on recommendations of three veterinary 
consultants were sent out via email and four accepted and participated.   
 In the first round of the survey, toxicologists identified 13 potential agents and 
pharmacologists identified four potential agents for use in depopulation.  Pharmacologists also 
identified six potential agents for sedation prior to euthanasia.  In subsequent rounds of the 
survey each group evaluated the respective agents according to the effectiveness for euthanasia, 
human health risk, animal welfare concerns, carcass disposal concerns, and availability of 
sufficient supply (Table 1).  Several toxicological agents were deemed highly effective however 
all of these agents also had high animal welfare concerns.   
 The only pharmacologic agent that was considered highly effective for euthanasia was 
pentobarbital sodium IV and the only agent highly effective for sedation was xylazine (Table 2).   
 Animal welfare and behavior experts were asked to evaluate the animal welfare impacts 
of expected clinical signs of toxic agents for the animals experiencing the signs and for pen 
mates and cattle in the vicinity.  All the clinical signs of toxic agents were deemed high or 
moderate welfare concerns; however there were minimal concerns with penetrating captive bolt 
and intravenous injection (Table 3).  There were also moderate concerns for the welfare of other 
cattle in the vicinity of animals being euthanized by sharpshooters in a lane or small pen.   
   The only method of depopulation identified as highly effective by veterinary consultants 
and feedlot managers was feeding a toxic agent to cattle while in pens (Table 4).  Both 
veterinarians and managers identified penetrating captive bolt as a minimally effective method of 
mass euthanasia.  Veterinarians identified sharpshooters shooting cattle as moderately effective 
however managers rated it not effective.  Veterinarians had high concerns for public perception, 
human safety during euthanasia, and completing the mass euthanasia in a timely manner. They 
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had moderate concerns for mental trauma to the workforce doing the euthanasia, animal welfare 
and carcass disposal.   
 Round table discussion results 
 Present for the discussion was a veterinary pharmacologist, veterinary toxicologist, 
veterinary animal welfare expert, two veterinary consultants, and one feedlot manager.  The 
discussion was moderated by a one of the authors (Sanderson).   
 Toxicological agents 
 Organophosphates were identified as potential toxic agents for use in depopulation, and 
that depending on the compound a very small amount would be effective.  Panelists agreed that 
with the most potent compounds of organophosphates, animals would die acutely with few 
clinical signs.  Supply of organophosphates was not a concern but achieving consumption of a 
homogenous and adequate dose when feeding in the bunk was a concern.  Panelists agreed that 
while an adequate toxic dose can be calculated not all the cattle in the pen will eat immediately, 
some being more aggressive than others.  To encourage all animals to eat immediately, feeding 3 
hours later than the regular schedule was recommended.  The panel toxicologist indicated that 
power washing and detergent would be sufficient to clean the equipment used to deliver toxic 
feed.  Additional issues that were brought up included manpower to dispose of the carcasses, 
environmental residue, and predator concerns due to secondary poisonings.  The panelists 
indicated that carcass removal and disposal would be a major problem.  Panelists agreed that 
with any toxicological agent a secondary method would be necessary to humanely euthanize 
cattle that did not receive an adequate dose in feed.  The panel toxicologist indicated 95% would 
likely die acutely from the feed toxin and some other method would be necessary to euthanize 
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the remaining 5% of cattle.  Panelists agreed that feeding a toxic agent to cattle would not fit the 
definition of euthanasia but would be considered depopulation.   
 Pharmacological methods 
 Due to availability and disposal concerns, panelists agreed intravenous phenobarbital 
sodium would not be effective for mass euthanasia in this type of situation.  Panelists also 
expressed concern regarding the cost of intravenous pentobarbital.  For intravenous injection 
euthanasia, each animal would be run through the chute, and removed after euthanasia in order to 
get the next animal in. While panelists indicated that a large feedlot could process approximately 
1,000 head of cattle per day for vaccination, the need to manually remove each animal from the 
chute would slow this process down dramatically.  Sedative agents, xylazine and ketamine mixed 
together were considered very effective even in fractious cattle for sedation and release from the 
chute prior to euthanasia following recumbency in the pen.  Panelists had concerns regarding 
availability of xylazine and a much smaller dose of xylazine was considered effective if used in 
conjunction with ketamine.  Xylazine and ketamine sedation was not believed to provide 
sufficient sedation to use potassium chloride for euthanasia.  Acepromazine was another sedative 
agent discussed that could be top dressed on feed but availability was a concern.  Any method of 
sedation would require follow-up euthanasia with captive bolt or firearm after they are released, 
become recumbent and are restrained with a halter.  This method would be timelier than 
euthanasia in the chute but panelists had some concerns on human safety with the use of captive 
bolt or firearms on recumbent cattle in the pen. 
 Physical methods 
 Captive bolt and gunshot were both identified as effective methods to euthanize 
individual cattle but neither was considered an effective way to depopulate a large number of 
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cattle in a timely manner.  For captive bolt euthanasia, like IV euthanasia, each animal would be 
run through the chute, and removed after euthanasia in order to get the next animal in slowing 
this process down dramatically.  The timeliness would be improved if cattle were sedated in the 
chute and then released in an alleyway or pen for euthanasia, by captive bolt or gunshot, once 
they were recumbent.  Due to safety concerns of euthanizing sedated unrestrained cattle in an 
alleyway, personnel with trained sharp-shooting experience were considered to be a better option 
than captive bolt euthanasia of unrestrained sedated cattle.  Panelists agreed the most convenient, 
lowest cost option appeared to be the intramuscular injection of a combination of xylazine and 
ketamine for immobilization of animals while the animals are in the working alley followed by 
euthanasia with captive bolt or firearm after they are released.  An additional method that was 
discussed was sharpshooters depopulating unrestrained and unsedated cattle in an alleyway.  The 
panelists agreed that this method had high animal welfare, human safety, and public perception 
concerns. 
 Though carbon monoxide gas was not considered effective by the Delphi survey 
participants, the panelists did discuss whether it could be a timely method of depopulation.    
Panelists did not agree whether it was a timely, practical method.  
 Discussion 
 One method to combine expert opinion in an unbiased way is a Delphi process20.  A 
properly conducted Delphi survey greatly improves the chances of obtaining unbiased estimates 
that account for the knowledge and judgment of experts compared to traditional discussions and 
meetings21.  To control investigator bias the exploratory round of the Delphi survey was used to 
allow the participants to identify the methods to be further investigated.  In the exploratory round 
of questions for the Delphi survey each group of experts generated the list of possible agents or 
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methods that would be considered within their area of expertise.  Experts were asked to provide 
any agent or method that might be used to kill large numbers of cattle in a short period of time.  
These results were used to generate the subsequent iterative Delphi survey.  The Delphi process 
allows participants to provide feedback on questions without the bias associated with group 
pressure or dominant individual pressure as individuals can reassess their expert opinions based 
on anonymous information from previous iterations14.  Following the Delphi survey, the face to 
face discussion allowed the subject matter experts from each area to review and discuss the 
results.  The value of the face to face discussion is to allow group learning of the technical and 
practical aspects of the problem across disciplines15 and to arrive at a consensus of the “best” 
approach to a problem.  To control for bias in the round table discussion the moderator was 
present to allow the expert in the field being discussed to have the table at the start of each 
discussion.  The discussion was then allowed to flow with the moderator working to engage all 
experts in each field for each method.  The moderator also made sure that all Delphi identified 
effective methods were deliberated. 
 Despite the number of possible agents and methods included in the Delphi survey there 
were no agents or methods that were agreed upon as a safe, humane, and able to quickly kill 
large numbers of cattle (timeliness).  Veterinary consultants and feedlot managers indicated the 
most effective method for timely and humane depopulation in a large feedlot would be feeding a 
toxic agent.  The toxicologists agreed that several toxic agents would be effective but there was 
also agreement that animal welfare and safe disposal of carcasses was a high concern with the 
use of the toxicological agents for depopulation.  The addition of expertise from environmental 
toxicologists would strengthen the data reported here in terms of disposal concerns for toxic 
agents.  Veterinary toxicologists are sufficiently trained and have experience to identify agents of 
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concerns but they lack the training in environmental disposal that an environmental toxicologist 
would have been able to add to the discussion.  In the survey of pharmacological agents, 
pentobarbital was considered effective for euthanasia but there was concern over timeliness of 
euthanasia, disposal of carcasses and whether there would be sufficient drug supply available.  
Xylazine was agreed upon as an effective option for sedation followed by another method of 
euthanasia but again timeliness and supply were concerns.   
 AVMA’s guidelines distinguish depopulation activities, recognizing depopulation in 
some cases may not fit the definition for euthanasia.  While desiring to induce as little distress as 
possible, the goal of rapid depopulation may not be compatible with elimination of distress and 
euthanasia.  In the face to face discussion it was believed that a high dose of organophosphate 
could be used that would cause an acute death and minimize the animal welfare concerns for 
most cattle in a pen.  The human safety concern to the personnel was considered minimal due to 
the ability to effectively clean the equipment that would dispense the toxin in the feed.  The 
clinical signs that are present with organophosphate toxins are salivation, lacrimation, and 
diarrhea.  Though the organophosphates were deemed to be the best option for toxicological 
depopulation of a large feedlot there were substantial concerns over animal welfare and ability to 
dispose of the carcasses.  In the face to face discussion it was clear that using organophosphates 
in the feed would be considered a method of depopulation and not humane euthanasia leading to 
concerns over animal welfare and public perception.  Organophosphate compounds have been 
reported as highly toxic but the reports are from accidental exposures where the dose is often 
unknown.  This lack of knowledge related to dose complicates calculation of the needed dose in 
feed for reliable and quick death.  Due to the lack of data on appropriate dose for any toxic agent, 
use of a toxicological agent in feed would require a secondary option be immediately available to 
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humanely euthanize calves that did not die quickly.  Both firearms and captive bolt were 
regarded as options to humanely euthanize the cattle with concern for the safety and mental state 
of the personnel carrying out the process.  Furthermore, depopulation of cattle using intoxicants 
such as organophosphates would likely require burial of carcasses in landfills designated for 
hazardous waste depending on the lethal dose of the agent22 and would require additional 
manpower for transport.  A large number of cattle would likely strain or exceed the capacity of 
available nearby landfills designated for hazardous waste.   
 Carbon monoxide was discussed during the face to face discussion as being potentially 
timely but Delphi survey participants did not consider it effective.  Participants expressed 
concern over the concentration of carbon monoxide necessary for humane euthanasia and the 
welfare of personnel and animals.  Previous research found that guinea pigs collapsed in 40 
seconds to 2 minutes at 8% carbon monoxide concentration23.  Carbon monoxide does induce 
loss of consciousness with minimal discomfort and often rapid death, but significant care must 
be taken due to possible exposure to personnel with this technically complex method.  
Participants were concerned with providing an adequate carbon monoxide source and 
environment that would minimize the stress to the animals while allowing rapid rise in carbon 
monoxide levels and other noxious gases that are present in exhaust.  The AVMA euthanasia 
guidelines report that the carbon monoxide flow rate must be adequate to rapidly achieve a 
uniform concentration of at least 6%13.  Whether this concentration could be achieved utilizing 
an ad hoc system in a large feedlot is unknown but due to human health and animal welfare 
concerns a consensus was not reached on its effectiveness.  
 Pharmacological methods for depopulation were also contemplated and there was 
agreement with the results of the Delphi survey and the face to face discussion.  Sedation of 
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cattle with xylazine or a xylazine/ketamine combination followed by the use of a captive bolt or 
firearm for euthanasia was considered an acceptable and humane method for depopulation.  This 
would require working all cattle through an alley and chute to administer the sedative followed 
by release and then euthanasia of recumbent individuals in pens or alleyways.  A portion of cattle 
would likely not become recumbent and would require an alternate method for euthanasia such 
as gunshot by sharpshooters.  Braun, et al., demonstrated that xylazine at 0.5 mg/kg IM resulted 
in 52 out of 90 healthy cows lying down within 20.7 ± 8.4 minutes24.  Due to the uncertainty 
surrounding recumbency and concerns regarding xylazine supply, there was concern about the 
feasibility of this method.  Any method involving moving cattle through an alley and chute 
would require proper handling to minimize pain and distress in animals, to ensure safety of the 
person performing the euthanasia, and, often to protect other people and animals13.   This method 
would require the cattle to be handled twice (once through the chute and once while recumbent 
in the pen) but it would not require the cattle to be removed from the chute manually.  
Additionally as with the use of any chemicals for depopulation, disposal could potentially be 
complicated.  Panelists indicated in a large feedlot approximately 1,000 head could be worked 
through the chute for vaccination in a day.  Depending on the methods used for depopulation the 
daily number of head worked could be much lower.  If the feedlot had 50,000-100,000 head of 
cattle it would be very difficult to euthanize the animals in a timely manner and properly dispose 
of the carcasses.  
 The final methods of depopulation that were studied were physical methods.  With 
physical methods of euthanasia, welfare concerns included correct placement of the captive bolt 
or gun shot as well as having enough personnel that understand and are experienced in animal 
handling.  Lack of trained personnel was a reported welfare problem during the depopulation of 
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animals during the 2001 UK outbreak8 and a concern of the panelists.  The captive bolt would be 
a humane euthanasia method and it is currently 90% effective without a secondary step.  New 
research for an air-injection system for captive bolt could render it a one-step process.  With gun-
shot and current captive bolt technology, the acceptable secondary methods are pithing, shooting 
a second time, and using potassium chloride intravenously.  The panelists agreed that euthanasia 
with a captive bolt in restrained cattle in the chute is humane and preferred method but it would 
be difficult to depopulate a feedlot in a timely manner.  If animals are restrained in a chute for 
captive bolt, removal of the down cattle from the chute would dramatically slow the process.  
Participants agreed that utilizing sharpshooters and gunshot, while potentially faster, has 
concerns regarding animal welfare and the safety of personnel. There were additional concerns 
over having enough qualified personnel and the public perception of this method of 
depopulation.   
 For intoxicants, organophosphates were deemed the best option due to minimal operator 
or human safety concerns and the high toxicity of the agent.  Animal welfare concerns were high 
due to inconsistent consumption and a secondary option for euthanasia would be required.  Due 
to concerns with environmental residue issues and welfare concerns the use of intoxicants for 
depopulation was not considered an acceptable method.  Physical methods of euthanasia and 
depopulation such as captive bolt of cattle restrained in a chute were agreed upon to be an 
effective and safe method, for personnel and the animals, but it would not be a timely method to 
euthanatize a large feedlot because of delays in removing euthanized cattle from the chute.  Due 
to additional environmental residue concerns of intravenous pentobarbital sodium euthanasia as 
well as concerns of this method not being timely, captive bolt in the chute was considered the 
better of the two options and is often considered the method of choice in emergency euthanasia.  
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With prior sedation, firearm or captive bolt euthanasia was considered timely but the concern for 
personnel and animal welfare was high due to animals not being fully restrained in a chute for 
euthanasia.  The panelists agreed that the use of sharpshooters to euthanize the cattle had very 
high human safety, animal welfare, and public perception concerns.   
 While not the focus of the survey, for all methods, the removal and disposal of the 
carcasses was a frequent topic of concern during the round table discussion.  Panelists agreed a 
tremendous about of labor would be required for all methods including veterinarians and 
equipment operators.  Almost all of the experts at the discussion had experience with small 
numbers of animal carcasses due to disasters and related the difficult experience with animal 
removal and disposal.  Animals cannot be left in the environment for extended periods of time so 
the rate of depopulation should not exceed the rate of disposal.  Managing traffic of equipment to 
pull cattle away rapidly was considered a major issue.  Any method such as an IV injectable 
euthanasia or captive bolt in the chute that resulted in cattle dying in or near the chute was 
particularly concerning.  Moving a large number of carcasses in a feedlot in general was 
regarded as a very difficult task even with trained and experienced personnel on site.  
Participants agreed that during a FMD outbreak having enough trained and experienced 
personnel could also be an issue as well as proper burial of the large number of carcasses.  Burial 
of carcasses is considered the most cost efficient method of disposal of occasional livestock 
losses but it could pose serious pollution risk to local groundwater and surface water resources if 
thousands of tons of carcasses needed to be disposed of quickly25.  An additional concern if 
burial of a carcass with an intoxicant was allowed was the possibility of organophosphates, 
pentobarbital sodium, xylazine, or other agents leaching into the soil, groundwater 
contamination, and secondary poisoning (eagles, hawks, coyotes, foxes domestic dogs and cats).  
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The rate of disposal of the carcasses would be important to prevent secondary poisonings.  While 
not the focus of this project, the participants expressed concern that despite the difficulties of 
timely depopulation, timely and appropriate disposal may be an even bigger problem.   
 The panel participants suggested that an alternative to mass depopulation would be to 
humanely euthanize animals as needed based on clinical signs in the face of a FMD outbreak in a 
large feedlot while allowing the disease to run its course.  The size of FMD epidemics have been 
attributed to factors such as livestock density, effectiveness of control methods, late detection, 
and animal movement26-28.  If FMD was allowed to run its course in a feedlot, biosecurity would 
be a major concern to prevent the direct or indirect spread of the virus to other livestock 
operations as well welfare aspects of providing the animals with feed under quarantine.  Since 
FMD does not affect humans, the animals could still be salvaged and slaughtered once the 
feedlot was no longer having new cases of disease.   
Vaccination may be effective in decreasing transmission between and even within 
feedlots, decreasing the need for depopulation.  Perez et. al, found that vaccination of cattle and 
movement restrictions significantly decreased the transmission of the virus in the 2001 FMD 
epidemic in Argentina29.  Vaccination is more widely used in conjunction with depopulation to 
control the spread of the highly infectious FMD virus30.  In the 2001 FMD outbreak in the 
Netherlands and the 2001 outbreak in Uruguay; after depopulating infected herds for a period of 
time, vaccination was initiated and was successful in stopping the outbreak11.  In the U.S, a 
vaccine has been developed that enables vaccinated cattle to be distinguished from those that 
were naturally infected with the disease31.  Such a vaccine could make the slaughter of 
vaccinated animals unnecessary to regain trade status.   
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 The goal of every response effort will be to stop the spread of the FMD but the best 
strategy will depend on many factors.  The United States Department of Agriculture states in 
their FMD Response Plan that emergency vaccination may be considered and the strategy 
decision will be influenced by many factors including the location of the outbreak, FMD vaccine 
availability, and the resources available to implement response strategies32. 
 Conclusion 
 No clearly acceptable method of rapidly depopulating a large feedlot was identified from 
this survey and discussion.  All methods identified had serious drawbacks.  Participants agreed 
that regardless of the method used for depopulation of cattle in a large feedlot, it would be very 
difficult to complete the task quickly, humanely, and be able to dispose of the carcasses.  These 
results suggest that control of FMD in large feedlots will require other methods than 
depopulation and available alternatives should be researched.     
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Table 3.1 – Agents identified by veterinary toxicologists in the exploratory phase of the 
survey and attributes for mass euthanasia/depopulation of cattle in a large feedlot in the 
United States from the Delphi survey. 
Agent Effectiveness Human 
Health Risk 
Animal 
Welfare 
Concerns 
Carcass 
Disposal 
Concerns 
Availability 
of Sufficient 
Supply 
Arsenic Not effective Minimal 
concerns  
High 
concerns 
High 
concerns 
Minimal 
concerns 
Cyanide Highly 
effective 
High 
concerns 
High 
concerns 
No concerns Moderate 
concerns 
Nitrates Moderately  
effective 
No concerns High 
concerns 
No concerns Minimal 
concerns 
Nitrite Moderately 
effective 
No concerns High 
concerns 
No concerns Minimal 
concerns 
Urea  Moderately 
effective 
No concerns High 
concerns 
No concerns Minimal 
concerns 
Aluminum 
phosphide 
Highly 
effective 
High 
concerns 
High 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
Strychnine 
coated milo 
Highly 
effective 
Moderate 
concerns 
High 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
Organophos-
phates  
Highly 
effective 
High 
concerns 
High 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
No concerns 
Taxus sp. Moderately Minimal High Minimal Moderate 
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effective concerns concerns concerns concerns 
Bluegreen 
algae 
Moderately 
effective 
No concerns High 
concerns 
Minimal 
concerns 
High 
concerns 
Oleander Moderately 
effective 
No concerns High 
concerns 
Minimal 
concerns 
High 
concerns 
Carbon 
monoxide 
Minimally 
effective 
High 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
No concerns Minimal 
concerns 
Carbamates Highly 
effective 
Moderate 
concerns 
High 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
No concerns 
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Table 3.2 - Agents identified by veterinary pharmacologists in the exploratory phase of the 
survey and attributes for mass euthanasia/depopulation of cattle in a large feedlot in the 
United States from the Delphi survey. 
Agent Effectiveness Human 
Health 
Risk 
Animal 
Welfare 
Concerns 
Carcass 
Disposal 
Concerns 
Availability 
of Sufficient 
Supply 
Pentobarbital 
sodium IV 
Highly 
effective 
Minimal 
concerns 
Minimal 
concerns 
High 
concerns 
High concerns 
T61 euthanasia 
solution 
Minimally 
effective 
Moderate 
concerns 
High concerns High 
concerns 
High concerns 
Potassium 
chloride 
Minimally 
effective 
Moderate 
concerns 
High concerns No concerns Minimal 
concerns 
Magnesium 
chloride 
Minimally 
effective 
Moderate 
concerns 
High concerns No concerns Moderate 
concerns 
Pentobarbital 
IM* 
Minimally 
effective 
Moderate 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
High 
concerns 
High concerns 
Xylazine* Highly 
effective 
Moderate 
concerns 
Minimal 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
Xylazine/ 
Ketamine* 
Moderately 
effective 
Moderate 
concerns 
Minimal 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
Acepromazine 
injection* 
Moderately 
effective 
Moderate 
concerns 
Minimal 
concerns 
Minimal 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
Potent opiates Moderately High Moderate Moderate Moderate 
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via darting* effective concerns concerns concerns concerns 
Acepromazine 
granulates* 
Moderately 
effective 
Minimal 
concerns 
Minimal 
concerns 
Minimal 
concerns 
Moderate 
concerns 
*agent identified for sedation prior to euthanasia/depopulation 
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Table 3.3 - Animal behaviorists evaluation of animal welfare and public perception 
concerns associated with specific methods of mass euthanasia/depopulation of cattle in a 
large feedlot in the United States and the Delphi survey results. 
Methods of Depopulation Animal Welfare Concerns Public Perception Concerns 
Penetrating captive bolt while 
in a chute 
Minimal concerns No concerns 
Penetrating captive bolt in a 
lane or pen after cattle have 
been sedated in a chute and 
released 
Minimal concerns Minimal concerns 
Intravenous injection while in 
a chute 
Minimal concerns Minimal concerns 
Feeding a toxic agent to cattle 
while in pens 
High concerns High concerns 
Sharpshooters shooting cattle 
while grouped in a lane or pen 
Moderate concerns Moderate concerns 
Carbon monoxide, cattle 
would be herded in a silage pit 
with a tarp over the top 
Moderate concerns Moderate concerns 
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Table 3.4 - Veterinary consultant and feedlot manager list of possible methods and the 
evaluation of their effectiveness to mass euthanasia/depopulation of cattle in a large feedlot 
in the United States and the Delphi survey results. 
Methods of Depopulation Effectiveness 
 Veterinarians Managers 
Penetrating captive bolt while 
in a chute 
Minimally 
effective 
Minimally 
effective 
Penetrating captive bolt in a 
lane or pen after cattle have 
been sedated in a chute 
Moderately 
effective 
Minimally 
effective 
Intravenous injection while in 
a chute 
Minimally 
effective 
Minimally 
effective 
Feeding a toxic agent to cattle 
while in pens 
Highly effective Highly effective 
Gunshot by sharpshooters 
shooting cattle while grouped 
in a pen or lane 
Moderately 
effective 
Not effective 
Carbon monoxide, cattle 
would be herded into a silage 
pit with a tarp over the top 
Moderately 
effective 
Minimally 
effective 
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 Abstract 
The central United States (U.S.) has a large livestock population including cattle, swine, 
sheep and goats. Simulation models were developed to assess the impact of livestock herd types 
and vaccination on Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreaks using the North American Animal 
Disease Spread Model (NAADSM), a spatially explicit, stochastic infectious disease model.  In 
this study, a potential FMD virus outbreak in the central region of the U.S. was simulated 
comparing different vaccination strategies to a depopulation only scenario.  Based on data from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Statistic Service, a simulated 
population of livestock operations was generated.  The population included 151,620 herds 
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defined by latitude and longitude, production type, and herd size.  For the simulations, a single 
17,000 head feedlot was selected as the initial latently infected herd in an otherwise susceptible 
population.  Direct and indirect contact rates between herds were based on survey data of 
livestock producers in Kansas and Colorado.  The control methods included ring vaccination 
around infected herds.  Feedlots >3,000 head were either the only production type that was 
vaccinated or had the highest vaccination priority.  Simulated vaccination protocols included low 
and high vaccine capacity based on results from a livestock producer survey, vaccination zones 
of 10 km or 50 km, and vaccination trigger of 10 herds or 100 herds.  A sensitivity analysis of 
the biosecurity, movement control and contact rate parameters was done.  All vaccination 
scenarios decreased number of herds depopulated but not all decreased outbreak duration.  When 
feedlots >3,000 head had the highest vaccination priority few other production types were 
vaccinated in most scenarios.  Increased size of the vaccination zone during an outbreak 
decreased the length of the outbreak and number of herds destroyed.  Increasing the vaccination 
capacity had a smaller impact on the outbreak and may not be feasible if vaccine production and 
delivery is limited.  Outbreak duration and number of herds depopulated were sensitive to 
biosecurity practices and movement restrictions. Vaccination was not beneficial compared to 
depopulation alone to control the outbreak when biosecurity and movement restrictions were 
increased.  The results of this study will provide information about the impacts of disease control 
protocols which may be useful in choosing the optimal control methods to meet the goal of rapid 
effective control and eradication.  
. 
125 
 
 Introduction 
 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is a highly contagious disease that affects all cloven-
hooved animals and is endemic in parts of Asia, Africa and South America.  The FMD virus can 
spread rapidly through susceptible livestock populations prior to the appearance of clinical signs 
(Burrows, 1968; Burrows et al., 1981) subsequently early detection prior to the spread of the 
disease is difficult.  FMD is a major constraint to international trade because countries currently 
free of FMD, like the United States (U.S.), take every precaution to prevent the entry of the 
disease.  The U.S. livestock population is naïve to FMD with the last outbreak occurring in 1929 
(Graves, 1979).  In the U.S. the concern for FMD virus re-introduction and the potential 
economic impacts have risen with the increase of international travel and trade of animals and 
animal products.  At the same time agriculture has become more concentrated with larger capital 
investments (Hueston, 1993) resulting in increased risk.  
 During a 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom (U.K.) more than 6 million animals 
were culled for disease control or welfare problems resulting from animal movement restrictions 
(National Audit Office, 2005).  The total estimated cost was $6 to $10 billion (Anderson, 2002).  
A secure food supply is vital to the economy with U.S. farms selling $297 billion in agriculture 
products through market outlets in 2007 (USDA-NASS 2007). The potential impact of an 
outbreak in the U.S. would be devastating.  Because FMD is a foreign animal disease, 
epidemiological disease modeling is the only avenue available to study the potential impacts of 
and effective control strategies for an introduction.  In the U.S., epidemiological disease models 
have been used to estimate the potential economic impacts of an outbreak.  Pendell et al. (2007) 
estimated economic losses of an outbreak confined to Kansas ranged from $43 to $706 million 
depending on the type of livestock herd that was initially infected.  In an economic model of the 
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impact to the entire U.S., Paarlberg et al. (2002) estimated that a FMD outbreak could decrease 
U.S. farm income by approximately $14 billion and in 2012 it was estimated that an outbreak 
originating from the proposed National Bio- and Agri-Defense Facility in Kansas could exceed 
$100 billion in costs (NBAF, 2012).   
   Previous studies that have modeled FMD outbreak in the central U.S. have relied on 
expert opinion or contact rates adapted from other regions (Pendell et al., 2007; Greathouse, 
2010; Premashthira, 2012).  Epidemiological disease models are dependent on accurate estimates 
of the frequency and distance distribution of contacts between livestock operations to estimate 
disease spread and impact, and to guide control measures (Gibbens et al., 2001; Woolhouse and 
Donaldson, 2001; Dickey et al., 2008; Premashthira et al., 2011).  Control measures, such as, 
movement restrictions, increased biosecurity, depopulation, pre-emptive culling, and vaccination 
have been implemented in various combinations to decrease the spread of the outbreak 
(Ferguson et al., 2001; Gibbens et al., 2001; Bouma et al., 2003; Sutmoller et al., 2003; Perez et 
al., 2004; Pluimers, 2004; Yoon et al., 2006; Volkova et al., 2011).  Depending on the size of the 
outbreak, timeliness of control implementation, the workforce capacity, and the available 
resources, the control strategy will also vary.  In the face of a FMD outbreak, well-informed 
decisions on the best control strategy will need to be made.  Within the U.S. there are regional 
differences in production types, management systems, operation size distributions, distance 
distributions that make comparison between regions difficult.  In order to produce the most 
accurate results for the region producer-reported contact data was used to parameterize the 
model.  The objective of this study was to model FMD outbreaks to identify vaccination control 
measures based on their effectiveness in controlling the outbreak duration and number of herds 
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depopulated.  A secondary objective was to analyze the sensitivity of the model to specific input 
parameters. 
 Materials and Methods 
 Study Population 
 The simulated population was based on the 2007 NASS data and production types 
adjusted according to criteria by Melius et al. (2006).  The study area included Wyoming, South 
Dakota, Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, the northern region of New Mexico and Oklahoma, and the 
Texas Panhandle (Fig. 1).  There were 151,620 livestock herds in the simulated study area in 
2007 (USDA, 2007) including 86,655 cow/calf, 3,232 dairy, 979 large feedlots (>3,000 head), 
25,096 small feedlots (<3,000 head), 1,071 large swine (>1,000 head), 6,463 small swine 
(<1,000 head), 5,159 beef and swine, and 22,965 small ruminant herds.  Seven percent of beef 
and swine operations were randomly re-designated from the population of cow/calf operations 
and small swine based on a livestock survey of the same region in which approximately 7% of 
herds reported having beef cattle and swine (McReynolds et al., in press).  The total population 
was 39,413,228 animals in all production types (Table 1).  
 Simulation model 
 The North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM), an open source (Harvey 
and Reeves, 2010) herd-based spatial stochastic epidemic simulation model (Schoenbaum and 
Disney, 2003; Harvey et al., 2007) was used to model FMD eradication strategies.  Scenarios 
were simulated for various FMD vaccination protocols compared to a depopulation only 
scenario.  Modeled scenarios are reported in Table 2 and include variations in vaccine capacity, 
vaccination zone diameter, and the number of infected herds required to initiate a vaccination 
program.  Simulated vaccination protocols included low and high vaccine capacity based on 
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results from a Kansas and Colorado livestock producer survey.  The livestock survey asked 
producers to report the time it would take to vaccinate their entire herd including tagging and 
keeping records.  Vaccination priority was either large feedlot only (low vaccine capacity 1 herd 
per day by day 22 and 3 herds per day by day 40 and high vaccine capacity 8 herds per day by 
day 22 and 15 herds per day by day 40) or all herd types (low vaccine capacity 5 herds per day 
by day 22 and 10 herds per day by day 40 and high vaccine capacity 50 herds per day by day 22 
and 80 herds per day by day 40).  Vaccination priority from highest to lowest for scenarios where 
all herd types could be vaccinated was: large feedlot (≥3,000 head), small feedlot (<3,000 head), 
large swine (≥1,000 head), small swine (<1,000 head), beef-swine, dairy, cow-calf, and small 
ruminant.  The low vaccine capacity was to simulate administration by USDA personnel and the 
high capacity producer administration of vaccine.  The vaccinated animals remain in the 
population unless infected after their immune period ends.   
 Distributions of the clinical stages of FMD were based on a meta-analysis of the duration 
of the disease states where the infectious period was reported including the subclinical and 
clinical periods (Mardones et al., 2010).  The clinical infectious period distribution for cattle, 
swine and small ruminants was calculated by using monte-carlo simulation (@Risk 5.01, 
Palisade Corp., Ithaca, NY, USA) to sample 10,000 values from the subclinical infectious period 
and the infectious period reported in Mardones et al. (2010).  When the sampled value from the 
infectious period was greater than the sampled value for the subclinical period, the value for the 
subclinical period was subtracted from the sampled values for the infectious period.  Values were 
discarded when the sampled subclinical value was greater than the infectious value.  The 
resulting distribution of values was fit to a theoretical distribution (@Risk 5.0.1) to estimate the 
clinical infectious period for use in NAADSM.  The probability of infection following a direct 
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contact was based on within-herd prevalence as a function of time since infection.  The 
distributions for within herd prevalence for NAADSM were produced using a within herd 
prevalence model (WH) (Reeves, 2012) based on estimates for the latent, subclinical infectious, 
and clinical infectious stages.  The WH model operates at the level of the individual animal, and 
incorporates sources of individual-level variation such as variability in the durations of 
incubating and infectious periods, the stochastic nature of the disease spread among individuals, 
the effects of vaccination, and disease mortality (Reeves et al., in preparation).  Direct and 
indirect contacts between livestock production types were based on a livestock contact survey in 
the central U.S. (McReynolds et al., in press) (Table 3 and 4).  The direct contact rate was 
calculated from the reported count of contacts between specific production types to provide an 
overall production type specific daily contact rate (McReynolds et al., in press).  Destination-
source combinations for indirect contact were calculated based on the total number of support 
industry contacts with each production type, multiplied by the proportion of all support industry 
visits made to the respective production type to produce the number of daily contacts between 
each destination source combination.  The daily indirect contact rate between each production 
type was adjusted based on the assumption that not all production types are equally connected 
(beef operations are more connected with each other than with swine operations).  The daily 
mean direct (Table 3) and indirect contact rate (Table 4) between production types were used to 
parameterize the model.  Actual contacts between production types in the NAADSM model were 
generated from a Poisson distribution with lambda equal to the mean contact rate for that 
production type combination.  
 Model parameters were set to allow virus to spread by direct contact, indirect contact, and 
airborne/local spread.  In NAADSM a direct contact represents the movement of infected 
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livestock between premises.  An indirect contact is a fomite such as contaminated vehicle, 
equipment, clothing, or a person. The probability of airborne spread at 1 km was 0.5% and the 
maximum distance of spread was 3 km.  For all scenarios, 1) the days to first disease detection 
was generated by the NAADSM model; 2) the probability of indirect disease transmission 
following indirect contact between an infected and susceptible herd was held fixed at 20% for all 
production types except swine which was set at 30% to account for increased FMD virus 
shedding by swine; 3) direct contact through animal movement was reduced to 10% of pre-
outbreak levels by day 7 and indirect contacts were reduced to 30% of pre-outbreak levels by day 
7 after disease detection; and 4) depopulation capacity was set at 8 herds/day by day 10 and 16 
herds/day by day 30 after disease detection.  In all simulations, quarantine of infected premises 
and a ban on livestock movement from infected premises was assumed.  Depopulation was set to 
begin on day 2 after first disease detection of the outbreak.  For all herds that were detected as 
positive, direct contacts were identified, traced forward, and depopulated.  All scenarios were run 
for 200 iterations.  The end of the active disease phase was the endpoint for all scenarios.  
 Experimental design 
 In all scenarios a single 17,000 head feedlot in Northeast Colorado was latently infected.  
Seventeen different disease mitigation strategies were simulated (Table 4).   
 Sensitivity Analysis 
 Values of selected parameters were varied from baseline values in a sensitivity analysis to 
assess their independent influence on the disease modeling results.  The 17 scenarios were 
simulated for each variable change.  The baseline probability of transmission given indirect 
contact was 20% and the sensitivity analysis assessed it at 15% and 25%.  Sensitivity analysis of 
the contact rates were also completed with the direct contact rates adjusted to +/- 20% and +/-
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50% of the baseline rate parameter.  Sensitivity of the indirect contact rates for each production 
type combination was assessed by increasing all production type combination rates by 20% from 
the calculated parameter, and decreasing all production type combinations by 20% from the 
calculated parameter for all scenarios.  Lastly the influence of indirect movement controls was 
assessed by changing the baseline indirect movement control of 30% of pre-outbreak levels to 
20% and 40% of pre-outbreak movement levels. 
 Data analysis 
 The NAADSM model produced results for each day of the outbreak for each iteration.  
The results from each scenario were aggregated into weekly and daily outcome counts for each 
iteration of each scenario.  Summary statistics were generated for each of the scenarios.  
Outbreak duration was calculated to the end of the active disease phase of the outbreak.  Analysis 
was performed in commercially available software Stata12.1, (StataCorp., 2011) and in open 
source 64 bit R 2.15.2 (R development core team, 2011).  To test the statistical differences 
between scenarios, a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance was used to identify 
significant differences in outbreak duration and number of herds depopulated controlling for 
multiple comparisons at p<0.05 according to the method of Holm (1979) implemented in R.   
 Results 
 In all scenarios the main source of new infections was indirect contacts with 
approximately 95% of infected herds resulting from an indirect contact and the remaining 5% 
infected from direct contact or airborne spread.  In all scenarios the median first day of detection 
was at 10 or 11 days.  For scenario 1, depopulation without vaccination, there was a sharp peak 
in the weekly number of detected herds compared to the scenarios with vaccination (Figure 2).  
In scenario 1 there were 104 new herds detected during week 18 and during week 28 342 herds 
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were detected.  In scenario 2, with a small vaccine capacity and small vaccination zone, 74 new 
herds were detected during week 18 and 60 herds were newly detected during week 28.  The 
total median number of herds detected as clinically infected in scenario 1 was 10,139 which 
represented approximately 6.5% of the herds in the region.  All vaccination scenarios had fewer 
detected clinical herds, for example, scenario 2 had a median of 2,183 clinically infected herds 
while scenario 4 had 419 clinically infected herds.  
 Outbreak Duration 
The model outcomes are reported in Table 5.  The scenarios with a vaccination zone of 
50 km (scenarios 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 16, and 17), had a shorter median and 90th percentile duration 
compared to the scenarios with a 10 km vaccination zone (scenarios 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, and 
15); the best eight ranked scenarios for shortest duration all had a 50 km vaccination zone (Table 
5).  Scenario 16 had the shortest outbreak duration followed by scenario 4, 8, 12, and 17.  The 
vaccination capacity and the number of herds infected prior to starting vaccination had less 
impact with both high and low vaccination capacity and number of herds infected to initiate 
vaccination represented in the top ranked scenarios.  Scenario 1 ranked 10th in outbreak duration 
despite being a depopulation only scenario with no vaccination.  Scenarios 7, 10, and 2 had the 
three longest outbreak durations and all had a vaccination zone of 10 km.  Additionally, 
scenarios 7 and 10 had a late vaccination trigger of 100 herds infected prior to the initiation of 
vaccination. 
 Number of herds depopulated  
Scenario 1 had a median of 6,890 herds depopulated and the distribution was heavily 
skewed toward higher numbers depopulated (Table 5).  In scenario 1, the median number of 
herds depopulated included all large feedlot and dairy herds in the population.  All vaccination 
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scenarios decreased the number of herds depopulated compared to scenario 1 and scenario 1 was 
the only scenario with herds waiting to be depopulated at the end of the active disease phase 
(2,830 herds waiting, data not shown).  Scenario 16 depopulated the lowest number of herds 
followed by scenarios 4, 8, and 17 which did not significantly differ.  The best 7 scenarios with 
the lowest number of depopulated herds all had a vaccination zone radius of 50 km.       
 Herds vaccinated 
 Scenario 11 vaccinated the fewest number of herds followed by scenarios 3 and 7 which 
did not differ from each other (Table 5).  The best 8 scenarios that vaccinated the fewest number 
of herds only vaccinated large feedlots.  None of these scenarios were among the best scenarios 
for outbreak duration or number of herds depopulated.  The only scenarios in which all 
production types were vaccinated were scenarios 6 and 14 which had a high vaccine capacity and 
a small zone size.  Due to vaccine capacity in the remaining scenarios only large and small 
feedlots were vaccinated.  In scenarios with large feedlot vaccination priority, a large vaccination 
zone and high vaccine capacity (scenarios 8 and 16) there was a sharp peak at the beginning of 
the outbreak in the number of animals vaccinated but it dropped off sooner than the scenarios 
with a small zone and high capacity (scenarios 6 and 14) (Figure 3).  The median of the 
maximum number of animals vaccinated in a 1 week period ranged from 163,124 to 963,427, 
and the maximum 90th percentile ranged from 251,883 to 2.5 million animals in one week 
depending on vaccine capacity and zone size. 
 Sensitivity analysis 
The probability of transmission of FMD virus following indirect contact was 20% in the 
baseline scenarios and in the sensitivity analysis it was increased to 25% and decreased to 15%.  
Probability of indirect transmission was influential within the range examined in determining the 
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duration of the outbreak, the number of herds depopulated and vaccinated.  Vaccination was less 
influential in mitigating the effects of an outbreak when probability of transmission following 
indirect contact was decreased to 15%.  In all scenarios when the probability of indirect 
transmission was 15% the median duration of the outbreak was approximately 100 days (range 
93-150) (Figure 4) and the median number of herds depopulated was approximately 50 (range 
36-83) (Figure 5).  The number of herds depopulated decreased by over 90% in most scenarios 
(range 82-99%) when the probability of indirect transmission was 15% and increased by over 
200% in all but scenario 1 when the probability of indirect transmission was 25% (range 218-
1381%) (Table 6) When the probability of indirect transmission was 25% the median duration of 
the outbreak was over 500 days for most scenarios (range 418-792) (Figure 4), and the median 
number of herds depopulated was over 5000 for all scenarios except 8, 16 and 17 (Figure 5).  In 
scenarios with a vaccination zone of 50 km, when the probability of indirect transmission was 
increased to 25%, the median duration of the outbreak increased by over 100% compared to an 
increase of less than 5% in the scenarios with a vaccination zone of 10 km (Table 7).   
Changes in the indirect contact movement controls were influential within the range 
examined in determining the outbreak duration, the number of herds depopulated and vaccinated 
(Figures 7, 8, 9).  When indirect movement controls were increased to achieve 20% of pre-
outbreak levels the median duration of all scenarios was approximately 100 days (range 85-120) 
(Figure 7) and median herds depopulated decreased 65-95% (Table 6) to approximately 50 herds 
(range 39-66) (Figure 8).  When indirect movement controls were set at 40% of pre-outbreak 
levels median duration of the outbreak was approximately 500 days for all scenarios (range 481-
726) (Figure 7), and the median number of herds depopulated increased over 200% for all but 
scenario 1 (Table 6) to over 5000 for all scenarios except 8 and 16 (Figure 8). 
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Changes in the indirect contact rates between herds were influential in the number of 
herds depopulated, but less so on outbreak duration.  When indirect contact rates were decreased 
by 20% the 10th percentile of outbreak duration was decreased approximately 25-72% (Table 7 
and Figure 10).  Median number of herds depopulated ranged decreased 65-97% (Table 6) to 58 
to 584 herds (Figure 11).  When indirect contact rates were increased by 20% the median number 
of herds depopulated increased 60-89% (Table 6) to greater than 5,000 herds for all scenarios 
except 4, 8, 16 and 17.   
Sensitivity analysis scenarios ranked similarly to the baseline with scenario 16 or 17 
always having the fewest number of herds depopulated for all sensitivity scenarios.   Scenarios 8 
and 4 were also among the best ranking scenarios for the lowest median number of herds 
depopulated but scenario 12 only ranked among the best five scenarios when the indirect contact 
rate was decreased by 20%.  Scenario 1 was ranked in the best 5 scenarios for number of herds 
depopulated when movement controls were either 20% or 40% of pre-outbreak indirect contact 
levels or when the indirect contact rate was increased by 20% (Table 8).  The sensitivity analysis 
scenario rankings for outbreak duration showed more variation from the baseline and among the 
sensitivity scenarios.  Scenario 4 was always among the best five scenarios for outbreak duration 
and scenario 16 was among the best five in all sensitivity scenarios except when indirect 
movement control was 40% of pre-outbreak indirect contact levels.  Scenario 1 was ranked best 
for outbreak duration in the sensitivity analysis scenario where indirect movement control was 
40% of pre-outbreak indirect contact levels and among the best five scenarios for outbreak 
duration when indirect transmission probability was 25% and when the indirect contact rate was 
increased by 20% (Table 8).   
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Increasing direct contact rate by 20% or 50% had little impact of the outcome of the 
results (data not shown). 
 Discussion 
 General discussion 
 Because of the nature of FMD as a highly infective foreign animal disease, the 
only method to assess the impact in the U.S. of an introduction and effectiveness and effect of 
control is through modeling.  Control methods in the face of an outbreak of FMD include 
movement controls on livestock and support industries, increased biosecurity such as disinfection 
of traffic on and off the farm, slaughter of affected and in contact or high risk animals, and 
vaccination; in this study biosecurity, movement controls, and vaccination protocols were 
analyzed to determine the impact of the different control methods.   
 Despite the large region represented in the model, in reality not all movements would be 
confined to the modeled area as in this hypothetical FMD outbreak, so a real outbreak could 
spread further.  The duration of the epidemic modeled in the Texas Panhandle region had a 
median of 25-52 days (Ward et al., 2009) which was much shorter than the results reported in the 
study reported here where median duration ranged from 181-608 days.  Ward et al. (2009) was 
confined to an eight county region and the outbreak could easily be larger following spread to 
other regions.  We chose an initially latent herd in the central location of our population to allow 
the most geographic freedom of disease spread and minimize any geographic boundary effect in 
the results.   
The median number of herds detected as clinically infected for scenario 1 represented 
approximately 6.5% (10,139 /151,620) of the herds in the study population and scenario 2 
represented 1.4% (2,183/151,620) of the herds.  The results of scenario 2 are comparable to 2001 
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U.K. FMD outbreak where 1.4% of herds were reported as infected (Keeling et al., 2001) and an 
FMD model of 3 counties in California where 2% of herds were infected (Bates et al., 2003b).  
In the study reported here, scenario 16 had the lowest number of infected herds detected at 
0.16% followed by scenario 4 at 0.3% of the herds detected as clinically infected based on visual 
inspection only.     
In scenarios 4, 8, 12, and 16 where all production types were eligible for vaccination with 
large feedlots as the first priority, outbreak duration was significantly shorter than the same 
scenario with vaccination only in large feedlots (scenarios 5, 9, 13 and 17).  However scenario 
17, the same as 16 but with vaccination in large feedlots only, was ranked fifth shortest in 
duration of outbreak.  Scenarios 4, 8, 12, 16, and 17 all had a large vaccine zone but varied in 
vaccine capacity and vaccine trigger.  Our data is consistent with a large vaccination zone having 
the biggest impact on the duration of outbreak.  Bates et al. (2003b) found that vaccinating all 
herds within 50 km of an infected herd was an effective strategy to reduce duration of outbreak 
when modeling a FMD outbreak in 3-county region of California.  In this regional study the 
outbreaks in scenarios with the large vaccination zone lasted the shortest number of days despite 
not all the herds in the zone getting vaccinated due to capacity limitations.    
Scenarios 7, 10, and 2 had a longer duration of outbreak when compared to scenario 1 
(only depopulation).  Each of these scenarios had a small vaccination zone and low vaccination 
capacity.  The duration of the outbreak may potentially be shorter in scenario 1 due to rapid 
expansion and burnout without vaccination to slow the spread of the virus.  The number of 
detected herds in scenario 1 had a steeper peak compared to scenarios with a longer duration of 
outbreak (Figure 2).  Scenario 1 had median peak of 458 new clinically detected herds on week 
32 and then fell rapidly.  Scenarios 2, 7 and 10 had a peak of approximately 80 new clinically 
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detected herds at week 22 but the outbreak persisted longer.  There are likely a lower number of 
susceptible herds in scenario 2 due to the vaccination but the vaccination control is not able to 
stop the outbreak resulting in extended outbreak duration.  Limited vaccination programs may 
limit the number of infections without effectively bringing the outbreak to an end.  Perez et al. 
(2004) concluded from the Argentina outbreak in 2001 that mass vaccination can be useful in 
controlling a large epidemic but that it could take a long time to bring the outbreak under control 
(Perez et al., 2004).  The number of herds depopulated reported here however, was decreased in 
all vaccination scenarios including 2, 7 and 10.  Based on number of herds depopulated, scenario 
2, 7, and 10 control methods are advantageous compared to scenario 1 despite the longer 
duration of outbreak.  An economic analysis of a subset of these scenarios however indicated that 
outbreak duration was a major determinate of outbreak cost (Schroeder et al. in review).  
In the baseline scenarios number of herds depopulated was the greatest for scenario 1 and 
the least for scenario 16 (Table 5).  In scenario 1, the number of herds depopulated was much 
higher than the scenarios that included vaccination.  The outbreak in scenario 1 spread rapidly 
and it was the only scenario with herds waiting to be depopulated at the end of the active disease 
phase having exceeded the depopulation capacity and not caught up with the depopulation 
backlog.  Scenario 16, which had a large vaccination capacity as well as a large vaccination 
zone, was able to contain the spread by decreasing the number of susceptible herds.  Due to 
workforce and vaccine capacity, the high capacity vaccination in a large zone might not be 
feasible during an outbreak.  After scenario 16, scenarios 4, 8, and 17 depopulated the least 
number of herds and all had a large vaccination zone, though vaccination capacity varied.  These 
results support the value of vaccination strategies, particularly those with large vaccination 
zones, to control disease impact.   
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The number of herds vaccinated was lowest in scenarios 11, 3 and 7 which all had a low 
vaccine capacity and vaccinated only large feedlots.  Our low vaccination capacity for the 
scenarios where only large feedlots were vaccinated and where all herds were eligible but large 
feedlots were the first priority were meant to represent vaccine administration by USDA 
personnel only.  Livestock production type had priority over days waiting in queue for 
vaccination so the only scenarios where any production type besides feedlots were vaccinated 
were scenarios that had a high vaccination capacity and a small zone.  However, these small zone 
and high capacity scenarios had outbreaks that lasted longer, leading to more herds being 
vaccinated compared to high capacity and large zone scenarios.  The two scenarios that had the 
highest number of herds vaccinated (scenarios 14 and 6) had high vaccination capacity with a 
small zone, vaccinated all herd types and exceeded 30,000 herds vaccinated.  The ability to 
vaccinate all the production types surrounding an infected herd did not appear as beneficial as 
priority vaccination of feedlot production type that have high numbers of indirect contacts.   
The high vaccine capacity scenarios were meant to represent vaccination being carried 
out by the farmers and ranchers as was done in the 2001 Uruguay outbreak.  Data from the 
Uruguay outbreak indicates an average vaccination rate of 350,000 cattle per day in each round 
of vaccination (Sutmoller et al., 2003) which is a higher rate than in our high vaccine capacity 
scenarios where the median of the maximum animals vaccinated in a 1 week period was 
963,427, and similar to the 90th percentile (2.5 million animals in one week).  In the U.S., animal 
health officials could have some concerns of producers administering FMD vaccine since it is a 
restricted and controlled vaccine.   
Minimizing the number of herds vaccinated is not the appropriate measure of the best 
vaccination strategy but rather identifying the most efficient use of vaccination.  Scenarios 16, 4, 
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8, 12 and 17 had the shortest duration of outbreak and the lowest number of herds depopulated.  
The number of herds vaccinated differed greatly between the scenarios.  Scenarios16 and 8 had a 
high vaccine capacity with large feedlots having first priority and vaccinated approximately 
10,000 herds, compared to scenarios 4 and 12 which had a low vaccine capacity and vaccinated 
approximately 1,800 herds. However, in scenario 17 only large feedlots were vaccinated 
resulting in 1,329 herds vaccinated and the number of herds depopulated was similar to scenarios 
4, 8 and 12.  There may be efficiencies associated with concentrating vaccination to fewer herds 
such as large feedlots only in scenario 17.  Animals in large feedlots are also a natural vaccinate 
to die (slaughter) population perhaps facilitating restoration of FMD free without vaccination 
status.  Depopulating vaccinated animals would be a massive waste of human protein nutrition.       
The top five ranking scenarios for outbreak duration and number of depopulated herds 
contained scenarios with both 10 and 100 herds infected prior to the initiation of vaccination 
suggesting the decision to vaccinate may not need to be made at the very beginning of the 
outbreak.  Vaccination zone size was most important.  All five top ranked scenarios for the 
duration of the outbreak and number of herds depopulated had large vaccination zones.  None of 
the top ranked scenarios had the low large feedlot only vaccination capacity.  In the scenarios 
where all herds were eligible for vaccination but large feedlots had first priority followed by 
small feedlots, the only scenarios where any production type besides large and small feedlots 
were vaccinated were scenarios that had a large vaccination capacity and small vaccination zone 
(scenarios 6 and 14).  The scenarios with the large feedlots having first priority had a higher 
vaccine capacity compared to matched scenarios with large feedlot only vaccination (i.e. 
scenarios 4 and 5, 8 and 9, 12 and 13, and 16 and 17) which allowed more large feedlots as well 
as small feedlots to get vaccinated.  The increased vaccine capacity did improve the impact of 
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the control methods although scenario 17 did rank in the top five scenarios for depopulation and 
outbreak duration.  Vaccination does not require the time or the quantity of labor that are needed 
for depopulation and disposal of carcasses.  The disadvantages of vaccination is the delay before 
protection of almost a week (Salt et al., 1998), the challenge of producing sufficient quantities of 
strain specific vaccine, the lack of cross immunity between strains, and the trade implications of 
vaccinating and recovering disease free status (OIE/World Organization for Animal Health, 
2013).  Some previous research has found that vaccination protocols in the control of a FMD 
outbreak were not economically beneficial (Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003; Elbakidze et al., 
2009).  Bates et al. (2003) in a benefit-cost analysis model of a FMD outbreak in 3 counties in 
California, found vaccination would be a cost-effective strategy if vaccinated animals were not 
subsequently depopulated (Bates et al., 2003a).    
All vaccination scenarios did improve the number of herds depopulated compared to 
depopulation only and an economic analysis found that vaccination was also advantageous to 
decreasing the median economic impact of the outbreak (Schroeder et al., in review).  In the 
scenarios with a larger vaccination zone, vaccination was advantageous in controlling 
depopulation and duration suggesting a threshold level of vaccination necessary to bring the 
outbreak under rapid control.  In the scenarios with a larger vaccination zone, vaccination was 
advantageous in controlling depopulation and duration suggesting a threshold level of 
vaccination necessary to bring the outbreak under rapid control.  However, vaccinating to live 
versus to die has different implications from an international trade perspective.  In that under 
vaccinate to live scenarios, export market access would likely be delayed at least one additional 3 
months relative to a depopulating all vaccinated animals.  Vaccinating to live would be 
advantageous in saving valuable genetics and food produced.   
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FMD simulation models have found that targeting high-risk production types can 
increase the efficiency of vaccination (Keeling et al., 2003).  In this study large feedlots were 
prioritized for vaccination due to their high contact rate and the large number of feedlots in the 
central region of the U.S.  Vaccination of large feedlots, which are intended for slaughter, were 
the focus of the vaccination protocols in these scenarios.  Large feedlots have a high number of 
indirect contacts (McReynolds et al., in press) potentially increasing their risk of receiving and 
spreading infection during an outbreak.  In this study the scenarios with large vaccine zones 
where vaccination was predominantly feedlots had a similar impact on the outbreak as scenarios 
where only feedlots were vaccinated in large vaccine zones.  Scenario 17 is of note as a top 
ranking large feedlot only vaccination scenario with high capacity (8 herds by 22 days and 15 
herds by 40 days) and large vaccination zone.  This suggests there may be methods to efficiently 
apply vaccination to high risk groups and efficiently use resources (Keeling et al., 2003; Keeling 
and Shattock, 2012).   
Discussion of sensitivity of input values 
The operational validity of the model was assessed using a sensitivity analysis to 
determine the impact of uncertainty in contact and control methodologies (Frey and Patil, 2002; 
Garner and Hamilton, 2011).  Indirect contacts are a potential risk for disease spread particularly 
for a highly contagious disease such as FMD (Cottral, 1969; Ellis-Iversen et al., 2011) and in our 
scenarios approximately 95% of the infections were transmitted through indirect contacts.  The 
sensitivity analysis was used to determine the impact of changes in the disease control methods 
and the contact rates on the model results.  The sensitivity analysis of the direct contact rate 
demonstrated that the model was not sensitive to changes in the direct contact rate likely due to 
the 100% quarantine of infected herds within the model.  The model was sensitive to changes in 
143 
 
the indirect contact rate.  Indirect contact rates used here are based on a survey of producers in 
Kansas and Colorado (McReynolds et al., in press) representing all modeled production types 
and provide the best available estimates of direct and indirect contacts between production types.  
When the indirect contact rates for all production types were decreased by 20%, the median 
duration of the outbreak and number of herds depopulated decreased substantially.  The ranking 
of the best scenarios by number of herds depopulated remained similar (Table 8) but the impact 
of vaccination was substantially decreased.  
When the indirect contact rates increased 20%, scenarios with a small vaccination zone 
had larger outbreaks than scenario 1, the depopulation only scenario.  Again scenario 1 did 
appear to spread quickly with the number herds exposed to the virus and waiting for 
depopulation being the largest of all the scenarios.  When the indirect contact rate was increased 
the number of infected herds increased rapidly and the vaccination capacities modeled were not 
sufficient to control the outbreak.  In the face of an outbreak that is spreading rapidly vaccine 
capacity appears to be important.  In the Taiwan outbreak inadequate vaccine supply was one of 
the potential factors in the large epidemic (Yang et al., 1999).  This may also be a factor in our 
scenarios where the vaccination zone was small and the outbreak lasted longer than the 
depopulation alone scenario.  Model results were sensitive to the indirect contact rate which was 
based on a survey of 532 producers in Colorado and Kansas.  This highlights the need for 
accurate data regarding direct and indirect contacts between livestock producers.  
Due to the impact of movement controls on an agriculture community and on animal 
welfare, a sensitivity analysis on the impact of movement controls within the model was 
simulated.  Feed delivery, supplies, and labor are indirect movements that must be maintained 
for business continuity and due to animal welfare reasons in the face of a FMD outbreak.  The 
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minimum amount of movements that will be necessary will vary for different production types.  
Decreasing indirect movement to 20% of pre-outbreak levels (baseline 30%) substantially 
decreased the number of herds depopulated and the duration of the outbreaks to similar levels in 
all scenarios.  None of the vaccination scenarios were different from scenario 1 for number of 
herds depopulated and duration of outbreak.  While decreasing movement was effective in 
decreasing the number of herds depopulated, the ability to achieve a decrease in indirect 
movement to 20% of the pre-outbreak “business as usual” level without animal welfare issues is 
not clear.  The animal welfare consequence of these movement controls on un-infected or 
infected herds awaiting depopulation has been found to be significant (Laurence, 2002).  If this 
level of movement control is achievable in the face of an outbreak, it may be sufficient and 
vaccination may have little additional benefit.  When indirect movement control was set at 40% 
of pre-outbreak levels, the duration of the outbreaks were all similar to scenario 1, lasting 500 to 
700 days and scenario 1 had the third lowest number of herds depopulated.  This demonstrates 
that if strict indirect movement controls are not possible vaccination might not be effective in 
disease outbreak control.  Achievable movement controls consistent with acceptable animal 
welfare require additional investigation.   
Probability of transmission given an indirect contact showed a similar effect in the 
sensitivity analysis.  When the probability of indirect transmission was decreased to 15% 
(baseline 20%) the number of herds depopulated and the outbreak duration decreased 
substantially in all scenarios.  The probability of transmission following indirect contact between 
an infected and susceptible herd is a measure of the biosecurity practices applied to traffic and 
people on and off the farm.  Important aspects include truck washing, boot washing and control 
of visitor contact with animals.  With increased biosecurity, vaccination did not offer any benefit 
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to the depopulation alone control strategy but again the ability to achieve this level of biosecurity 
is unknown.  Increased biosecurity would be an important aspect of control efforts and could be 
a welfare friendly option to control spread compared to increased movement controls.  
Alternately, decreased probability of transmission following indirect contact may be 
representative of FMD strains with lower transmissibility.  When the probability of transmission 
given an indirect contact was increased to 25% the number of herds depopulated was 
substantially increased and the impact of vaccination decreased.    
The scenarios with a large vaccination zone had the greatest percentage of increase in the 
duration of the disease when movement controls or biosecurity was decreased.  This may 
indicate that without sufficient movement and biosecurity controls even extensive vaccination 
programs may not be effective.  When strict biosecurity and movement was in place in scenarios 
with a vaccination trigger at 100 herds, the median number of herds vaccinated was 0, likely 
representing the ability to effectively manage the outbreak with movement controls, biosecurity, 
and depopulation of infected herds.   
 Conclusion 
In this simulation study of a FMD outbreak in the central U.S., scenarios with increased 
size of the vaccination zone had decreased length of the outbreak and number of herds destroyed.  
Increasing the vaccination capacity had a smaller impact on the outbreak and may not be feasible 
if vaccine production and delivery is limited.  In these scenarios, feedlots >3,000 head had the 
highest vaccination priority and even with larger vaccine capacity few other production types 
were vaccinated in some scenarios.  Outbreak size and number of herds depopulated was 
sensitive to biosecurity practices and movement controls and to a lesser extent indirect contact 
rates. The level of biosecurity required to achieve a given probability of transmission and the 
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ability to restrict indirect movement consistent with acceptable animal welfare is uncertain.  
Vaccination was not beneficial compared to depopulation alone to control the outbreak when 
biosecurity and movement controls were increased.  A better understanding of the biosecurity 
changes necessary during an outbreak to attain these levels is needed.  Biosecurity and 
movement controls are known to be important aspects of a control strategy during a FMD 
outbreak due to the potential risk of disease spread (Cottral, 1969; Ellis-Iversen et al., 2011).  
Additionally, identifying the personnel requirements to achieve sufficient levels of biosecurity 
and movement controls is needed, as well as their impact on animal welfare.  An improved 
knowledge of the biosecurity practices and the ability to achieve strict movement controls to 
limit direct and indirect transmission would allow more focused planning of optimal control 
efforts.  The results of this study will provide information about the impacts of disease control 
protocols which may be useful in choosing the optimal control methods to meet the goal of rapid 
effective control and eradication.  The results and impact of the control methods however may 
not be applicable to other regions due to the variability of livestock production systems that are 
found in different regions in the U.S.  
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Figure 4-1 - An 8-state outlined region of central U.S. selected for modeling the potential of 
a foot and mouth disease outbreak initiated in a large feedlot in Northeast Colorado. 
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Figure 4-2 - Median number of new herds detected as clinically infected by week of a 
potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
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Figure 4-3 - The total number of animals vaccinated each week by scenario number of a 
potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
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Figure 4-4 - Box plots of the duration of the active disease phase for the sensitivity analysis 
of the probability of transmission given indirect contact is at 15%, 20%, and 25% for all 
scenarios of a potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the 
U.S. 
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a The box plot parameters are boxes at 25th and 75th percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5th and 
95th percentiles and dots are outliers.  
157 
 
Figure 4-5 - Box plots of the number of herds depopulated for the sensitivity analysis of the 
probability of transmission given indirect contact at 15%, 20%, and 25% for all scenarios 
of a potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S.   
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a The box plot parameters are boxes at 25th and 75th percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5th and 
95th percentiles and dots are outliers.  
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Figure 4-6 - Box plots of the number of vaccinated herds for the sensitivity analysis of the 
probability of transmission given indirect contact is at 15%, 20%, and 25% for all 
scenarios of a potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the 
U.S. 
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a The box plot parameters are boxes at 25th and 75th percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5th and 
95th percentiles and dots are outliers.  
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Figure 4-7 - Box plots of the duration of the active disease phase for the sensitivity analysis 
of the movement controls at 20%, 30%, and 40% of pre-outbreak levels for all scenarios of 
a potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S.   
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a The box plot parameters are boxes at 25th and 75th percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5th and 
95th percentiles and dots are outliers.  
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Figure 4-8 - Box plots of number of herds depopulated for the sensitivity analysis of the 
movement controls at 20%, 30%, and 40% of pre-outbreak levels for all scenarios of a 
potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S.   
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a The box plot parameters are boxes at 25th and 75th percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5th and 
95th percentiles and dots are outliers.  
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Figure 4-9 - Box plots of number of herds vaccinated for the sensitivity analysis of the 
indirect movement controls at 20%, 30%, and 40% of pre-outbreak levels for all scenarios 
of a potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S.   
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a The box plot parameters are boxes at 25th and 75th percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5th and 
95th percentiles and dots are outliers.  
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Figure 4-10 - Box plots of the duration of the active disease phase for the sensitivity analysis 
of the indirect contact rate and the baseline indirect contact rate for all scenarios of a 
potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
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a The box plot parameters are boxes at 25th and 75th percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5th and 
95th percentiles and dots are outliers.  
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Figure 4-11 - Box plots of the number of herds depopulated for the sensitivity analysis of 
the indirect contact rate and the baseline indirect contact rate for all scenarios of a 
potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
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a The box plot parameters are boxes at 25th and 75th percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5th and 
95th percentiles and dots are outliers. 
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Figure 4-12 - Box plots of the number of herds vaccinated for the sensitivity analysis of the 
indirect contact rate and the baseline indirect contact rate for all scenarios of a potential 
foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
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a The box plot parameters are boxes at 25th and 75th percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5th and 
95th percentiles and dots are outliers. 
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Table 4.1 - Simulation population of the 8-state region in the central U.S. that was used in 
NAADSM with the number of animals and herds by production type 
Production Type Animals Herds 
Cow-calf 9,698,630 86,655 
Feedlot-Large (≥3,000 head) 9,147,279      979 
Feedlot-Small (<3,000 head) 7,377,698 25,096 
Dairy 1,062,276     3,232 
Swine-Large (≥1,000 head) 9,227,569      1,071 
Swine-Small (<1,000 head)  663,465    6,463 
Beef-swine mix    520,283    5,159 
Sheep 1,716,028 22,965 
Total 39,413,228 151,620 
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Table 4.2- Description of vaccination strategy for 17 simulated scenarios of a potential foot 
and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S.   
Scenario  
Large  
Feedlots  
Vaccination a 
Vaccination  
Capacity b 
Vaccination 
Trigger (herds) 
Size of  
Vaccination Zone 
(km) 
1 - - - - 
2  Priority 5,10 10 10 
3 Only 1,3 10 10 
4 Priority 5,10 10 50 
5 Only 1,3 10 50 
6 Priority 50,80 100 10 
7 Only 8,15 100 10 
8 Priority 50,80 100 50 
9 Only 8,15 100 50 
10 Priority 5,10 100 10 
11 Only 1,3 100 10 
12 Priority 5,10 100 50 
13 Only 1,3 100 50 
14 Priority 50,80 10 10 
15 Only 8,15 10 10 
16 Priority 50,80 10 50 
17 Only 8,15 10 50 
 
a  Priority – from highest to lowest: large feedlot (≥3,000 head), small feedlot (<3,000 head), 
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large swine (≥1,000 head), small swine (<1,000 head), beef-swine, dairy, cow-calf, and small 
ruminant.  
Only – Large feedlots only vaccinated.  
b  The capacity for vaccination protocols in herds per day by 22 days after disease detection and 
by 40 days after disease detection  
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Table 4.3 - Calculated mean daily direct contact rates used to parameterize the NAADSM 
model based on livestock contact survey results in Colorado and Kansas. 
Source  
Production Type 
Destination  
Production 
Type 
Mean Number 
of Contacts per 
Day 
Cow/Calf Cow/Calf 0.027 
Cow/Calf Large Feedlot 0.002 
Cow/Calf Small Feedlot 0.002 
Cow/Calf Beef/Swine 0.027 
Dairy Dairy 0.065 
Large Feedlot Large Feedlot 0.005 
Large Swine Large Swine 0.186 
Small Feedlot Large Feedlot 0.019 
Small Feedlot Small Feedlot 0.017 
Small Swine Small Swine 0.013 
Small Swine Beef/Swine 0.013 
Beef/Swine Cow/Calf 0.027 
Beef/Swine Large Feedlot 0.003 
Beef/Swine Small Feedlot 0.003 
Beef/Swine Beef/Swine 0.026 
Beef/Swine Small Swine 0.013 
Small Ruminant Small Ruminant 0.024 
aAll combinations that are not listed above had a mean daily contact rate of 0.0. 
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Table 4.4 - Calculated mean daily indirect contact rate by production type used to 
parameterize the NAADSM model based on livestock contact survey results in Colorado 
and Kansas. 
 
FROM 
       
TO Cow/Calf 
Small 
Feedlot 
Large 
Feedlot 
Dairy 
Small 
Swine 
Large 
Swine 
Small 
Ruminant 
Beef/Swine 
Cow/Calf 0.133 0.090 0.123 0.181 0.005 0.026 0.018 0.009 
Small 
Feedlot 
0.141 0.095 0.131 0.191 0.005 0.028 0.019 0.009 
Large 
Feedlot 
1.711 1.155 1.589 2.326 0.063 0.337 0.229 0.114 
Dairy 0.623 0.420 0.578 1.045 0.026 0.136 0.093 0.041 
Small 
Swine 
0.020 0.014 0.019 0.030 0.003 0.014 0.003 0.003 
Large 
Swine 
0.044 0.030 0.041 0.066 0.015 0.086 0.015 0.013 
Small  
Ruminant 
0.052 0.035 0.048 0.078 0.002 0.008 0.070 0.001 
Beef/Swine 0.092 0.062 0.086 0.125 0.007 0.033 0.012 0.006 
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Table 4.5 - Median duration of outbreak, number of herds depopulated, number of animals 
depopulated, number of herds vaccinated, and number of animals vaccinated for each 
scenario (10th - 90th percentiles) of a potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in a 
central region of the U.S. 
Scenario Name 
Outbreak  
Duration 
Number of 
Herds 
Depopulated 
Number of 
Animals 
Depopulated 
(1000) 
Number of 
Herds 
Vaccinated 
Number of 
Animals 
Vaccinated  
(1000) 
1 
527 f  
(87-621) 
6,890 h 
(32-8,101)  
13,663 
(196-17,611) 
 
 
 
2  
608 i 
(102-767)  
2,227 g 
(42-2,449)  
9,921 
(222-10,600) 
 
5,709 i 
(657-7304)  
7,644 
(0-8,500) 
3 
530 fg 
(48-687)  
2,248 g 
(10-3,156)  
9,939 
(72-11,500) 
472 b 
(0-514)  
4,319 
(0-4,764) 
4 
223 b 
(86-310)  
416 b 
(31-879)  
1,736 
(238-3,214) 
1,876 g 
(494-2,736)  
16,400 
(1,490-23,640) 
5 
389 e 
(286-559)  
1,735 e 
(1,326-2,063)  
7,508 
(5,774-8,591) 
1,043 e 
(725-1,460)  
10,300 
(7,000-14,800) 
6 
459 fg 
(45-721)  
1,991 f 
(9-2,301) 
9,098 
(65-10,000) 
30,594 k 
(0-51,136)  
19,600 
(0-23,832) 
7 
550 ghi 
(64-753) 
2,249 g 
(15-5,133)  
10,000 
(81-12,500) 
458 b 
(0-488)  
4,183 
(0-4,600) 
8 
202 ab 
(131-390)  
440 b 
(233-616)  
1,863 
(1,071-2,395) 
10,000 j 
(6,400-24,560)  
14,900 
(10,000-25,800) 
9 
342 d 
(256-528) 
1,605 d 
(1,242-3,712)  
6,950 
(5,600-10,400) 
1,044 e 
(784-1,398)  
10,400 
(7,400-14,200) 
10 
596 hi 
(154-800)  
2,203 g 
(49-3,270)  
9,968 
(341-11,121) 
5,165 h 
(0-7,030)  
7,132 
(0-8,330) 
11 
540 fgh 
(90-709)  
2,276 g 
(32-7,318)  
10,000 
(268-15,000) 
425 a 
(0-463)  
3,851 
(0-4,263) 
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12 
250 c 
(146-318)  
855 c 
(234-1,150)  
3,702 
(968-4,727) 
1,800 g 
(635-2,420)  
17,200 
(6,250-22,600) 
13 369
 de 
(244-579)  
1,848 f 
(1,320-7,904)  
8,008 
(6,275-16,360) 
859 d 
(528-1,098)  
8,461 
(4,833-11,000) 
14 
527 fghi 
(77-791)  
1,925 f 
(22-2,174)  
9,098 
(141-10,000) 
37,928 l 
(746-59,380)  
21,600 
(205-25,800) 
15 
545 fgh 
(363-706)  
2,238 g 
(1,681-2,648)  
9,922 
(8,017-10,675) 
499 c 
(432-525)  
4,561 
(3,850-4,860) 
16 
181 a 
(123-366)  
252 a 
(107-427)  
1,028 
(515-1,644) 
11,902 j 
(6,923-26,654)  
15,500 
(10,000-23,200) 
17 
241 bc 
(133-568)  
440 b 
(87-850)  
1,754 
(521-3,373) 
1,329 f 
(528-2,718)  
13,100 
(5,000-26,310) 
Values within columns with different superscripts are different p<0.05 (adjusted p-value 
accounting for multiple comparisons) 
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Table 4.6 - Percent difference of median number of herds depopulated for sensitivity 
analysis scenarios compared to original comparable baseline scenario of a potential foot 
and mouth disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
Scenario 
Baseline 
Herds 
Depopulated 
(Median) 
Probability of 
Indirect 
Transmission 
Indirect Movement 
Control (Percent of 
Pre-outbreak) 
Indirect Contact Rate 
15% 25% 20% 40% -20% +20% 
1 6,890 -99.5% -0.4% -99.4% -2.9% -95.0% -1.1% 
2 2,227 -97.6% 319.2% -97.2% 327.6% -91.1% 75.9% 
3 2,248 -96.5% 231.1% -97.6% 227.1% -89.5% 70.0% 
4 416 -88.0% 1381.0% -89.3% 1562.5% -84.0% 70.7% 
5 1,735 -96.3% 390.1% -96.9% 376.6% -92.1% 80.5% 
6 1,991 -97.8% 337.1% -97.4% 345.3% -97.1% 76.5% 
7 2,249 -98.1% 523.2% -97.1% 231.6% -88.6% 70.5% 
8 440 -87.0% 232.0% -89.3% 490.8% -64.8% 60.4% 
9 1,605 -96.2% 536.5% -97.0% 590.3% -88.3% 81.7% 
10 2,203 -98.4% 308.4% -97.5% 321.8% -73.5% 75.1% 
11 2,276 -97.0% 218.0% -98.0% 215.5% -78.0% 69.8% 
12 855 -92.9% 1080.2% -94.1% 1152.8% -83.4% 89.4% 
13 1,848 -97.3% 331.3% -96.9% 312.0% -90.6% 78.5% 
14 1,925 -97.3% 366.1% -96.9% 363.9% -86.4% 78.1% 
15 2,238 -96.3% 237.9% -97.8% 232.1% -94.7% 70.3% 
16 252 -82.3% 259.3% -84.7% 413.7% -77.0% 60.4% 
17 440 -90.9% 545.7% -89.3% 1550.2% -81.0% 78.0% 
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Table 4.7 - Percent difference of median outbreak duration for sensitivity analysis 
scenarios compared to original comparable baseline scenario of a potential foot and mouth 
disease virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S. 
Scenario 
 
Baseline 
Outbreak 
Duration 
(Median) 
Probability of  
Indirect  
Transmission 
Indirect Movement 
Control (Percent of 
Pre-outbreak) 
Indirect Contact Rate 
15% 25% 20% 40% -20% +20% 
1 527 -80.8% -7.3% -82.2% -7.9% -34.9% -5.7% 
2  608 -80.0% 5.1% -81.2% 7.3% -57.2% 5.4% 
3 530 -71.8% -0.5% -79.1% -2.7% -47.0% 0.9% 
4 223 -47.7% 108.1% -57.9% 124.1% -44.8% 57.9% 
5 389 -68.7% 52.7% -71.2% 48.1% -49.0% 54.9% 
6 459 -75.9% 33.1% -76.4% 32.5% -72.0% 29.0% 
7 550 -80.8% -3.1% -78.2% -3.9% -57.5% -2.5% 
8 202 -35.5% 129.5% -48.9% 207.4% -24.8% 64.0% 
9 342 -59.4% 105.0% -69.3% 118.7% -48.0% 92.1% 
10 596 -84.4% 4.5% -82.4% 7.5% -38.6% 4.4% 
11 540 -73.4% -6.4% -81.7% -5.6% -34.9% -1.7% 
12 250 -49.7% 172.9% -55.9% 190.8% -32.7% 129.5% 
13 369 -68.7% 50.7% -72.6% 45.1% -34.3% 61.7% 
14 527 -78.7% 19.8% -79.5% 16.7% -49.5% 17.4% 
15 545 -68.8% -3.2% -80.8% -3.9% -64.1% -2.4% 
16 181 -42.5% 130.9% -53.0% 197.8% -40.1% 55.0% 
17 241 -58.8% 229.1% -61.5% 112.7% -44.3% 181.9% 
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Table 4.8 - The top 5 rankings of the scenarios with the lowest number of herds 
depopulated and shortest outbreak duration of a potential foot and mouth disease virus 
outbreak in a central region of the U.S.  Rankings based on a Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
analysis of variance.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
Parameter 
Number of Herds Depopulated Outbreak Duration 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Baseline  16 4 8 17 12 16 4 8 12 17 
Indirect Transmission 15% 17 16 4 10 6 17 16 4 8 10 
Indirect Transmission 25% 16 8 4 17 1 4 1 11 16 3 
Indirect Movement Control 
40% 
16 8 1 4 17 1 17 11 4 3 
Indirect Movement Control 
20% 
16 4 17 8 1 16 4 17 8 7 
Indirect Contact Rate -20% 16 4 17 8 12 16 4 17 8 12 
Indirect Contact Rate 
+20% 
16 8 4 17 1 4 16 7 1 11 
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 Abstract 
The central United States (U.S.) has a large livestock population including cattle, swine, 
sheep and goats that are fully susceptible to Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD).  Introduction of 
FMD to the U.S. would have potentially devastating consequences to the livestock industry. 
Auction markets could play a critical role in increasing initial spread of an FMD incursion prior 
to detection. We simulated the impact of an FMD outbreak beginning in multiple herds using the 
North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM), a spatially explicit, stochastic 
infectious disease model. 
Using USDA, National Agricultural Statistic Service data, a simulated population of 
151,620 livestock operations in the central U.S. was defined by latitude and longitude, 
production type, and herd size.  To simulate auction market dispersal, two different starting 
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conditions of12 initially latently herds in eastern Colorado and western Nebraska were modeled.  
One starting condition included 1 cow/calf herd, 2 large feedlots, 5 small feedlots, 1 dairy, 2 
small ruminants, and 1 small swine herd.  A second starting condition included only beef 
operations, 2 cow/calf, 3 large feedlots, and 7 small feedlots.  Results from the multiple initial 
latently infected herds were compared to identical scenarios with a single 17,000 head feedlot in 
northeast Colorado as the initial latently infected herd. 
Direct and indirect contact rates between herds were based on survey data of livestock 
producers in Kansas and Colorado.  Scenarios were simulated with either no vaccination or with 
vaccination zone radius 10 km or 50 km and vaccination capacity high or low.  Scenarios were 
compared to assess the effect of multiple herds initially infected representing an outbreak 
spreading from an auction market. 
The initial incidence of newly detected herds was greater in the scenarios with multiple 
initially latent herds. The weekly number of new herds detected at week 8 of the outbreak was 
approximately 35 herds for scenarios with multiple initially latent herds compared to 
approximately 7 new herds in scenarios with a single initial latent herd.  Multiple initial latently 
infected herds had minimal impact on the median outbreak duration, and the total number of 
herds depopulated and vaccinated when compared to single latent herd scenarios. Outbreaks 
dispersed from auction markets may have initially increased incidence and resource needs but 
may have little influence on final outcome.  
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 Introduction 
The United States (U.S) has a livestock population fully susceptible to foot and mouth 
disease (FMD) due to the last outbreak having occurred in 1929.  The economic costs of FMD 
are increased in countries where export markets are large such as the U.S.  Taiwan had a FMD 
outbreak in 1997, after being free of the disease for over 68 years, that was estimated to cost 
$378.6 million (Yang et al., 1999).  Following the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom 
(U.K.) economic losses to agriculture and the food chain were estimated to be approximately $5 
billion (Thompson et al., 2002).  The more recent FMD outbreaks in countries that had 
previously been free of the disease demonstrate the need for research and extensive planning on 
the possible control strategies that could be utilized during an FMD outbreak in the U.S.   
Auction markets have been reported as being the most critical factor contributing to large 
FMD epidemics in countries which have previously been free of the disease (McLaws and 
Ribble, 2007).  This is likely due to the auction markets leading to wider dissemination of the 
virus.  For example in the 2001 U.K. outbreak the FMD virus was widely disseminated 
throughout the country prior to the first diagnosis being made (Gibbens et al., 2001).  The ability 
of the virus to spread prior to detection is a concern in the U.S. as well, due to the frequency at 
which animals are moved and the movements through auction markets.  Recent analysis of 
interstate certificate of veterinary inspection data for livestock found that the entire U.S. is 
closely connected with the central plains states having the most livestock connections 
(Buhnerkempe et al., 2013).       
As of May 2012, there were 1,229 auction markets in the U.S. registered with the Grain 
Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards Administration (USDA-GIPSA, May 2012).  In a 
government survey of cow-calf producers in the U.S., 61% reported using auction markets as the 
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primary method of sale and over 50% of operations used an auction market as their primary 
method of sale of weaned or older heifers not intended for breeding (USDA-APHIS, 2010).  
Research in California found that among beef producers, movements to auction markets 
accounted for 41.3% of the three most recent movements (Marshall et al., 2009).  Considering 
the large number of cattle sold and fed in the central U.S., auction markets would likely play an 
important role in disease spread.  
Previous research utilizing the North American Animal Disease Spread Model 
(NAADSM) for modeling of FMD, suggests that vaccination, strict movement controls, and 
increased biosecurity can decrease the duration of the outbreak and the number of animals 
depopulated (McReynolds et al., in preparation).  The research also suggests that the size of the 
vaccination zone has more of an impact on the outbreak duration and number of animals 
depopulated than the control method of early vs. late vaccination trigger.  NAADSM currently 
has no explicit way of including auction markets in the population.  With the number of auction 
markets in the U.S. and the high utilization of auction markets by livestock producers 
(USDA:APHIS 2010, Marshall et al., 2009), markets could potentially result in widespread 
initial disease dispersal.  One way to represent the wide dispersal of FMD that originates in an 
auction market is to include multiple initially latent herds at the beginning of the outbreak.  Once 
FMD is detected in the U.S. it is assumed that auction markets will be closed to prevent further 
dissemination of the disease so they would no longer play a role in the spread.  Previous research 
modeling an FMD outbreak in the central U.S. has been done with one initially latent large 
feedlot (McReynolds et al., in preparation) but due to the exclusion of auction markets in the 
population, uncertainty remains especially with the potential impact of the initial spread of FMD 
virus.  With the closure of auction markets after detection of FMD, it was assumed that their role 
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in dissemination would occur at the beginning and could be captured by including multiple 
initially latent herds.  The objective of this study was to assess the impact of wider dissemination 
of the FMD virus on a potential FMD outbreak in the central plains region of the U.S. 
 Materials and Methods 
 Study Population 
 The simulated study population was based on the 2007 NASS livestock herd data 
and production types adjusted according to criteria by Melius et al. (2006).  The 8-state study 
area included Wyoming, South Dakota, Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, the northern region of New 
Mexico and Oklahoma, and the Texas Panhandle (Fig. 1).  The number of herds in the simulated 
study population was 151,620 in 2007 (USDA, 2007) including 86,655 cow/calf, 3,232 dairy, 
979 large feedlots (>3,000 head), 25,096 small feedlots (<3,000 head), 1,071 large swine (>1,000 
head), 6,463 small swine (<1,000 head), 5,159 beef and swine, and 22,965 small ruminant herds.  
The total population was 39,413,228 animals in all production types (Table 1).  Seven percent of 
beef and swine operations were randomly re-designated from the population of cow/calf 
operations and small swine based on a livestock contact survey where approximately 7% of 
herds in Kansas and Colorado reported having beef cattle and swine (McReynolds et al., in 
press). 
 Simulation model 
NAADSM was used to model FMD eradication strategies.  NAADSM is an open source 
(Harvey and Reeves, 2010) herd-based spatial stochastic epidemic simulation model 
(Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003; Harvey et al., 2007).  Nine scenarios were simulated for various 
FMD vaccination protocols compared to the depopulation only baseline scenario.  Each of the 
nine scenarios was simulated with 3 different starting conditions for the number and type of 
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initially latent herds.  Modeled scenarios included variations in vaccine capacity (low vaccine 
capacity 5 herds per day by day 22 and 10 herds per day by day 40 and high vaccine capacity 50 
herds per day by day 22 and 80 herds per day by day 40), vaccination zone diameter (10 km or 
50 km), and the number of infected herds required to initiate a vaccination program (10 or 100 
herds).  The simulated vaccination strategies included low and high vaccine capacity to represent 
USDA administration of vaccine (low capacity) or producer administration of vaccine (high 
capacity).  Vaccination strategies included all herd types with priority from highest to lowest: 
large feedlot (≥3,000 head), small feedlot (<3,000 head), large swine (≥1,000 head), small swine 
(<1,000 head), beef-swine, dairy, cow-calf, and small ruminant.    
The clinical stages of disease distributions are based on a meta-analysis of the duration of 
the disease states (Mardones et al., 2010).  The clinical infectious period distribution for cattle, 
swine and small ruminants was calculated as reported previously (McReynolds et al., in 
preparation).  Briefly monte-carlo simulation (@Risk 5.01, Palisade Corp., Ithaca, NY, USA) 
was used to sample values from the subclinical infectious period and the infectious period 
reported in Mardones et al. (2010).  The value for the subclinical period was subtracted from the 
sampled values for the infectious period to generate a distribution for the clinical period which 
was fit to a theoretical distribution (@Risk 5.0.1) to estimate the clinical infectious period for use 
in NAADSM.  The within-herd prevalence as a function of time since infection was used to 
determine the probability of infection following a direct contact. The within herd prevalence 
model (WH) (Reeves, 2012) based on estimates for the latent, subclinical infectious, and clinical 
infectious stages was used to produce the distributions for within herd prevalence for NAADSM. 
The WH model operates at the level of the individual animal, and incorporates sources of 
individual-level variation such as variability in the durations of incubating and infectious 
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periods, the stochastic nature of the disease spread among individuals, the effects of vaccination, 
and disease mortality (Reeves et al., in preparation).  The results of a livestock contact survey in 
the central U.S. (McReynolds et al., in press) were used to calculate direct and indirect contacts 
between livestock production types.  Actual contacts between production types in the NAADSM 
model were generated from a Poisson distribution with lambda equal to the mean contact rate for 
that production type combination.  
The assumptions in the model were that the virus could spread by direct contact, indirect 
contact, and airborne/local spread.  In NAADSM, a direct contact represents the movement of 
infected livestock between premises.  An indirect contact is a fomite such as a contaminated 
vehicle, equipment, clothing, or a person. The probability of airborne spread at 1 km was 0.5% 
and the maximum distance of spread was 3 km.  For all scenarios, 1) the days to first disease 
detection was generated by the NAADSM model; 2) direct contact through animal movement 
was reduced to 10% of pre-outbreak levels by day 7 and indirect contacts were reduced to 30% 
of pre-outbreak levels by day 7 after disease detection; 3) the probability of indirect disease 
transmission following indirect contact between an infected and susceptible herd was held fixed 
at 20% for all production types except swine which was set at 30% to account for increased 
shedding; and 4) depopulation capacity was set at 8 herds/day by day 10 and 16 herds/day by day 
30 after disease detection.  For all herds that were detected as positive, direct contacts were 
identified, traced forward, and depopulated.  Depopulation did not begin until day 2 after first 
disease detection of the outbreak.  In all simulations a 100% quarantine of infected premises and 
a ban on livestock movement from infected premises was assumed.  The endpoint for all the 
scenarios was the end of the active disease phase. 
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 Model Scenarios 
All 9 of the scenarios were simulated in the population each with three different starting 
conditions for the number and type of initially latent herds (Table 2).  In the first condition, the 
initial latently infected herd was a single 17,000 head feedlot in Northeast Colorado.  In order to 
simulate FMD dissemination to multiple premises from an auction market, two additional 
starting conditions were modeled each with 12 initially latent herds.  The second starting 
condition had 12 initial herds that were latently infected in eastern Colorado and western 
Nebraska including 1 cow/calf herd, 2 large feedlots, 5 small feedlots, 1 dairy, 2 small ruminant 
herds, and 1 small swine herd.  The third starting condition also had 12 initial latently infected 
herds that were all beef production types in western Nebraska.  The latent herds were 2 cow/calf, 
3 large feedlots, and 7 small feedlots.  The choice of initially latent herds was based on data 
collected from auction markets in northwest Colorado and western Nebraska on the percentage 
of production types sold and distance shipped.  For each scenario 200 iterations were simulated.  
  Data analysis 
The NAADSM model produced outputs for each day of the outbreak for each iteration.  
The outputs from each scenario were aggregated into weekly and daily outcome counts for each 
iteration of each scenario.  Disease duration was calculated to the end of the active disease phase 
of the outbreak.  Summary statistics were generated for each of the scenarios.  Analysis was 
performed in commercially available software Stata12.1, (StataCorp., 2011) and in open source 
64 bit R 3.0.1 (R development core team, 2013).  A Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance 
was used to test the statistical differences between scenarios and within initially latent 
populations.  The test was used to identify significant differences in disease duration and number 
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of herds depopulated controlling for multiple comparisons at p<0.05 according to the method of 
Holm (1979) implemented in R. 
 Results  
The outbreak duration, number of herds depopulated, and weekly number of new 
infections were not normally distributed.  The weekly analysis of results only included the 
iterations that still had an active outbreak.  For example the number of iterations with an active 
outbreak by week 50 was less than 5% of the total iterations for scenario 4 (Figure 2). Tails of 
the scenario distribution medians were impacted by this as long outbreak durations were highly 
influential in the upper tails of the median outcome curves (Figure 3). 
 Detected herds 
The median first day of detection was at day 10 or 11 (5th percentile day 5 and 95th 
percentile day 16) for the nine scenarios with a single large feedlot initial latently infected.  
However for scenarios with 12 herds initially latent, the median first day of detection was at day 
5 or 6 (5th percentile day 3 and 95th percentile day 8) and the initial incidence of newly detected 
herds was greater compared with the scenarios with single initially latent large feedlot in the 
population (Figure 3).  At the time of first detection the median total number of herds that were 
infected was 3 or 4 for scenarios with one initially latent feedlot and 15 or 17 for scenarios with 
multiple initially latent herds.  At week 2 of the simulations, a total of 1 herd had been detected 
in the scenarios with a single large latent feedlot initially latent compared to 14 to 16 herds for 
the scenarios with multiple initially latent herds.  The initial incidence was higher for all 
scenarios with multiple initially latent herds.  The weekly median number of new herds detected 
at week five was 7 or 8 for all scenarios with the starting condition of a single latent large feedlot 
compared to 33-35 herds for scenarios with multiple initial latent mixed production types and 41-
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44 herds for scenarios with the multiple initial latent beef production types.  At week 8 the 
weekly number of new herds detected was 12-16 for scenarios with a single large latent feedlot 
compared to 33-62 herds for multiple mixed production type latent scenarios and 35-75 herds for 
multiple beef production latent scenarios.  
Based on the Kruskal-Wallis test, scenario 16 had the lowest final number of herds 
detected under all three initial latent herd conditions (medians, 248-380 herds) and scenario 1, 
the baseline scenario, had the highest for all initial conditions (medians, 10,087-10,300 herds).  
In the scenarios with a large vaccination zone of 50 km the number of herds detected at the end 
of the outbreak was increased when there were multiple initially latent herds, for example, in 
scenario 4 the median increased from 407 when a single large feedlot was initially latent to 913 
when multiple mixed production types were initially latent and 988 when multiple beef 
production types were initially latent.  However in the baseline scenario the number of herds 
detected at the end of the outbreak was comparable for the three initially latent conditions 
(median, 10,087-10,334).  The scenarios with a small vaccination zone of 10 km also had 
comparable results, for example in scenario 2 the median ranged from 2,183 to 2,262 herds 
detected with clinical infections among the three initially latent conditions.   
 Outbreak duration 
Box plots of disease duration in days, categorized by initially latent condition, are shown 
in Figure 4.  The median outbreak duration of the baseline scenario, 1, was approximately 500 
days for all initially latent herd conditions (median range 480-522).  Despite the scenarios having 
comparable medians among all three initially latent herd conditions, the lower end of the 
distribution is cut off when multiple herds were initially latent compared to single initially latent 
herd.   
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Within each initially latent herd condition, the outbreak duration was longer in the 
vaccination scenarios with a vaccination zone of 10 km (medians, 455-608 days) compared to 
the scenarios with a vaccination zone of 50 km (medians, 142-250 days).  Outbreak duration was 
similar for like scenarios between the two multiple initially latent herd conditions.  Like 
scenarios were significantly shorter for scenarios with the multiple initially latent herds 
compared to the scenarios with a population with a single initially latently herd for all scenarios 
except scenario 14.  Outbreak duration of scenario 14 was similar among all initial latent 
conditions.  The Kruskal-Wallis ranking of scenarios within initial latent conditions were similar 
with scenarios 16, 8, 12 and 4 having the shortest durations and scenarios 10 and 2 the two 
longest durations in all three initially latent conditions.   
 Herds depopulated 
Box plots of the number of herds depopulated by initially latent condition are shown in 
Figure 5.  In the baseline scenario, the median number of herds depopulated was approximately 
7,000 for all initially latent conditions (range 6,890-7,080) and it had the largest number of herds 
depopulated for each initially latent condition.  The median result for like scenarios was similar 
for each of the initially latent conditions, however comparing like scenarios between initially 
latent conditions, the scenarios with a single initially latent feedlot were always ranked first in 
depopulating the lowest number of herds.  Scenarios 16, 8 4, and 12, all with 50 km vaccination 
zones, depopulated the lowest number of herds in each initially latent population based on the 
Kruskal-Wallis test.  The scenarios with a small vaccination zone and late vaccination trigger 
(scenarios 6 and 10) however had wider distribution with a long upper tail when multiple beef 
herds were initially latently infected. 
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 Herds vaccinated 
The day of first vaccination for the scenarios with an early (10 herds infected) trigger was 
later in scenarios with a single latently infected feedlot at the beginning of the outbreak  
(medians, day 27-29) compared to the scenarios with multiple herds initially latently infected 
(median, day 13).  Similar results were found when the vaccination trigger was late (100 herds 
infected) the median day of first vaccination ranged from day 70 to 74 for a single initially latent 
herd compared to day 33 to 37 for scenarios for multiple initially latent herds.  The median 
number of animals vaccinated at the end of the outbreak was comparable across the different 
initial latent conditions (Figure 6).  In scenarios 2 and 10 with small vaccine capacity and 
vaccination zone, the fewest number of animals were vaccinated in all initially latent conditions, 
these two scenarios however were not among the best for number depopulated or duration of the 
outbreak.  
 Discussion 
Auction markets have been found to play a critical role in causing wide dissemination of 
disease and in increasing the magnitude of FMD outbreaks (Bates et al., 2001; Shirley and 
Rushton, 2005; Fevre et al., 2006; McLaws and Ribble, 2007).  One impact of auction markets in 
disease dissemination is to widely disperse disease to multiple operations following common 
exposure at the market and subsequent animal dispersal to multiple farms. Other research has 
found that the larger the number of detected herds within the first 14 days of an outbreak, the 
higher the risk of a large subsequent spread of FMD (Hutber et al., 2006; Halasa et al., 2013).  In 
the Taiwan FMD outbreak four major factors were reported as responsible for the rapid spread of 
FMD in the 1997 outbreak: inability to shut down auction markets; the long delays in 
depopulating the livestock on infected farms; the high density of pig farms; and inadequate 
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vaccine supply (Yang et al., 1999).  The NAADSM model used in this study does not explicitly 
include auction markets.  However one potential way to assess the possible impact of an 
outbreak spreading through an auction market prior to detection is to simulate scenarios initiated 
with multiple initially latent herds.  The results were then compared between like scenarios for 
the different initial latently infected conditions.   
The number of herds detected increased when multiple herds were initially infected. 
However the outbreak duration was statistically shorter compared to the single initially infected 
feedlot for all scenarios except 14.  Despite the shorter outbreak duration when multiple herds 
were initially latent, the lower outliers that were present when a single feedlot was initially 
latently infected disappeared.  This implies that the chance of having a small outbreak duration 
when multiple herds are initially latently infected is very small.  The control methods were 
robust enough though that the same control method that would be the most effective to decrease 
outbreak duration when a single herd is initially latent are the same when multiple herds are 
initially latent.  Scenarios with a large vaccination zone had the shortest outbreak duration for all 
initially latent conditions.  Interestingly figure 3 illustrates late peaks in number of new 
infections for scenarios with a large vaccine zone, such as scenario 4, 8, 12, and 16.  Due to the 
effect of outlying large outbreaks increasingly influencing the median as time passes and most 
outbreaks are brought under control.  The peaks represent the larger outbreaks. 
The number of herds depopulated was fewer when a single herd was initially latent 
compared to scenarios with multiple initially latent herds.  The scenarios with a large vaccination 
zone were again the most effective across all three initially latent conditions.  In the each of the 
different initially latent conditions, scenario 16, which had a high vaccine capacity, early vaccine 
trigger, and large vaccination zone, always depopulated the lowest number of herds.  Scenario 4, 
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with a small vaccine capacity, early trigger, and large vaccination zone depopulated ranked 
second for the lowest median number of herds and did not differ from scenario 8 when the 
initially latent condition was a single large feedlot but when multiple herds were latently 
infected, scenario 8 depopulated fewer herds.  Scenario 8 also had a large vaccination zone but it 
also had a high vaccine capacity of 50 herds by day 22 of the outbreak.  This effectiveness of 
large vaccination radius and capacity implies that when multiple herds are infected early in an 
outbreak the more aggressive vaccination strategies are the most beneficial.   
The initial incidence density was higher in the scenarios with multiple initially latent 
herds and by week 2 approximately 15 herds had been detected.  The increased incidence would 
require a large number of personnel and resources for tracing, depopulation, disposal, 
disinfecting premises, and vaccination at the beginning of the outbreak.  By week 5 the number 
of newly detected herds ranged from 33 to 44 per week for the populations with multiple initial 
latently infected herds compared to 7 to 8 herds for the scenarios with a single initial latently 
infected herd.  While this study suggests the final distribution of outbreak size may be 
comparable between the initial starting herd populations, the front loaded resource needs of 
multiple initially latent herds may be substantial and could complicate timely control.  
Workforce capacity can limit the method and scale of disease control strategies (Morris et al., 
2002).  The workforce needed for a rapid response in a high density region such as the central 
U.S. is especially a concern.  Additionally, the NAADSM model was constrained by not 
accounting for transmission to livestock beyond the defined 8-state region, and transmission of 
FMD virus that might have originated outside the study population and been re-introduced.  The 
rapid expansion of the outbreak might continue for longer if there were more herds available 
over a wider area.   
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Though the median number of animals vaccinated did not change substantially among the 
three initial latent conditions, multiple latent herds would require an increased supply of vaccine 
and personnel to be available earlier in the outbreak.  If vaccine availability and resources were 
limited early in a FMD outbreak it could negatively impact control.  A study modeling the 
impact of FMD vaccination as a control method in a region of California found that vaccination 
must be implemented quickly in order to have maximum effectiveness (Bates et al., 2003).  
Scenarios 16, 8, 4, and 12 ranked as the best scenarios in terms of outbreak duration and number 
of herds depopulated for all initially latent conditions and all had a large vaccination zone of 50 
km.  A large number of resources and personnel would be needed to set up a large vaccination 
zone around each detected herd.  If this could not be achieved effective control might be 
hampered.  If aggressive vaccination strategies are most beneficial, careful planning to assess the 
resource requirements and ability to provide sufficient resources is necessary.   
While vaccination has been used to successfully stop outbreaks when used in 
combination with depopulation (Leforban and Gerbier, 2002), Ward et al. (2009) found that 
vaccination was not significantly beneficial even with an adequate supply in a high density 
livestock region of Texas.  In the study the ring vaccination was within a radius of 5 km of a 
newly identified infected herd.  In our study, the ring vaccination zone of 10 km found similar 
results.  The baseline scenario which was depopulation without vaccination had an outbreak 
duration as short as or shorter than scenarios with a 10 km vaccination zone.  However, when the 
vaccination zone was 50 km vaccination decreased both the number of herds depopulated and the 
outbreak duration for all initially latent herd populations.   
 Previous FMD simulation model studies had found that when an auction market was the 
index herd the median size of the outbreak increased by 837% compared to randomly selected 
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initial infected herds in a 3-county region in California (Bates et al., 2003).  However in the 
Bates et al. (2003) study there was a 21 day delay in diagnosis compared to this study which 
found that detection occurred earlier when multiple herds were initially latently infected.  In 
Ward et al. (2009) simulation model early detection in the initially infected herd had the largest 
effect on reducing the outbreak duration and the number of herds depopulated to control 
outbreaks.  Based on Ward et al. (2009) results a possible explanation of the shorter outbreak 
duration in this study when multiple herds were initially latent compared to scenarios with a 
single initially latent herd is the earlier detection time. 
FMD simulation models suggest the day of detection is one of the most influential 
parameters (Ward et al., 2009; Boklund et al., 2013).  The NAADSM simulation model 
generates the day of detection for each herd.  The probability of detecting the disease is based on 
the probability of detecting clinical signs in a herd based on the number of days the herd has 
been clinically infected.  Over time the probability of observing clinical signs increases as more 
animals are likely becoming infected in the herd and signs become more obvious.  The 
NAADSM criterion for detection is independent for each herd but based on how long the herd 
has been clinical.  The first day of detection was at approximately day 11 for the scenarios with a 
single large feedlot initial latently infected.  The NAADSM simulation study of an outbreak 
originating from the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Kansas had similar day of 
detection at day 15 of the outbreak (NBAF, 2012).  However in this study when 12 herds were 
initially latent, the first day of detection was approximately day 6.  In this study using NAADSM 
with 12 initially latent herds with an independent probability of detection there is a higher 
probability on each day that one of the herds will be detected.  The scenarios with 12 initially 
latent herds have an earlier first day of detection due to the probability of detecting one of 12 
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herds being greater than when only one herd is initially latent.  Still, the number of herds infected 
at first detection is increased for multiple initially latent starting herds.  The U.K. 2001, the 
Netherlands 2001, and the Japan 2010 FMD outbreaks all took 20 to 21 days to detect the disease 
(Gibbens et al., 2001; Pluimers et al., 2002; Nishiura and Omori, 2010).  The ability to rapidly 
detect a FMD outbreak in the central plains is unknown but in production types that are 
monitored daily for illness such as feedlots the probability of detecting the clinical signs is likely 
higher than cow/calf herds or small ruminants that are out to pasture.   
This study raises a number of questions for future research.  Further research on the day 
to detection, wide spread dissemination of the disease, as well as different vaccination strategies 
could be evaluated.  With early detection, outbreaks dispersed from auction markets may have 
initially increased incidence and resource needs but may have little influence on final outcome; 
however the effect of an unconstrained population geography and potential delayed detection 
may substantively alter this conclusion. 
 References 
Bates, T. W., M. C. Thurmond and T. E. Carpenter, 2001. Direct and indirect contact rates 
among beef, dairy, goat, sheep, and swine herds in three California counties, with 
reference to control of potential foot-and-mouth disease transmission. Am. J. Vet. Res. 
62: 1121-1129. 
Bates, T. W., M. C. Thurmond and T. E. Carpenter, 2003. Results of epidemic simulation 
modeling to evaluate strategies to control an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Am. J. 
Vet. Res. 64: 205-210. 
192 
 
Boklund, A., T. Halasa, L. E. Christiansen and C. Enoe, 2013. Comparing control strategies 
against foot-and-mouth disease: Will vaccination be cost-effective in Denmark? Prev. 
Vet. Med. 111: 206-219. 
Buhnerkempe, M. G., D. A. Grear, K. Portacci, R. S. Miller, J. E. Lombard and C. T. Webb, 
2013. A national-scale picture of U.S. cattle movements obtained from Interstate 
Certificate of Veterinary Inspection data. Prev. Vet. Med. 
Fevre, E. M., B. M. Bronsvoort, K. A. Hamilton and S. Cleaveland, 2006. Animal movements 
and the spread of infectious diseases. Trends Microbiol. 14: 125-131. 
Gibbens, J., J. Wilesmith, C. Sharpe, L. Mansley, E. Michalopoulou, J. Ryan and M. Hudson, 
2001. Descriptive epidemiology of the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in Great 
Britain: the first five months. Vet. Rec. 149: 729-743. 
Halasa, T., P. Willeberg, L. E. Christiansen, A. Boklund, M. AlKhamis, A. Perez and C. Enøe, 
2013. Decisions on control of foot-and-mouth disease informed using model predictions. 
Prev. Vet. Med. 112: 194-202. 
Harvey, N. and A. Reeves. 2010. Model description: North American Animal Disease Spread 
Model 3.2.  
Harvey, N., A. Reeves, M. A. Schoenbaum, F. J. Zagmutt-Vergara, C. Dube, A. E. Hill, B. A. 
Corso, W. B. McNab, C. I. Cartwright and M. D. Salman, 2007. The North American 
Animal Disease Spread Model: a simulation model to assist decision making in 
evaluating animal disease incursions. Prev. Vet. Med. 82: 176-197. 
Holm, S., 1979. A simple sequentially rejective multiple test procedure. Scandinavian journal of 
statistics: 65-70. 
193 
 
Hutber, A. M., R. P. Kitching and E. Pilipcinec, 2006. Predictions for the timing and use of 
culling or vaccination during a foot-and-mouth disease epidemic. Res. Vet. Sci. 81: 31-
36. 
Leforban, Y. and G. Gerbier, 2002. Review of the status of foot and mouth disease and approach 
to control/eradication in Europe and Central Asia. Rev. Sci. Tech. 21: 477-492. 
Mardones, F., A. Perez, J. Sanchez, M. Alkhamis and T. Carpenter, 2010. Parameterization of 
the duration of infection stages of serotype O foot-and-mouth disease virus: an analytical 
review and meta-analysis with application to simulation models. Vet. Rec. 41: 45. 
Marshall, E. S., T. E. Carpenter and C. Thunes, 2009. Results of a survey to estimate cattle 
movements and contact rates among beef herds in California, with reference to the 
potential spread and control of foot-and-mouth disease. J. Am. Vet. Med. Assoc. 235: 
573-579. 
McLaws, M. and C. Ribble, 2007. Description of recent foot and mouth disease outbreaks in 
nonendemic areas: Exploring the relationship between early detection and epidemic size. 
The Canadian Veterinary Journal 48: 1051. 
McReynolds, S. W., M. W. Sanderson, A. Reeves and A.E. Hill. Modeling the impact of 
vaccination control strategies of a foot and mouth disease outbreak in the Central United 
States.  in preparation. 
McReynolds, S. W., M. W. Sanderson, A. Reeves, A. E. Hill, M. Sinclair and M. D. Salman, 
2013. Direct and Indirect contact rates among livestock operations in Colorado and 
Kansas. J. Am. Ved. Med. Assoc. in press. 
Melius, C., A. Robertson and P. Hullinger, 2006. Developing livestock facility type information 
from USDA agricultural census data for use in epidemiological and economic models. 
194 
 
Department of Homeland Security, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-TR 
226008. 
Morris, R. S., R. L. Sanson, M. W. Stern, M. Stevenson and J. W. Wilesmith, 2002. Decision-
support tools for foot and mouth disease control. Rev. Sci. Tech. 21: 557-567. 
Nishiura, H. and R. Omori, 2010. An epidemiological analysis of the foot-and-mouth disease 
epidemic in Miyazaki, Japan, 2010. Transbound Emerg Dis 57: 396-403. 
Pluimers, F. H., A. M. Akkerman, P. van der Wal, A. Dekker and A. Bianchi, 2002. Lessons 
from the foot and mouth disease outbreak in The Netherlands in 2001. Rev. Sci. Tech. 
21: 711-721. 
Reeves, A., 2012 "User's guide for WH: A simulation model of within-unit disease dynamics." 
Colorado State University http://www.naadsm.org/wh (accessed June 17, 2013) 
Reeves, A., M. Talbert, M. D. Salman and A. E. Hill, in preparation "Development of a 
stochastic, individual-based modeling framework for within-unit transmission of highly 
infectious animal diseases. ." in preparation Draft available at: 
http://www.naadsm.org/wh (accessed July 17, 2013) 
Schoenbaum, M. A. and W. T. Disney, 2003. Modeling alternative mitigation strategies for a 
hypothetical outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the United States. Prev. Vet. Med. 58: 
25-52. 
Shirley, M. D. F. and S. P. Rushton, 2005. The impacts of network topology on disease spread. 
Ecol. Complex. 2: 287-299. 
StataCorp. 2011. Stata: Release 12. Statistical Software College Station, TX, StataCorp LP. 
195 
 
Thompson, D., P. Muriel, D. Russell, P. Osborne, A. Bromley, M. Rowland, S. Creigh-Tyte and 
C. Brown, 2002. Economic costs of the foot and mouth disease outbreak in the United 
Kingdom in 2001. Rev. Sci. Tech. 21: 675-685. 
USDA-APHIS, A. a. P. H. I. S. United States Department of Agriculture, 2010. Reference of 
Beef Cow-calf Management Practices in the United States. 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/nahms/beefcowcalf/ (accessed Nov. 14, 2012). 
USDA-GIPSA, United States Department of Agriculture, May 2012. Grain Inspection, Packers 
& Stockyards Administration. 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/livestock_markets/ (accessed Nov 21, 2012). 
Ward, M. P., L. D. Highfield, P. Vongseng and M. Graeme Garner, 2009. Simulation of foot-
and-mouth disease spread within an integrated livestock system in Texas, USA. Prev. 
Vet. Med. 88: 286-297. 
Yang, P. C., R. M. Chu, W. B. Chung and H. T. Sung, 1999. Epidemiological characteristics and 
financial costs of the 1997 foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in Taiwan. Vet. Rec. 145: 
731-734. 
 
 
196 
 
Figure 5-1 - An 8-state outlined region of central U.S. selected for modeling the potential of 
a foot and mouth disease outbreak initiated in a large feedlot in Northeast Colorado 
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Figure 5-2 - The number of iterations included in the analysis by week for scenario 4 
during the Foot and Mouth disease outbreak in the central U.S. 
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Figure 5-3 - Median number of new herds detected as clinically infected by week 
categorized by initially latent condition for a potential foot and mouth disease outbreak in 
the central region of the U.S. for each scenario. 
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a  Baseline scenario with depopulation and no vaccination  
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a The capacity of 5 in herds per day by 22 days after disease detection and 10 herds by 40 days after disease 
detection  
b Vaccination trigger of 10 herds 
c Vaccination zone of 10 km. 
d  Results of scenarios 6, 10, and 14 were similar to scenario 2 
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a The capacity of 5 in herds per day by 22 days after disease detection and 10 herds by 40 days after disease 
detection  
b Vaccination trigger of 10 herds 
c Vaccination zone of 50 km.  
d  Results of scenarios 8 and 16 were similar to scenario 4 
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a The capacity of 5 in herds per day by 22 days after disease detection and 10 herds by 40 days after disease 
detection  
b Vaccination trigger of 100 herds 
c Vaccination zone of 50 km 
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Figure 5-4 - Box plots of outbreak duration in days by initially latent condition of the 9 
simulated scenarios for a potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in the central 
region of the U.S. 
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a Values within initially latent condition with different superscripts are different p<0.05 (adjusted p-value accounting 
for multiple comparisons) for each population of initially latent herds. 
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Figure 5-5 - Box plots of number of herds depopulated by initially latent condition of 9 
simulated scenarios for a potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in the central 
region of the U.S.   
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a Values within initially latent condition with different superscripts are different p<0.05 (adjusted p-value accounting 
for multiple comparisons) for each population of initially latent herds. 
b The box plot parameters are boxes at 25th and 75th percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5th 
and 95th percentiles and dots are outliers.  
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Figure 5-6 - Box plots of the number of animals vaccinated for each initially latent 
condition 9 simulated scenarios for a potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in the 
central region of the U.S. 
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a The box plot parameters are boxes at 25th and 75th percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5th and 
95th percentiles and dots are outliers.  
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Figure 5-7 - Box plots of the number of animals vaccinated for each initially latent 
condition 9 simulated scenarios for a potential foot and mouth disease virus outbreak in the 
central region of the U.S. 
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aThe box plot parameters are boxes at 25th and 75th percentiles, the line in the box is the median, whiskers are 5th and 
95th percentiles and dots are outliers.  
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Table 5.1 - Simulation population of the 8-state region in the central U.S. that was used in 
NAADSM with the number of animals and herds by production type. 
Production Type Animals Herds 
Cow-calf 9,698,630 86,655 
Feedlot-Large (≥3,000 head) 9,147,279      979 
Feedlot-Small (<3,000 head) 7,377,698 25,096 
Dairy 1,062,276     3,232 
Swine-Large (≥1,000 head) 9,227,569      1,071 
Swine-Small (<1,000 head)  663,465    6,463 
Beef-swine mix    520,283    5,159 
Sheep 1,716,028 22,965 
Total 39,413,228 151,620 
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Table 5.2 - Description of vaccination strategy for 9 simulated scenarios that were 
simulated for each of the initially latent populations of a potential foot and mouth disease 
virus outbreak in a central region of the U.S.  
Scenario  Vaccination  
Capacity a 
Vaccination 
Trigger (herds) 
Size of  
Vaccination Zone 
(km) 
1 - - - 
2  5,10 10 10 
4 5,10 10 50 
6 50,80 100 10 
8 50,80 100 50 
10 5,10 100 10 
12 5,10 100 50 
14 50,80 10 10 
16 50,80 10 50 
a  The capacity for vaccination protocols in herds per day by 22 days after disease detection and by 40 days after 
disease detection  
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
The objective of this comprehensive review and research was to determine the impact of 
a possible Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak and impact of control methods in the central 
United States (U.S.).  The economic impact of a FMD outbreak in the U.S. would be devastating 
due to the decrease in production and more importantly the loss of international trade.  In the 
face of a FMD outbreak, well- informed decisions on the best control strategy will need to be 
made.  
Simulation modeling is the only avenue available to study the potential impacts of a 
foreign animal disease introduction and is an essential tool to evaluate control methods.  One 
limitation of epidemiological disease models is that they dependent on accurate estimates of the 
frequency and distance distribution of contacts between livestock operations to estimate disease 
spread.  Prior to the livestock survey of Kansas and Colorado producers, few direct and indirect 
contact rates were available for the central U.S. and simulation models of livestock disease 
outbreaks lacked an essential element to provide valid model results and evaluate alternate 
control methods in this important agriculture region.  The results of the livestock survey reported 
here help to fill that knowledge gap and provide baseline data to guide biosecurity improvements 
for emergency planning during an infectious disease outbreak among livestock as well as provide 
data to parameterize simulation models to evaluate control methods during a possible outbreak.  
This data fills a need for region specific contact rates to provide parameters for modeling a 
foreign animal disease and producing valid results helpful for planning and decision making 
including the relative importance of different control strategies such as biosecurity and 
movement control. 
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The next phase of the research was to use the region specific contact data to parameterize 
the North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM).  In this simulation study of a 
FMD outbreak in the central U.S., scenarios with increased size of the vaccination zone had 
decreased length of the outbreak and number of herds destroyed.  Vaccination trigger and 
vaccination capacity had less of an impact on the outbreak.  A concern with the large vaccination 
zone and the large vaccination capacity are workforce constraints and the feasibility if vaccine 
production and delivery is limited.  Increased vaccine capacity and large vaccination zones both 
will require a large workforce.  However, vaccination requires less time and labor than are 
needed for depopulation and disposal of the carcasses.  In the face of workforce limitations one 
solution is to prioritize the high risk herds for vaccination.  The high contact rates of large 
feedlots and the high density of them in the central U.S. led to them having the highest 
vaccination priority when all production types were vaccinated.   
Further analysis of the scenarios demonstrated that outbreak size and number of herds 
depopulated was sensitive to biosecurity practices and movement controls and to a lesser extent 
indirect contact rates.  The level of biosecurity required to achieve a given probability of 
transmission and the ability to restrict indirect movement consistent with acceptable animal 
welfare is uncertain.  When biosecurity and movement controls were increased, vaccination was 
not beneficial compared to depopulation alone to control the outbreak.  The results of this study 
will provide information about the impacts of disease control protocols which may be useful in 
choosing the optimal control methods to meet the goal of rapid effective control and eradication.   
Auction markets could play a critical role in increasing initial spread of a FMD incursion 
prior to detection.  Since NAADSM currently does not have an explicit way of including auction 
markets, a simulation study on the impact of a FMD outbreak beginning in multiple herds and 
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production types was evaluated.  The day of detection was approximately 5 days earlier when 
multiple herds were initially latent compared to scenarios where a single herd was initially latent.  
The initial incidence of newly detected herds was greater in the scenarios with multiple initially 
latent herds.  However, multiple initial latently infected herds had minimal impact on the median 
outbreak duration, and the total number of herds depopulated and vaccinated when compared to 
scenario results with a single herd initially latently infected.  Due to the greater initial incidence 
of detected herds, the impact on resource needs may be substantial and could complicate timely 
control when there are multiple initially latent herds.  Overall, outbreaks dispersed from auction 
markets may have initially increased incidence and resource needs but may have little influence 
on final outcome.   
Depending on the location of the outbreak, size of the outbreak, timeliness of the 
implementation, the workforce capacity, and the available resources the control strategies will 
vary.  The central U.S. has a high density of livestock with a large number of large feedlots.  
Depopulation of infected herds and herds that have been in contact with infected animals has 
been an essential component of outbreak control methods to reduce transmission of FMDV.  The 
feasibility of depopulating a large feedlot in a timely and efficient manner that minimizes the 
human and animal health concerns is a key question to be answered in considering a 
depopulation program.  An expert Delphi survey and roundtable discussion did not identify a 
clearly acceptable method of rapidly depopulating a large feedlot.  All methods for euthanasia or 
depopulation identified had serious drawbacks.  Participants in the study agreed that regardless 
of the method used for depopulation of cattle in a large feedlot, it would be very difficult to 
complete the task quickly, humanely, and be able to dispose of the carcasses.     
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These studies raise a number of questions for future research.  Further research on the 
control methods, days to detection, and wide spread dissemination of the FMD virus could be 
evaluated.  A better understanding of the biosecurity changes necessary during an outbreak to 
attain these levels is needed.  Additionally, identifying the personnel requirements to achieve 
sufficient levels of biosecurity and movement controls is needed, as well as their impact on 
animal welfare.  An improved knowledge of the biosecurity practices and the ability to achieve 
strict movement controls to limit direct and indirect transmission would allow more focused 
planning of optimal control efforts.  With early detection, outbreaks dispersed from auction 
markets may have initially increased incidence and resource needs but may have little influence 
on final outcome; however the effect of an unconstrained population geography and potential 
delayed detection may substantively alter this conclusion.  Lastly, due to the infeasibility of 
timely depopulating a large feedlot in the face of an outbreak, further research on available 
alternatives for control of FMD in large feedlots is also needed.  
 
